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Abstract 
Many of the stateless children and youth who were born on the Thai side of the border to 
Myanmar parents have not been granted any legal status in either Thailand or Myanmar. 
Thus, they remain stateless. Their lack of human security is morally unacceptable 
especially in a world where cross border activities are natural and human rights are serious 
concerns for the global community. This research analyses the situation of statelessness 
in Thailand, identifies some of the key problems resulting from the lack of citizenship 
and its impact on stateless young adults in areas along the Thailand–Myanmar border. It 
sets out key challenges facing the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in relation to the 
concepts of Thai national security, human rights, and human security with regard to 
stateless young adults of Myanmar parents.  
The research has employed mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods to obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of social facts regarding statelessness in Thailand. The 
research focuses on young adults aged between 18–24 years old who were born and live 
along the Thailand–Myanmar border in Chiang Mai province and Tak province. 
Qualitative methods such as participatory observation, focus group discussions (FGD) 
and in-depth interviews with some stateless youth, parents, teachers, NGO representatives 
and the Thai authorities were conducted in order to identify the problems resulting from 
lack of citizenship and its impact on stateless youth. Quantitative methods such as a set 
of questionnaires were employed to investigate the opinions of Thai respondents towards 
the stateless children and youth in Thailand. 
The qualitative data discuss the causes and the impact of statelessness in Thailand 
concerning the concept of Thai citizenship and the dynamics of the Thai’s national 
security policies towards stateless people. The data also suggest that stateless youth who 
were born in Thailand to migrant parents from Myanmar and who have lived in Thailand 
their whole lives, or at least for more than 10 years, would prefer to remain in Thailand 
and obtain Thai citizenship. During their stay, stateless youth have to negotiate their rights 
with the Thai government through four different aspects of life such as access to education 
and health care service, legal protection and the right to move which are limited by Thai 
law. Moreover, the application process to obtain Thai citizenship is difficult, complex and 
seemingly endless. It requires complicated supporting documentation and depends 
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heavily on the whims of local authorities. Importantly, this application process does not 
guarantee that an application for citizenship will be successful. In addition, the qualitative 
data demonstrate that most Thai respondents support these stateless youth being granted 
Thai citizenship, because they believe that granting Thai citizenship will assist stateless 
youth have more secure lives.  
Finally, the research presents the results followed by policy recommendations from four 
perspectives: the legal perspective, the national security perspective, the human security 
perspective and the perspective of the respondents. The research recommends that the 
Thai state amend its national security policy concerning the stateless youth who live along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border in order to achieve better outcomes for this vulnerable 
group. 
Key words: national security, human rights, human security, citizenship, stateless youth, 
forced migrants, borderlands, Thailand, Myanmar 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research Background and Context  
Stateless children are among the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Hidden in 
the back corners of the world, they are ‘a scattered population of millions of nobodies, 
citizens of nowhere, forgotten or neglected by governments, ignored by census takers’ 
(Mydans 2007). Perhaps the largest stateless population in the world is living in Thailand 
and Malaysia (Chia and Kenny 2012; Spindler 2016). According to Mydans (2007), 
‘many [stateless children] were born in remote areas on the border with Myanmar, and 
lack documents to prove that they, or one of their parents, were born in Thailand’. 
Although there is no reliable statistical evidence on the present number of stateless people 
worldwide, it is believed that Thailand has one of the world’s largest populations of 
stateless persons, numbering approximately two to three and a half million (Voice of 
America 2015; Waas et al. 2015; Rakkanam 2017). The majority comprises over half a 
million so-called ‘hill tribe’ people and ethnic minority groups. Children of illegal 
migrants, especially those from Myanmar, form another major stateless group (UNHCR 
2013a; Voice of America 2015) . 
1.1.1. History of the Thailand–Myanmar Border 
The movement of people has occurred throughout the history of mankind. People 
movement along the Thailand–Myanmar border is part of this phenomenon. These 
migrations originate from economic, social and political motives (Kukathas 2005). 
Thai and Myanmar people moving back and forth across this area occurred before the 
border between these two countries officially existed. The nature of the relationship 
between Thailand and Myanmar is historically rich and complex. This goes back prior to 
the fall of Ayuthaya in 1569 (and again in 1767). In the period of nineteenth century 
imperialism in Southeast Asia, the boundaries of competing power domains resulted from 
negotiation among the colonial powers. In the past, the military power of kings was 
concentrated in the capital as the centre of power, and was weakest at the far periphery of 
the kingdom because, for Thai and Burmese kings, control of manpower and the 
allegiance of vassal provinces were far more important than control of territory. It was 
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thus more prestigious to conquer the centre of power in order to be able to manage people 
and resources, than to occupy the outlying territories  (Chutintharānon and Tun 1995). 
Figure 1.1: Catchment areas of northwest Thailand showing river systems, dams 
and elevation 
 
Source: Carto GIS 2014a, CAP, Australian National University 
 3 
Consequently, people who lived in the far periphery never considered themselves as Thais 
or Burmese because there was no clear idea of which countries occupied which territories. 
Thus they did not strictly belong only to one nation. Given that the Thailand–Myanmar 
border runs for 2,400 kilometres, people living on both sides have been doing their 
business and crossing the frontiers to meet their relatives and family for centuries as part 
of everyday activities. Historically, the boundary of sovereign authority could be defined 
without the agreement or ratification of another country. So both countries left the border 
corridor indeterminate, without including it in either country (Winichakul 1994). 
During the period of colonisation, after the British invaded Burma1 in 1824, the common 
borders among Southeast Asian countries gradually became established. British 
colonialism in Burma and French colonialism in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam ‘forced 
Thailand to accept a new ordering of political space and a new regime of interstate 
relations built upon the principle of territorial sovereignty’ (Battersby 1998, p.474). 
In Siam Mapped (1994), Thongchai Winichakul offers a clear explanation as to why the 
idea of a boundary was different between the British government in Burma and the 
Siamese court.2 The British conquered the southern part of Burma in 1826. They made 
Arakan and Tenasserim provinces British. A British government official, Henry Burney, 
was in Bangkok in late 1825. He requested the court to appoint a high-ranking official to 
negotiate the western frontier of Siam (Winichakul 1994). According to Siam’s point of 
view, the issue was not urgent, because it was not certain at the time that the British would 
defeat the Burmese. The Siamese court simply replied  
...no boundaries could ever be established between the Siamese and the 
Burmese. But the English desire to have these fixed. Let them enquire from 
the old inhabitants residing on the frontier of Mergui, Tavoy and Tenasserim, 
what they know respecting the contiguous territories, and let what they point 
out be the boundaries between the English and Siamese possession (The 
Burney Papers, Vol. 1, p. 154–155, cited in Winichakul 1994, p.64). 
Bangkok had no interest in setting the boundary because this boundary issue only 
mattered for local people, not people in the capital, Bangkok. Moreover, according to 
another response of the Siamese court, the boundary establishment was not an important 
                                                             
1 The term ‘Burma’ is used here for pre-1988 before the country’s official name was changed to 
Myanmar.  
2 The term ‘Siam’ is used here to refer to Thailand pre-1939. 
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concern. This is because the Siamese court believed that the natural boundary already 
existed since ‘the boundaries between the Siamese and Burmese consisted of the tract of 
mountains and forest, which is several miles wide and which could not be said to belong 
to either nation’ (The Burney Papers, Vol. 1, p. 122, cited in Winichakul 1994, p. 64). 
The long stretch of mountains and hills dividing Thailand and Myanmar has served as a 
natural separation line. The Tenasserim Hills or Thiokhao Tanaosi in Thai, are the 
geographical name of a 1,700 km long mountain chain, which is in the northern section 
of both countries along the low-lying Kraburi River that runs along the southern border 
between Thailand and Myanmar. These natural separation lines have been the location 
for peoples of both kingdoms to exchange products and other necessities. Villagers come 
across with their home-grown produce or hand-sewn items. Most of the trade has been 
conducted without any government sanction, except at key trading posts accessible by 
road and to tourists, such as those in Mae Hong Son province, Mae Sot in Tak province 
and Mae Sai in Chiang Rai provinces. 
Although Siam had notions of boundary, they were totally different from those of the 
Western point of view. According to Thongchai Winichakul (1994, p. 75), Siam did not 
lack the terminology and concept of boundary. However, none of these terms, such as 
khobkhet, khetdaen, anakhet, or khopkhanthasima, refers to a boundary line. They simply 
indicate areas, district, frontier and limit without a clear-cut sense of division between the 
two powers. These areas and their surroundings mattered for Siam only when the Siamese 
court was able to control and protect them. ‘A town may or may not have a common 
border connecting it with another town, let alone a line dividing the realms of two towns 
or countries’ (Winichakul 1994, p.75). In addition, the boundaries and guardhouses 
between two or more connecting towns meant nothing since the people on both sides of 
the boundary were allowed to travel or settle freely between the frontier areas 
(Winichakul 1994, p.76).  
However, the use of Western-style political mapping techniques and the emergence of a 
modern Siamese state forced Siam to draw borderlines. As the practice of multiple 
loyalties in a single area is unacceptable in the modern state era, frontier people were 
forced to be included or excluded within clear territorial boundaries. The issue of 
‘belonging’ became more important to state integrity and national security (Toyota 2006, 
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p.6). Eventually, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, or Bangkok Treaty of 1909, between the 
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam was established with the drawing of new 
national boundaries. This currently serves as the legal instrument which demarcates the 
2,400-kilometre long border between Thailand and Myanmar.  
Figure 1.2: Map of Myanmar and its border with Thailand 
 
Source: Carto GIS 2014b, CAP, Australian National University 
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As a result, due to this imposed boundary, many Indigenous peoples were divided into 
different countries. This legal separation ignored traditional cultural and economic 
relations of the people living in-between the nation states. Consequently, ethnic 
minorities along the border areas were arbitrarily split. This separation eventually left a 
legacy of a poorly demarcated land border (Battersby 1998, p.474). Although politically 
the governments in Rangoon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane did not correspond to any 
territorial jurisdiction conferred by international law (Battersby 1998), people from 
different sides of the boundaries have been limited in travelling across the borders since 
the treaty of 1909. Nowadays, ten Thai provinces share the border with Myanmar: Mae 
Hong Son, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Tak, Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Petchaburi, 
Prachuap Khiri Khan, Chumpon and Ranong. 
1.1.2. Thailand’s National Security Policies 
The concept of national security in the Thai context is controversial and has changed over 
time. It is a sensitive concept ‘and one that transcends the boundaries of the kingdom’ 
(Karunan 1997, p.75). Thailand has often had conflicts with neighbouring countries such 
as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The military has often exaggerated this external 
security threat ‘in order to cover up its own involvement [in internal crises] and to provide 
justification for its continued hegemony in Thai politics’ (Karunan 1997, p.75).  
The Thai state’s misuse of the concept of national security has been evident in its history. 
As a result, Thai politics today are dominated by the power struggle between the Thai 
elites, the military-bureaucracy and the capitalist-politicians (Karunan 1997, p.76). In 
1932, the military played a central role in the Siamese revolution to create the modern 
state by ending the absolute monarchy. It was believed that the military acted in the true 
interests of the people. McCargo (2002), Chaloemtiarana (2007) and Farrelly (2013) 
demonstrate that the Thai state’s national security policy gradually changed due to shifts 
in the balance of elite power in Thailand. However, the political power 'moved no farther 
down than to the bureaucracy, civil and military, and the social structure as a whole did 
not change much’ (Chaloemtiarana 2007, p.115). In the Thai context, national security 
discourses are essentially incoherent. They are used to serve the immediate interests of 
the military and defense elite (McCargo 2002, p.55). As one can see from Thai history, 
the military and national security concepts are misused by the Thai political elites to 
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protect their privileges and interests, as well as to maintain their position in the political 
arena, rather than to confront genuine threats to the nation. Essentially, Thai national 
security policies are for domestic control, rather than to confront any external threats. 
Thailand’s military is an armed bureaucracy, which does not fight external wars. It has 
not fought an independence struggle or defended national sovereignty. ‘The pursuit of 
security, as understood from the perspective of the Thai military, has sometimes 
amounted to finding strategies to avoid having to fight anyone’ (McCargo 2002, p.51). 
The military has used various strategies in order to build up its internal power, because 
the development and strengthening of the armed forces and national defense capability in 
safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the state are major policies of Thai national 
security (Office of the National Security Council 2015). 
(1) Thailand’s Coups D’état 
During the Vietnam War era (1962–1975), the Thai military forged a powerful alliance 
with the United States so that it could benefit from American aid and training. Resources 
from the United States ‘helped to bolster the prestige of the armed forces, and also enabled 
senior military officers to build up their own political and economic power bases’ 
(McCargo 2002, p.51). In politics, the military did not hesitate to be a base for staging 
coups d’état. According to Farrelly (2013), Thailand has experienced sporadic military 
interventions, with 12 successful coups and several coup attempts, since the 1932 
revolution (Farrelly 2013, p.281). As McCargo (2002, p. 52) points out, the military has 
‘consistently claimed for themselves high political office (many of Thailand’s prime 
ministers have had a military background), and a share in the running of the country’, 
although it pretends to be supportive of the national interests of the people. 
Farrelly (2013) also agrees with McCargo (2002) in arguing that episodic military 
interventionism, supported by significant and persistent military influence in politics, is 
now part of a distinctive elite coup culture (Farrelly 2013). In other words,  
the persistence of military interventionism in Thai society is explained by the 
links between the army and the palace, by the relative tolerance of Thai 
decision-makers for coups, by relations among economic elites and by the 
consistent support that all governments - even military governments – have 
received from foreign partners (Farrelly 2013, p.293).  
For instance, the 2006 coup d’état by army Commander-in-Chief General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin seized power from the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. This 
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military action was justified primarily on the basis of the Thaksin government’s 
corruption of the democratic process and ‘the stresses and strains imposed as he exploited 
social division for political gain’(Ward 2007, p.1). Moreover, it was believed that military 
intervention may have a positive impact on the deep-south Thailand conflict, where 
Muslim separatist insurgency has occurred since January 2004 (Ward 2007). On the other 
hand, McCargo (2005, p. 499) understands Thai politics during 1973–2001 as ‘network 
monarchy’ because of a strong connection with the palace. For McCargo (2005, p. 499), 
Thaksin’s power declined because ‘he sought to displace network monarchy with new 
networks of his own devising’. Satha-Anand (2007) also argues that as a powerful civilian 
prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra enhanced the government’s strength and legitimacy 
after his electoral victory in 2001. Nevertheless, his style of being a businessman 
combined with politician appeared to be a threat to the country’s traditional powers 
(Satha-Anand 2007, p.186). As a result of the conflict with royalist and elite networks, 
the Thai Rak Thai government was overthrown by the military coup in 2006 (Jory 2011, 
p.557) 
The current military coup launched on 22 May 2014 is seen as an attempt to break down 
the political deadlock between competing elites. At that time, due to the clash between 
protestors and pro-government groups on the streets of Bangkok, civilian government led 
by Yingluck Shinawatra from the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) dissolved the House of 
Representatives in December 2013. A massive political demonstration shut down most 
of the government at the end of 2013. On 7 May 2014, Yingluck Shinawatra was removed 
from office by the Constitutional Court (Independent 2013). Martial law was declared 
before the coup was launched. Coup leader, Army Commander General Prayuth Chan-
ocha, vowed to solve the political deadlock and reform the country. The coup was 
justified on the grounds that it brought back stability and order. It enabled government 
officials to return to their offices, and allowed Bangkok residents to resume their everyday 
activities (Prasirtsuk 2015, p.203). However, after three years in power, the military still 
‘kept tight control, suppressed all opposition and outlawed all debate in order to push 
through a large-scale programme of change’(Baker 2016, p.390). A national election is 
not likely in the foreseeable future. In conclusion, the concept of national security in 
Thailand has been ‘manipulated as a means of securing the privileged political standing 
of the military, and to justify an extension of the military role into a wide range of political 
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arenas’ (McCargo 2002, p.53). This military intervention was performed to address the 
political crisis and halt the street rallies that had become more violent and likely to cause 
deaths and injuries (BBC News 2014). It is likely this latest coup was also a pre-emptive 
strike to ensure that there was no civil unrest at the change of reign which occurred in 
2016.  
(2) The Communist Insurgency in Thailand 
During the Cold War, the military, as defenders of the country against communism, was 
involved in combating the communist threat, both from external and domestic sources 
(Baker 2016). The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), closely aligned with the 
Communist Party of China (CCP), began the armed struggle in Thailand in the 1920’s 
(Bartlett 1973, p.42). At first, the Royal Thai Government was under little pressure to 
counter Communist activities, because the CPT efforts prior to opening of the armed 
struggle did not pose a serious threat. However, in August 1965 the CPT adopted armed 
insurgency and launched operations throughout the country (Karunan 1997, p.63). This 
armed struggle posed an entirely new set of problems for the government. The operative 
laws therefore focused on Communist-like behaviour, considering it ‘posed a threat to the 
nation, its religion, and its monarchy’ (Ettinger 2007, p.663). By 1973 the Thai 
government considered the CPT as a major threat. 
The seriousness of the situation is mirrored in both the size and scope of the 
combat operations being conducted against the Communist guerrillas, and in 
the suspension of the constitution between 17 November 1971 and 15 
December 1972; the latter measure being described as necessary to eliminate 
subversive elements in the government (Bartlett 1973, p.49). 
During the five decades of combating the CPT (1920s–1970s), the Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) employed every possible means including three battles in 1973 
against the hill tribes in the north, the Thai-Lao and Vietnamese of the northeast and 
insurgents in southern Thailand (Bartlett 1973, p.48). During these battles, over 12,000 
Royal Thai Army troops were employed to search out and destroy an estimated 300–500 
Communists. After nearly six weeks, the Thai government announced casualties of 30 
soldiers killed and 100 wounded, while Communist deaths were more than two hundred 
(Bartlett 1973, p.42). 
At that time the Thai government led by General Thanom Kittikachorn and Field Marshal 
Sarit Thanarat (1 January 1958–14 October 1973) was a military dictatorship. After 
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waiting for a promised democratic constitution, demonstrations of around 100,000 
protesters, led by the Thai democratic students, occurred in 1973 to pressure the military 
government to move towards democratic governance. When the government chose to take 
military action in Democracy Boulevard, Thammasat University and Sanam Luang, the 
whole nation went into shock (Ettinger 2007, p.671). The military government was asked 
to step down by King Bhumibol Adulyadej (King Rama IX, 1946–2016) (Ettinger 2007, 
p.671). The demonstration is known nowadays as the popular uprising of 14 October 1973. 
The victory of the Thai democratic student movement brought widespread democratic 
inspiration to Thai people in the brief period of democratic rule between 1973 and 1976 
(Karunan 1997, p.64). During this time, the CPT became popular among radical students 
and professionals, especially in 1975. By 1976 the Thai Government was worried about 
the implications of the fall of Indochina to the Communists. The Thai Right-wing or the 
Red Gaurs (Krating Daeng), was organized and began to circulate anti-Left propaganda. 
Later on in October 1976, demonstrations against Thanom Kittikhachon’s return to the 
country were led by the National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT) which was believed 
to be Thai Left-wing. The conflict between the Thai Right-wing and the leftist leaning 
students broke out when the right-wing groups and border patrol police invaded 
Thammasat University and Sanam Luang ‘and brutally killed many people’ (Satha-Anand 
2002, p.237) early in the morning of 6 October 1976. This event is known as the 
Thammasat University Massacre, or Massacre of 6 October 1976. 
After that event, Thai progressives in academia and politics went into hiding. Fearing for 
their lives, many students fled to the jungle. This group requested to join the CPT against 
the Bangkok government (Ettinger 2007, p.674). As a result, the CPT gained over 3,000 
of Thailand’s brightest and best left-leaning students, teachers, intellectuals, labour 
leaders, politicians, workers and peasants. They joined the People’s Liberation Army of 
the CPT in the jungle (Karunan 1997; Satha-Anand 2007). Ettinger emphasises that this 
was ‘a great leap forward for the CPT’ (Ettinger 2007, p.674). 
In the 1980s, the Royal Thai Government of General Prem Tinsulanonda employed its 
peace-line strategy led by General Chawalit Yongchaiyut and Colonel Han 
Phongsithanon to combat the CPT, which was already a spent force after political changes 
in China following the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976. Prime Ministerial Order No. 
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66/2523, or PMO 66/23, was issued in order to promote broad-based political stability 
for Thailand (Bunbongkarn 2004; Ettinger 2007, p.670). It allowed radicals to emerge 
from the jungles on their own volition and be granted amnesty (Karunan 1997, p.64). By 
1980, there was no further support from mainland China, or Vietnam for the CPT. 
According to Ettinger, ‘the Maoist Communist Party of Thailand did not pretend to go 
away, but it did disappear. No Communist Party meetings were held after 1980 and most 
of its leaders died of old age. Thailand’s defeat of the CPT is complete’ (Ettinger 2007, 
p.677). The ‘communist threat’ is therefore no longer a justification for Thailand’s 
national security policies or military domination of Thailand’s political life. 
(3) The Illegal Drugs Trade 
After the election of the Thaksin-led government in early 2001, Thailand’s national 
security policy changed significantly due to Thaksin’s controversial campaign against the 
illegal drugs trade. Starting on 1 February 2003, the campaign primarily aimed to reduce 
the substantial increase in methamphetamine pills (ya baa) from Myanmar which have 
been widely used by people of all ages throughout the country since the mid-1990s (Head 
2003; Vongchak et al. 2005). The policy focused on major smugglers along the borders, 
especially the spiralling traffic of illicit drugs in areas such as the Golden Triangle, the 
border area of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos, and on small dealers peddling in bars and 
clubs (BBC News 2002; Moodley 2015). This policy had huge effects on Thailand and 
neighbouring countries’ relationships because the government believed that the drug’s 
extensive availability and use throughout Thailand was a result of the increased 
production and trafficking of methamphetamine, predominately from the neighbouring 
country of Myanmar (Vongchak et al. 2005, p.116).  
The war on drugs created tremendous pressure on many segments of Thai society. The 
responsibility on local leaders to produce lists of resident drug users and dealers resulted 
in widespread fear of, and discrimination towards, all drug users (Vongchak et al. 2005, 
p.116). From February to the end of April 2003, governors of all 75 provinces3 nationwide 
were ordered to cut by at least 75 per cent the number of suspected drug dealers on a 
                                                             
3 At the time of the War on Drugs, Thailand had 75 Provinces, before Bueng Kan Province was 
established by the Act Establishing Changwat Bueng Kan, BE 2554 (2011) on 23 March 2011. 
Currently, Thailand consists of 76 Changwat (provinces) and one Maha Nakhon (municipality), 
Bangkok. 
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blacklist. Any governors who failed to reach such targets would be transferred for 
neglecting their duties. To meet the target, the authorities were operating an unofficial 
and illegal ‘shoot to kill’ policy towards suspected dealers (Head 2003; BBC News 2003; 
Chin 2009). 
Figure 1.3: The border area of Myanmar, Thailand and Laos showing the central 
location of the Golden Triangle 
 
Source: Carto GIS 2017, CAP, The Australian National University 
As a result, the campaign caused irrevocable damage to people’s reputation, property and 
lives (Suwannawong, Flynn and Muanmoonchai 2008). The campaign led to allegations, 
illegal searches, beatings, abuse and deaths of highland individuals caused by the general 
belief that ‘hill tribes are involved with the drug trade because of their traditional 
cultivation and use of the opium poppy’ (Minority Rights Group International 2008). 
Approximately 2,500 people died as a result of alleged extrajudicial killings during the 
anti-drugs campaign (Ilchmann 2003; The Economist 2008). This anti-drugs campaign in 
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Thailand attracted widespread condemnation from domestic and international human 
rights groups due to extensive human rights violations (Hayashi et al. 2013). The human 
rights groups were worried about the way that the government was conducting its 
crackdown on drugs and that the government failed to identify or punish any of the 
perpetrators of these crimes (Dabhoiwala 2003; Human Rights Watch 2004) 
(4) Border Conflict between Cambodia and Thailand 
As mentioned above, Thailand has often had conflicts with neighbouring countries. The 
border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, for example, can be traced back many 
centuries. The roots of the Preah Vihear Temple dispute lie not in Cambodia’s ownership 
of Preah Vihear Temple, but that both countries have laid claim to the adjacent 4.6-
square-kilometre piece of land which lies in maps drawn up in 1907 during French 
colonial rule (ABC News 2013a). However, the tension arising from the border dispute 
between Thailand and Cambodia in 2008 is closely associated with Cambodia and Thai 
nationalists, domestic politics and the use of military force to protect sovereignty within 
Thailand’s borders (Croissant and Chambers 2011; Sothirak 2013; Lee 2014). 
In April 2009, soldiers from both sides exchanged fire across the disputed border. Both 
countries have tried to settle their dispute through various approaches, such as a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2000 and a Joint Working Group (JWG) in 
2011. However, the conflict became serious in February 2011when at least eight people 
were killed in several days of fighting (BBC News 2013). With many casualties, property 
damage and the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians during the heavy fighting 
between the two countries, in November 2013, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
interpreted a 1962 ruling that ‘Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the 
promontory of Preah Vihear’ (Koh 2013). Although the situation on the border has 
improved, Sothirak (2013, p. 96) points out that 
…the selection of a preferred settlement mechanism will remain a difficult 
choice. The dispute may drag on for many years as long as the respective 
governments of Cambodia and Thailand remain unable to subdue the forces 
of nationalism and are unwilling to compromise with each other. 
Consequently, the Thai and Cambodian troops were withdrawn from that territory. 
Thailand’s former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra agreed to hold talks with 
Cambodia over the issue by emphasizing that she would protect her country’s interests. 
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‘The government has asked the military4 ... to take care of peace along the border’ (ABC 
News 2013a) as conflict with neighbouring countries is considered a major threat to 
national security. 
(5) Transnational Crimes and International Terrorism 
During 2003–2006, Thailand experienced new forms of threat to its national security as 
a result of the global phenomena of transnational crime and international terrorism. The 
increasingly violent problem in the poorest southern provinces of Thailand is a good 
example of the failure of national security policy and nation-building in Thailand. 
Political violence in the ‘Deep South’ of Thailand today stems from the occupation of the 
Patani Kingdom 5  by Ayutthaya 6  during the eighteenth century, followed by Siam’s 
control since the foundation of the Chakri Dynasty in 1782 (Storey 2008, p.33). Its 
incorporation with the modern Thai nation-state in 1906 occurred after the administrative 
centralisation policy called the Thesaphiban system was introduced by King Rama V 
(1868–1910) (Satha-anand 1993, p.195). 
The majority of people who live in the ‘Deep South’ provinces of Thailand are Malay 
Muslim. The separatist sentiment of local Malay Muslim people has been rising since the 
failure of Thai government policy which in the early twentieth century sought to coerce 
local Malay Muslims to become Thai Muslims.7 Moreover, the government lacks interest 
and investment in the south, resulting in ‘poor governance, maladministration, and 
political and economic marginalization’ of Malay and Thai Muslim people (Storey 2008, 
p.31).  
Violence emerged and continued in the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat for many decades. In late 2001, the violence became a major focus of 
domestic and international concern. In 2002 the Thaksin Shinawatra government 
                                                             
4 Italics added by the researcher. 
5 The Kingdom of Patani consisted of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. It was founded in the mid-
fourteenth century and converted to Islam one hundred years later (Storey 2008, p. 33). 
6 The forerunner of the modern Thai state. 
7 Especially under Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram’s regime, the nation-building program 
was carried on from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to 1957. This program includes its mantra of nation, 
religion and king (i.e. the Thai nation, Buddhism and King Bhumibol Adulyadej). The 
government controlled the Islamic schooling system (pondok or ponoh system), and ‘Bangkok 
tried to alter the demographics of the southern provinces by encouraging and facilitating the 
resettlement of Thai Buddhists from the northeast of the country’ (Storey 2008, pp.33–34). 
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abolished the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) which enabled 
cooperation between local Muslim leaders and government officials. This replacement of 
local military by the police force for security control added significantly to the southern 
conflicts (Kitiyadisai 2008) which intensified following a weapons heist in January 2004 
(McCargo 2010, p.261). Hence, national security policy 2007–2011 has focused on 
internal security and stability. The underlying context of the policy reflects the strong 
perception that Thailand will be confronted with internal and external risks to internal 
security (Office of the National Security Council 2007). 
However, the outcomes have shown that the security strategy worked better when it dealt 
with external rather than internal sources (Chongkittavorn 2012). The political conflicts 
after the 2006 coup remain and manifest themselves in various forms in the country. 
Violence and damage in the southern provinces, mainly caused by political divisions, 
have remained the same. Although on 28 February 2013 in Kuala Lumpur, the Thai 
government signed an agreement to initiate peace talks between the Thai National 
Security Council and Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), one of the major 
separatist groups in southern Thailand, there is still no ceasefire agreement and a political 
settlement is still far away (Engvall 2013). 
(6) Stateless People as a Threat to National Security 
National security policy has impinged on the statelessness of many people living in 
Thailand. The situation of statelessness in Thailand occurred mainly as a result of political 
conflict in Myanmar and the complexity of laws that prevent children obtaining 
citizenship.  
Current ethnic minority people from Myanmar, especially Karen and Shan, have been 
displaced to Thailand due to armed conflict inside Myanmar. It is estimated that today 
nearly 400,000 refugees from Myanmar reside in ten8 refugee camps or in villages along 
the north-western border inside Thailand. Currently more than 30 per cent of 140,000 
people, or approximately 42,000 people, who live in nine UNHCR refugee camps, are 
young people between 10–24 years (Benner et al. 2010). Although temporary shelter 
                                                             
8 The numbers of camps are different in different sources. UNHCR identifies nine camps along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border. This excludes the unofficial Wieng Heng Shan refugee camp in 
Chiang Mai Province due to a small number of refugee residents. 
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areas, a.k.a refugee camps, are difficult places to live, many older people have lived in 
the camps for so long that they can hardly remember their homeland, and thousands of 
new babies have been born in the camps and have never left. According to the number of 
registered refugees, these are 22.1 per cent female and 22.6 per cent male aged younger 
than 17 years living along the Thailand–Myanmar border (UNHCR 2008). Besides, 
approximately 100,000 stateless children live in the border towns of Mae Sot and Ranong 
(Polutan 2012). However, no official data is available to indicate how many children have 
been born in the camps along the Thai side of the border. 
Temporary shelter areas are the only reality that many young children along the Thai side 
have ever experienced.  
They have grown up isolated in a closed setting with little access to the outside 
world with notable systematic aid dependency by receiving shelter, food, 
health services and education from the Thai government and the international 
community (Benner et al. 2010, p.2).  
In the shelter areas, many children and young adults not only live with the absence of 
formal education9, appropriate health care services and job opportunities that can ensure 
young people’s right to a healthy and productive life (Benner et al. 2010, p.2), but they 
also have not been granted any legal status in either Thailand or Myanmar. Thus, they 
remain stateless (Sukkhaphap, Raengngan and Chattiphaa 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 On the other hand, religions such as Burmese Buddhist, Christian or Animists, as traditional 
social norms, strongly influence the daily life, behaviour and informal education of the refugee 
residents (Benner et al. 2010).  
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Figure 1.4: Thai border camps in 199510 
 
Source: Carto GIS 2016a, CAP, Australian National University 
                                                             
10 This map shows refugee villages in 1995 before they were consolidated into nine ‘temporary 
shelters’ as today (Bowles 1998). 
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Thailand’s complex laws obstruct children from obtaining citizenship. They are 
underpinned by reasons of national identity and, importantly, national security (Office of 
the National Security Council 2015). On the Thai government side, official documents 
show that stateless people, as individuals without legal status, are considered a threat to 
national security by the Thai government. According to the Policy Statement of the 
Council of Ministers made by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in 2011, national 
security is intended to 
… resolve the problems of … human trafficking, illegal immigration, illegal 
foreign workers and individuals without legal status by improving preventive 
measures and law enforcement including laws on the prevention and 
suppression of money laundering; ensure fairness and improve surveillance 
so that it does not affect national security11… (Shinawatra 2011, p.10). 
Furthermore, since mid-2006 Thailand has allowed the registration of very few refugees 
in the camps and more than a third of the camp population is currently unregistered 
(Human Rights Watch 2012). Therefore, refugees and stateless children remain in the 
country without legal status, because they are not only ineligible for resettlement and for 
most university scholarships abroad, but also considered by the Thai state to reside 
illegally in the country (Office of the National Security Council 2015; Burma Link 2017). 
The lack of legal status of the Thai and Myanmar migrant children generally means that 
they not only lack access to social support such as health care services and formal 
education, but also that they are not protected by law. They are also prone to being a target 
for violence, abuse and exploitation which includes trafficking.12 In this regard, these 
non-citizen migrants without legal documentation are some of the most marginalised and 
vulnerable people in Thai society. 
There is a growing number of stateless children in Thailand. According to UNHCR 
(2013a: 231), Thai government official data ‘indicate that some 506,200 people were 
deemed to be without a nationality, or stateless, as of 31 December 2011’. Most of the 
stateless people reside in the northern region. Many are members of hill tribes. Others are 
                                                             
11 Italics added by researcher 
12 Violence, abuse and exploitation take various forms such as child labour, child soldiers, child 
trafficking, marriage at an early age and sexual exploitation of children. It is also true, however, 
that some socio-political or economic environments surrounding children drive them to make 
choices that result in violence, abuse and exploitation (Wangsiriphaisan et al. 2010; UNICEF 
Thailand 2017). 
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migrants from Myanmar due to political instability since 1988 and armed ethnic struggles 
in Myanmar. Most of them do not have evidence of Myanmar citizenship, ethnic 
minorities who have registered with civil authorities, previously undocumented 
minorities and displaced persons residing in border camps.  
According to the Thai law, migrants who migrated to Thailand between 3 October 1985 
(B.E. 2528) until 15 September 1999 (B.E. 2542) can register an additional name in the 
household registration and then apply for Thai citizenship, as can migrant children born 
before 1992. In the latter case, they must have proof of their birth in Thailand, like the 
testimony of a midwife or neighbour. This is part of government policy to categorise non-
Thai migrants according to one of the 16 types of identification cards discussed in chapter 
4. 
On the other hand, a large number of people who migrated to Thailand after 15 September 
1999 (B.E. 2542) and some children born after 1992 can only submit an application for 
people without registered legal status. This legal status gives them permission for 
temporary residence in Thailand but they cannot become Thai citizens (UNESCO 2008). 
It is worth noting that during 1997–1998 Asian countries, including Thailand, 
experienced financial crisis. Later in 1999, the Foreign Business Act B.E.2542 (1999) was 
released to limit foreign ownership of certain Thai industries. Only Thai citizens are 
eligible to have majority ownership of these industries, a part of economic security 
(Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 1999). As a result, it has become more difficult for 
migrants to apply for Thai citizenship since then.  
In 2009, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva made it clear that the attempt to enter the 
kingdom by the boat people from Bangladesh and Myanmar (Rohingya) subverted 
Thailand’s national security. The Prime Minister assigned the Ministry of Defence to 
monitor the moves of the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group of the Northern Rakhine State 
of Western Myanmar, because these people intended to make landings along the 
Andaman coast. According to Asia News Monitor (2009a), Thai officials detained these 
people and later forced them back to the ocean without adequate food, water or power for 
the boat engines. They were exposed to human trafficking, and some were killed in the 
jungle in 2015 (Chang 2015; Stoakes 2015). Obviously, this infringed Human Rights 
principles, but the Thai government clarified that the authorities had done their best in 
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accordance with the principles (Asia News Monitor 2009b). In fact, Thai authorities had 
assumed that these people entered the kingdom to seek better lives and were therefore 
economic migrants. They were thought to be likely to commit crimes, if they could not 
find a decent job. The Thai authorities therefore have resorted to ‘every means’ in an 
attempt to shut the door on stateless people including depriving them of the legal status 
of citizenship (The Nation 2013, ABC News 2016). 
In 2013, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) proposed a draft ministerial regulation concerning 
stateless children who live in Thailand (Asian Human Rights Commission 2013). Under 
the regulation, children and adults born in Thailand to non-Thai parents will be deemed 
to have entered and resided in Thailand without permission under the Immigration Act 
B.E. 2522 (1979). Particularly since Thailand’s coup in May 2014, the military 
government has paid more attention to illegal migrants, as it claims that illegal labourers 
are a threat to Thailand. According to the Ministry of Labour, migrant workers in the 
fishing industry which employs a large number of Cambodian and Myanmar migrant 
crews, are an urgent problem that must be solved immediately (Ministry of Labour 2015). 
Due to an attempt to regulate the migrant labour population, Thailand’s junta government 
expects to register all foreign labourers within one year. All undocumented migrants will 
be arrested and deported, if they are found (Hodal 2014). In temporary shelter areas, the 
Thai military government cooperated with the Myanmar government to undertake a 
headcount in the nine refugee camps for a repatriation programme (Fox News 2013). 
In January 2017, Notification of the Ministry of Interior on granting Thai citizenship to 
persons born in the Kingdom of Thailand to alien father and mother in general and 
specific cases was released. This law allows stateless people who have lived in the country 
for more than 15 years to apply for Thai citizenship. However, the conditions for eligible 
applicants are very strict: they must be born in Thailand to parents from ethnic minority 
groups and be registered by the Ministry of Interior; they must have lived in Thailand for 
more than 15 years continuously; or they were born in Thailand to members of foreign 
groups and have graduated from university (Rakkanam 2017). With the strict criteria, 
most stateless adults and youth are ineligible to apply for Thai citizenship and continue 
to be categorised as illegal migrants. Stateless children and youth, who do not have the 
opportunity to go to Thai public schools and attend university, can also be forced to leave 
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the country involuntarily. This will be the case even though they were born in Thailand. 
They have no right to move internally, be citizens, or to stay in Thailand. 
1.2. Research Objectives and Research Questions 
1.2.1. Research Objectives 
The objective of the research is to explore the concept and practice of citizenship related 
to the Thai state’s national security policy and its impact on stateless young adults along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border. This research also explores the opinions of Thai citizens 
to support or not support these stateless young adults to gain Thai citizenship. The 
research has four specific objectives: 
1. To identify the causes of statelessness in Thailand and discuss the impact of 
statelessness on stateless young adults living along the Thailand and Myanmar 
border; 
2. To investigate the Thai state’s management of  the situation of statelessness and 
the dynamics of the Thai state’s national security policies towards young adults 
living along the Thailand and Myanmar border; 
3. To reveal the opinions of Thai citizens to support or not support these stateless 
young adults to gain Thai citizenship and investigate reasons underlying their 
opinions; and 
4. To propose policy recommendations for balancing national security, human rights 
and human security to benefit Thai citizens and young adults along the Thailand–
Myanmar border. 
1.2.2. Research Questions 
Four research questions guide the study:  
1. What are the causes of statelessness in Thailand and the impact of statelessness 
on young adults living along the Thailand and Myanmar border? 
2. How does the Thai state manage the situation of statelessness and what are the 
dynamics of the Thai state’s national security policies towards young adults living 
along the Thailand and Myanmar border? 
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3. What are the opinions of Thai citizens relating to the issue of stateless children 
and young adults? Do they support or not support these children and young adults 
to gain Thai citizenship and why? 
4. How should the Thai state balance its national security, human security and 
human rights obligations for stateless young adults in responding to their right to 
be citizens and to stay in Thailand? 
1.2.3. Research Hypothesis 
The research hypothesis is that stateless youth who were born to migrant parents and have 
lived along the border of Thailand and Myanmar for more than 10 years are more likely 
to prefer to remain in Thailand and obtain Thai citizenship.  
1.3. The Contributions of the Study 
The study aims to make at least four contributions to knowledge. Firstly, the research 
discusses the theory of citizenship in the context of, and its impact on, these stateless 
children and young adults along the Thailand–Myanmar border. There is literature 
available from different disciplines on Myanmar forced migrants and displaced peoples 
along the Thailand–Myanmar border. However, the mainstream study of statelessness, or 
refugees, in Thailand overlooks the existence of stateless children and young adults along 
the border. Unlike general migrants or refugees, stateless children do not receive national 
and international recognition or aid. In some countries, stateless children are born, live 
and die as practically invisible people (Lynch 2008).  In this case, they are stateless 
because of the Thai state’s unwillingness to recognise children of parents who were 
displaced by armed conflict. For instance, a fire accident in refugee camps in Mae Surin, 
Mae Hong Son province, north-west Thailand, on 22 March 2013 was ignored by the Thai 
government (ABC News 2013b). Some people were killed and approximately 100 people 
injured, mostly women, children and the elderly. It may not have been an accident; 
however, the Thai authorities believed that the fire was sparked by an unattended cooking 
flame and did not take immediate action simply because the victims were not considered 
to be Thai citizens (Tan 2013). These issues of citizenship and statelessness will be the 
focus of in-depth investigation. 
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A second contribution is the study’s contemporary applied nature. This research 
investigates the recent situation of stateless children and young adults who were born 
along the Thailand–Myanmar border and who have lived and experienced the difficulty 
of being stateless. In 2015, the government accelerated the repatriation programme with 
a view that all camps would be closed as soon as possible. Initially, the headcount in the 
temporary shelter areas conducted by local Thai authorities raised fears among refugees 
and international concerns that refugees would be forced to return to Myanmar (Sullivan 
2013; Reuters 2014; Naing 2014; Win 2014). The situation changed when the first group 
of 68 Myanmar refugees from Tak and Ratchaburi provinces voluntarily returned to 
Myanmar with the endorsement of the Thai and Myanmar governments (Lefevre 2016). 
Although it is too early to see the long-term consequences, this research aims to help the 
Thai government create suitable national policies and appropriate plans to address the 
current problem of statelessness for these displaced people.  
A third contribution of the study is its multiple complementary perspectives. This study 
elucidates the perspectives of two groups: stateless young adults and the Thai respondents. 
This study bridges an important research gap by considering Thailand as a host country 
taking responsibility for these stateless young adults regarding the right to stay and to be 
granted citizenship. A quantitative questionnaire survey reveals Thai respondents’ 
opinions whether or not they support granting citizenship to these stateless young adults. 
The questionnaire survey is designed to capture not only their answers, but also provide 
an opportunity for Thai respondents to explain important reasons behind their decision. 
The results from this survey help inform policy recommendations on the national policies 
relating to statelessness. 
Finally, this research investigates the Thai Government’s recent policies on national 
security relating to stateless young adults. In 1972, Thailand’s Nationality Act B.E. 2508 
(1965) was radically changed to prioritise the ‘protection and preservation of national 
security’ (Tang 2005, p.163). This research seeks to investigate the reasons underpinning 
this change and attempts to provide an explanation for Thai national security policy 
towards stateless youth who were born and have lived inside the country. The reasons 
behind national security policy will enable us to explore justification for the Thai state’s 
decision. In conclusion, the research aims to suggest a suitable way of balancing national 
security, human rights and human security to encourage the Thai state to amend its 
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nationality law and national security policies by granting citizenship to the stateless youth 
who were born and have lived in Thailand for many years. The research suggests that full 
rights of citizenship will make these youth less vulnerable. 
The research contributes to the knowledge of citizenship, statelessness, national security 
policies of the Thai state and public opinion about stateless youth and the discussion of 
the current situation of stateless youth in Thailand. Stateless young adults along the border 
are able to express their thoughts and the opinions of local Thai citizens are heard. The 
mixed method design provides empirical data with policy suggestions on how the Thai 
government might amend its national security policies. 
1.4. Chapter Outline 
The thesis consists of eight chapters, each of which responds to a separate question of the 
research:  
Chapter One: Introduction provides an insightful discussion of the research context. 
Research questions, research objectives and research contributions are also discussed in 
this chapter. 
Chapter Two: Literature Review provides and discusses previous and contemporary 
studies that are relevant to the research topic. The discussion involves the theory of 
citizenship, existing research on stateless youth along the Thailand–Myanmar border and 
how the research contributes to bridging the research gap on this issue.  
Chapter Three: Research Methodology offers a discussion of the methodology employed 
in the research. It discusses the rationale of the research design used during fieldwork 
data collection. This section not only explains data collection methods, but also discusses 
the techniques employed during participant observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), 
in-depth interviews and the paper questionnaire survey. This chapter also describes the 
target groups for the qualitative and quantitative methods to ensure that data collection 
corresponds with research questions. 
Chapter Four: Becoming Stateless in Thailand responds to the first research question by 
discussing the development of Thai nationality law and identifying the three main reasons 
for people becoming stateless in Thailand, particularly the stateless young adults along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border. 
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Chapter Five: Legalising Statelessness: National Security Policies Towards Stateless 
People in Thailand investigates the dynamics of the Thai state’s national security policies 
and their impact on stateless young adults along the Thailand–Myanmar border. 
Chapter Six: A Life in Waiting: Negotiating Basic Rights Among Stateless Youth in 
Thailand discusses the negotiations for basic rights between stateless youth and the Thai 
government through four different aspects of life: education, health care service, legal 
protection, mobility and restrictions arising from the Thai laws. 
Chapter Seven: The Opinions of Thai Respondents Towards the Stateless Youth in 
Thailand presents the research results from the paper questionnaire survey undertaken 
between November 2014 and April 2015. It also discusses the rationale of the results 
relating to the opinions of Thai citizens towards stateless children along the Thailand–
Myanmar border.  
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations provides the main findings of 
the research and offers policy recommendations on how the Thai state might balance its 
national security, human rights and human security policies for stateless young adults, 
according to the opinions of Thai respondents. 
1.5. Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the research background, research objectives 
and research questions. Moreover, the significance of the study is articulated. The chapter 
also sets out the structure of the thesis. The next chapter will review relevant literature 
that significantly contributes to the research theme. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relating to studies of citizenship and 
global and local statelessness. This literature review begins by highlighting key studies 
of the political and sociological theory of citizenship. It then focuses on ‘statelessness’ 
around the world. In these frameworks, international and national laws play important 
roles in dealing with statelessness. A comprehensive review of studies on statelessness in 
Thailand follows by exploring works focusing on stateless youth refugee lives in 
contemporary shelter areas along the Thailand and Myanmar border. Finally, the notion 
of ‘agency’ to conduct research on youth and the importance of the youth perspective in 
accessing citizenship are discussed. 
2.2. The Negotiation of Citizenship Rights 
‘Citizenship is often seen as a simple question of nationality: people either are, or are not, 
citizens of a given country’ (McCargo 2011, p.833). The concept of citizenship began in 
Ancient Greek political thought. However, it has been described as a ‘momentum 
concept’13 that has been developed in various ways including political and academic 
fields (Lister 2007, p.49). The definition of citizenship, as a member of a political 
community, often comes with legal substance which refers to the special rights and 
obligations that a state invests in its members (Turner 1997; Heywood 2004). The right 
which is fundamentally guaranteed by the status of citizenship is the right to live in a 
country. In this sense, a citizen is then distinguished from aliens, outsiders and foreign 
citizens (Heywood 2004, p.204). 
A classic work on the study of citizenship is that by T.H. Marshall in Citizenship and 
Social Class (1950). Basically citizenship is a principle of equality. It shows that 
citizenship is linked to the capacity to enjoy a set of rights. In Marshall’s model, 
‘citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who 
                                                             
13 John Hoffman explains ‘momentum concepts’ as unfolding concepts that ‘we must 
continuously rework in a way that realises more and more of their egalitarian and anti-
hierarchical potential’ (Hoffman 2004, p.138). 
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enjoy the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed’ (Marshall 1950, p.28).   
A British sociologist, Marshall discusses citizenship in England at the end of the 19th 
century. His version of citizenship relies heavily on ‘the material distribution of power’ 
(Schoettli, 2013, p.27). He divides citizenship into three elements which are civil, 
political and social. He argues that civil rights, which are composed of the rights of 
individual freedom such as ‘liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, 
the right to own property… and the right to justice’ are primary (Marshall 1950, p.28). 
These rights are exercised within civil society and limit the power of government over 
individuals. Political rights, which are about ‘the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector 
of the member of such body’ are secondary (Marshall 1950, p.10). These rights require 
the development of universal suffrage, political equality and democratic government. The 
final elements of Marshall’s model of citizenship are social rights. These rights refer to 
‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the 
right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being 
according to the standard prevailing in the society’ (Marshall 1950, p.11). The rights 
require the development of a state that is responsible for the economic and social life of 
its citizens. Finally, Marshall aims to expand the social rights for the working class to 
integrate into British society and have access to social welfare in the 20th century 
(Schoettli 2013). 
In contrast, sociologist Bryan Turner argues that Marshall’s idea of citizenship is narrow, 
because it is an outcome of his experience in the formerly homogenous society of Britain 
in the 19th century. It does not reflect a modern state with complex ethnic divisions 
(McCargo 2011, p.386). Moreover, from the legal point of view, Marshall’s concept of 
citizenship is unsatifactory because ‘citizenship is an arbitrary or contingent set of rights’ 
that ‘constitute the privileges of social membership’ (Turner 1993, p.498) within a single 
nation-state as the boudary of society. In fact, Marshall’s citizenship is a mixture of 
bourgeois individual rights and democratic collective rights, whilst economic rights are 
absent (Turner 1993). Likewise, Marshall not only ignores the differences between active 
and passive citizenship, but also the relationship between state and individuals is absent 
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(Turner 2001). As a result, the development of his concept of citizenship is not well-
rounded, because it lacks logical coherence (Turner 2001). 
Turner argues that recent socio-economic and political changes and globalisation have 
led to an erosion of citizenship (Turner 1993, 2001). Turner aims to expand the range of 
citizenship rights by re-defining citizenship as  ‘[a] set of practices (juridical, political, 
economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and 
which, as a consequence, shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups’ 
(Turner 1993, p.2). Being considered as a set of practices, citizenship can be seen ‘as a 
powerful sociological tool’ that connects the micro level of ordinary people’s everyday 
lives with the state–society relationship in terms of politics, economics and socio-culture 
in each country (Chang and Turner 2012, p.2). Chang and Turner furthermore propose 
that the progress of citizenship, especially in East Asia, cannot be easily ‘characterised as 
the evolutionary advancement in citizenship rights from civil to political to social 
citizenship as was orginally formulated by T.H. Marshall (1950)’ (Chang and Turner 
2012, p.5). On the other hand, Asian citizens are formed by three contextual conditions 
which are developmental politics, globalisation and the tension between the national unit 
and sociopolitical divisions arising from immigration and ethnic minorities (Chang and 
Turner 2012). It is therefore impossible to study citizenship in Asia without the state, 
because the state–citizen relationship is fundamental in Asia. As Turner suggests,  
[C]itizenship can serve as a powerful analytical strategy for researching East 
Asia. Citizenship studies provide detailed and systematic accounts of the 
state–society relationship and citizens’ status within the national society and 
polity that may be readily communicated to ordinary citizens (Chang and 
Turner 2012, p.4). 
McCargo agrees with Turner’s idea of citizenship in Asia. He suggests that the three 
elements of formal citizenship proposed by Marshall fail to explain the relationship 
between the individual and the state. On the other hand, the legal–rational definition of 
citizenship proposed by Turner is also inadequate to explain the realities of citizenship in 
Thailand (McCargo 2011). 
2.2.1. Thai Citizenship  
McCargo argues that citizenship in Southeast Asia is a complicated issue. It embodies 
both ambiguity and complexity for millions of people in Thailand (McCargo 2011, p.841). 
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Due to the lack of reliable census data and an effective birth registration system, fake 
citizenship papers and identity (ID) cards are widely used by fake citizens and sometimes 
by genuine citizens. This is because in Thailand a person without proper ID papers may 
be subject to harassment, asked to pay bribes and is vulnerable to changing regulations or 
the rotation of individual officials (McCargo 2011). Many ethnic minority groups in 
Northern Thailand, especially hundreds of thousands of stateless Karen people and huge 
numbers of the Myanmar population in Western Thailand have had these experiences. 
Consequently, citizenship for such people is always a question of extensive negotiation 
between individuals and the state. ‘Even Thailand’s most liberal constitution (that of 1997) 
explicitly assigned rights only to citizens: non-citizens had no constitutional rights’ 
(McCargo 2011, p.842). 
McCargo concludes that citizenship is a concept that operates on multiple levels. It is ‘not 
an either/or, but a matter of degree’ (McCargo 2011, p.846). Thai citizenship can be 
considered a result of the negotiation between the state and the individual. There are three 
levels of formal citizenship in Thailand. The first level is full Thai citizenship for those 
who hold formal citizenship and feel completely Thai by embracing Thai-ness. That is, 
they speak Thai without an accent and express their loyalty to the three main Thai national 
elements: the Thai Nation, the Buddhist Religion and the King as the nation which was 
constructed during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V, 1868–1910) 
(Winichakul 1994; McCargo 2011; Connors 2004). The second level is formal citizenship 
for those who hold Thai nationality, but do not share notions of Thai-ness and may suffer 
from Thainess Deficiency Syndrome14 (Tejapira 2009; McCargo 2011). These groups are 
ethnic minority groups in Northern Thailand, Indigenous people, such as the Moken and 
Orang Laut who live along the Andaman soast of southwest Thailand, north of Phanga 
and the Malay Muslims in the deep south of Thailand. The third level refers to paper 
citizens who hold paper citizenship and do not suffer from Thainess Deficiency Syndrome 
(McCargo 2011).  
However, McCargo, whose work is focused mainly on the Southern Thailand conflict, 
fails to mention hundreds of Mon, Shan and Thai Yai people, who were born and have 
lived in the country all their lives, but are not considered either Thai or part of the ethnic 
                                                             
14 Thai citizens who feel uneasy in considering their identity as Thai (Tejapira 2009), and ‘are 
constantly aspiring to increase their own sense of Thai-ness’ (McCargo 2011, p.838). 
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minorities. In the official record, the Thai government considers them from Myanmar, 
although they do not have Myanmar citizenship (Achavanitkul 2011, p.107). 
Traitongyoo (2008) and Hamilton-Coates (2013) theorise that the Thai government 
considers overall non-Thai living in Thailand as migrant labourers. Traitongyoo (2008) 
argues that the idea of Thai nationalism has played a significant role in immigration 
regulation to ensure that ‘the migrants would only serve the purpose of providing labour 
supply to the Thai economy, but do not have the possibility [of staying permanently] in 
Thailand or [integrating] into Thai society’ (Traitongyoo 2008, p.236). As shown in 
Hamilton-Coates’s study (2013), the Thai government implements ‘a differentiated 
citizenship model to keep track of citizens and outsiders using identity documentation’ 
(Hamilton-Coates 2013, p.130). This affects the Tai Yai, or Shan community in Chiang 
Mai. As the Thai government considers Tai Yai people as migrants who cannot acquire 
the full set of citizenship rights, they and their children are prevented from accessing 
citizenship rights and social services. This differentiated citizenship model in Thailand is 
discriminatory in its origins. It aims to prevent non-Thai migrants from accessing the 
rights of Thai citizenship whilst the Thai state can earn benefit from their cheap labour. 
Without access to citizenship and legal protection, they are excluded from participating 
in politics. They become vulnerable and subject to exploitation, violence and debt slavery 
by Thai employers (Hamilton-Coates 2013). However, Traitongyoo (2008) and 
Hamilton-Coates (2013) fail to demonstrate how migrants and Tai Yai people have 
negotiated their status to access public services. Many Shan youth in Chiang Mai can 
access education services and are able to work, which means that negotiation between the 
state and the individual is possible, although they are stateless, as individuals without 
legal status, in Thailand. 
The case of negotiation between the Thai state and non-citizens was investigated by 
Phongsiri and Thongyou (2012). They studied 40,000 displaced Thai who lived in 
Myanmar and crossed the border to Thailand in the 1980s. Without Thai citizenship, their 
lives became difficult, because of the lack of rights to access livelihood assets (Monchai 
and Thongyou 2012). Without political rights, they sought to negotiate their status in Thai 
society by using the concept of ‘father’s home-mother’s homeland’, as political capital 
for negotiation. Finally, they were granted Thai nationality by birth, not by naturalisation, 
according to the Nationality Act (No.5) BE 2555 (2012). Phongsiri and Thongyou (2012) 
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expect that the negotiations will ‘create a social norm that encourages policy makers to 
be aware of people in vulnerable contexts who claim their rights and begin to play an 
active role as citizens’ (Monchai and Thongyou 2012, p.68). Therefore, this case shows 
that it is possible for non-citizens to negotiate with the state to gain Thai citizenship. 
On the other hand, stateless youth have less social capital to engage in collective action 
to develop political capital for negotiating access to social services, because they have 
not yet developed a strong network to support them on the issue. By relying on their own 
personal connections, stateless individuals can, however, access health care services in 
public hospitals, because the Thai public health care system is available to poor Thais and 
non-citizens, such as Shan migrant people, with the help of hospital staff (Seo 2015). 
Thus, their political capital is very weak. Stateless people have to rely on NGOs to handle 
their applications for Thai citizenship, which is resolved only on a case by case basis. 
2.3. De Jure and De Facto Statelessness 
The UNHCR (2013b, p. 1) defines statelessness in the following terms: 
...stateless people are not citizens of the country where they live (or of any 
other country), they are often denied basic rights and access to employment, 
housing, education, health care and pensions. They may not be able to own 
property, open a bank account, get married legally or register the birth of a 
child. Some face long periods of detention, because they cannot prove who 
they are or where they are from (UNHCR 2013b). 
Under this definition, South-East Asian countries contain the largest number of 
unregistered children, more than 24 million (Mydans 2007). This number includes street 
children, child domestic servants, displaced children and refugee children (Humanium 
2013). The status of being unregistered children can lead to the status of statelessness for 
which there are many reasons. UNHCR (2013b) Media Backgrounder: Millions Are 
Stateless, Living in Legal Limbo lists six main reasons for being stateless. They are break-
up of states, complex laws, simple obstacles such as failure or inability to register children 
at birth, discrimination against women and racial and ethnic discrimination (UNHCR 
2013b). These issues are all part of being stateless in Thailand. 
Blitz and Lynch (2011) discuss the problems of marginalised groups and individuals 
without nationality in Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative Study on the Benefits 
of Nationality. The plight of stateless people has sometimes been described as a matter of 
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human security. Although it seems that stateless people are entitled to many human rights 
under international law, in practice they have great difficulty in exercising their rights and 
therefore lead a precarious existence. Moreover, there are innumerable barriers that 
stateless people have to encounter such as  
…the denial of opportunities to: establish a legal residence, travel, work in 
the formal economy, send children to school, access basic health services, 
purchase or own property, vote, hold elected office, and enjoy the protection 
and security of a country. All too often the births, marriages and deaths of 
stateless people are not certified and, as a result, many stateless persons lack 
even basic documentation. This lack of identification means that they are 
often powerless to seek redress through the courts. Significant numbers of 
stateless people therefore face extortion from state and non-state agents as 
well as arbitrary taxation (Blitz and Lynch 2011, p.2). 
Blitz and Lynch focus on a small number of individual states, including Kenya and Sri 
Lanka which have made measurable progress in helping individuals acquire or regain 
citizenship. Their research shows positive developments in these countries, especially 
qualitative differences in the lives of formerly stateless people who benefit from 
citizenship and enjoy a wide range of human rights (Blitz and Lynch 2011).  
In the case of Kenya, for example, Blitz and Lynch indicate that the situation of the 
Nubians has generally positively changed, although some negative aspects remain. The 
positive effects of citizenship are that more people can obtain registration documents and 
passports, which help to facilitate their entry into the labour market, especially in the 
private sector. Negative effects arise at the administrative level where bureaucratic 
barriers undermine the provision of official documents such as birth certificates, identity 
cards and passports. There has been no improved access however to housing rights, 
sanitation, water or education (Blitz and Lynch 2011).  
In Sri Lanka, during the naturalisation campaign in 2003, a total of 190,000 individuals 
were registered as citizens. In addition, the immigration authorities have provided ‘special 
declarations’ to 72,000 de facto stateless persons to acknowledge their status as 
‘Upcountry’ or ‘Plantation Tamil’. The benefits are ‘the right of nationality and the 
provision of national identification documents; greater political participation, including 
the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate in local elections; and improved 
basic rights for their children who now have the right to receive a birth certificate’ (Blitz 
and Lynch 2011). 
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Blitz and Lynch argue that granting citizenship really has improved the situation and 
quality of life for stateless people in the countries they researched. However,  
…there are a multitude of domestic factors that undermine the possibility of 
protection…one of the by-products of weak governance and societal 
discrimination is the fragmentation of citizenship into different classes and 
entitlements that vary greatly, depending on one’s place in the hierarchy of 
privilege (Blitz and Lynch 2011, p.195).  
This is because granting citizenship can only solve the problem of de jure or legally 
enforced statelessness, whilst de facto statelessness receives little attention in the study. 
Granting citizenship to stateless people is one basic element, but domestic dynamics in 
specific countries are a matter of de facto statelessness which needs further consideration. 
Therefore, they also argue that  
... [s]tate responsibility does not end with the granting of citizenship status, as 
important as such action is. Proactive steps to educate officials and stateless 
persons as well as to ensure and enhance protection are required (Blitz and 
Lynch 2011, p.207). 
The problems of de facto statelessness that are rooted ‘in economic inequality, systemic 
discrimination and other forms of injustice’ have not been investigated in this study (Blitz 
and Lynch 2011, p.207).  
De jure and de facto statelessness have been further discussed in Bhabha’s investigation 
of the paradox of the uncertainty of children’s rights to citizenship and their conditional 
proof of legal identity in Children Without a State: A Global Human Rights Challenge 
(2011). Bhabha sets out two important arguments about stateless children. Firstly, his 
argument pertains to de jure or legal statelessness. Children need to have a demonstrable 
legal identity to flourish. ‘Without legal protection, children are left stateless. Their claims 
to citizenship, belonging, protection and inclusion in the community in which they live 
are compromised’ (Bhabha 2011, p. xiii). 
Secondly, Bhabha discusses de facto statelessness. He highlights a problem facing two 
different groups of stateless children. The first group is irregular migrant children who 
‘cannot turn to the state in which they live for protection or assistance,’ although they 
have a nationality (Bhabha 2011, p. xiii). The second group is ‘children who have both a 
nationality and legal status but cannot prove either, typically because their birth is not 
registered’ (Bhabha 2011, p. xiii). This leaves them undocumented, which deprives them 
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of the inability to enforce the rights to which they are entitled. Bhabha also discusses 
effective statelessness in Asia, ‘which is the inability to prove formal nationality and legal 
immigration status despite having both’ (Bhabha 2011, p. 3). These children are ‘living 
within their own countries but [their] birth has never been registered’ (Bhabha 2011, p. 
3). 
To solve the problem of statelessness, Bhabha not only offers a new twenty first century 
notion of citizenship as an entrance ticket to the political/social community, but also a 
more complex approach derived from empirical analysis of each country researched to 
explain the problems and effects on stateless children in order to engage with the diversity 
of interests (Bhabha 2011). While Bhabha seeks to improve the situation for stateless 
children, he agrees that ‘everyone should have the right to citizenship somewhere’ 
(Bhabha 2011, p.30; Gibney 2009, p.50). 
2.3.1. The Stateless Situation in Thailand 
The situation of statelessness in Thailand has occurred as a result of political conflict in 
Myanmar, and the complexity of laws underpinned by concepts of national identity and 
national security.  
The UNESCO Highland Peoples Survey in 2006 (UNESCO 2006) studied a sample of 
192 border villages in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces to determine 
the impact of a person’s legal status (citizenship and birth registration) on access to social 
services, education, health care, land tenure and agricultural credit. According to the study, 
about 30 per cent to 60 per cent of highlanders who reside predominately in the 
mountainous northern region of the country, who are without Thai citizenship have never 
registered (UNESCO 2006). Without official citizenship, 73 per cent of hill tribe people 
are less likely to enter primary school, while 94 per cent are less likely to enter secondary 
school. In terms of health care, 99 per cent of stateless highlanders are less likely to be 
able to access health care. The lack of citizenship has been identified as the greatest risk 
factor for highland girls and women in Thailand to be trafficked or otherwise exploited 
(Calderbank 2008). 
Mika Toyota (2006) also examines the so-called ‘hill tribes’ who are seen by the state as 
an existential internal threat to Thai national identity. He considers both hill tribe and 
foreign workers in identical terms. They are seen as a threat to the Thai societal 
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integration. Hence, the Thai state has constructed the legal division between Thai and 
non-Thai to justify its actions in arresting and deporting a large number of illegal migrants. 
Toyota helps us to understand the national security reasons underpinning the policies of 
the Thai state and the limited quotas available for granting Thai citizenship to the 
minorities who live along the borders (Toyota 2006). 
Although Toyota focuses on identity, he concentrates heavily on the legal perspective, 
while the normal livelihoods of highland people are ignored. These hill tribes are 
perceived as opium cultivators, forest destroyers and illegal migrants. They are threats to 
Thai national identity and security (Toyota 2006). On the other hand, these people and 
their stateless children are considered local people, because they have already assimilated 
with, and become one of, the local Thais. The UNESCO Highland Peoples Survey (2006) 
provides evidence that many migrants have been living in Thailand for a long time, but 
they do not have legal recognition as Thai citizens, because their parents are not included 
in the original census surveys (UNESCO 2006; Calderbank 2008). Moreover, many 
policies relating to their rights have never been translated into these people’s native 
languages. However, their identity as one of the local people has developed and been 
established through their social connections and relationships with local Thai people. In 
fact, the sense of belonging is presented as they consider themselves bonded with Thai 
people and the Thai state. What they lack is actually the rights that come with legal status; 
the rights that are officially guaranteed by the state (UNESCO 2006). This legal 
obstruction, not identity obstruction, inhibits them from accessing public health care 
services, educational facilities, land rights, legal occupation options and freedom of 
mobility (Toyota 2006). 
Nonetheless, gaining citizenship for hill tribe people is extremely difficult. With the 
variety and complexity of laws involved, the legal status of hill tribes fluctuates between 
naturalised, alien and illegal (Fujioka 2002). There is no official census data which tracks 
the number of hill tribe residents, or their citizenship status due to the lack of efficient 
record keeping and the frequent movement of the people. In 2017, 438,821 people have 
been registered as stateless in Thailand, but UNHCR estimates that the total stateless 
population in Thailand is 506,197 people (Dombrowski 2014; Jedsadachaiyut and Al-
jasem 2016; Kneebone 2017). The major group is stateless children. Many families are 
not citizens of Thailand, even though whole generations of families have lived in the same 
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hill tribe village in Thailand and have considered Thailand as their country for a long time. 
This is a result of complex additional regulations of complex laws.15 
The main policy document that prevents hill tribe peoples from obtaining citizenship is 
the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965). Article 7(3) states that ‘anyone born in the Thai 
Kingdom whose parents are alien is not eligible for Thai citizenship and thus has entered 
the Kingdom illegally under the immigration law’ (Nationality Act B.E. 2508 1965, p.2). 
In addition, the procedure to apply for Thai citizenship is a tedious process. Firstly, 
sufficient proof of Thai nationality such as presentation of hospital records, or birth 
certificate is required, but most hill tribe people do not have the proof, because they are 
not born in hospitals. Secondly, errors in completing application forms for citizenship 
often occur, because the form is in official and complicated Thai (Asia Indigenous 
Peoples Pact (AIPP) 2012). Lastly, highland minorities have not been able to obtain 
citizenship ‘partly because of widespread corruption and inefficiency among highland 
village headmen and government officials’ (Minority Rights Group International 2008, p. 
1). 
The consequences of lack of citizenship are extremely severe for those who do not have 
it. Lack of citizenship not only restricts their ability to access public services such as basic 
health care services, education, travel, employment or political representation, but also 
their ability to own land (Oliver 2002). Consequently, they are faced with forced evictions 
and relocation, although ‘they live on land they have cultivated for decades or even longer’ 
(Minority Rights Group International 2008). However, some hill tribes ‘with money can 
always buy nationality cards…[i]t is the peasants who suffer because they don’t have 
enough money [to bribe officials].’ (Sanitsuda 2002, cited in Fujioka 2002, p. 11). Thus 
their life opportunities are limited. 
In terms of refugees, Rangkla (2012) focuses on a group of Karen self-settled refugees, 
who left the refugee camp to live in a Thai border town, and their non-institutional 
approach to protection. His main argument ‘focuses on the informal relations of refuge 
and settlement that occur within this broader borderlands context’ in order to ‘look at 
dialectical relations and mutual understandings enacted between people in the face of 
                                                             
15 These laws refer to the regulations of the Central Registration on Nationality Acquisition, 
under the House Registration Act for Hill Tribe People of 1992 and its 1996 Amendment. 
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adversity and powerful social forces’ (Rangkla 2012, p.3). He agrees that the Thai 
government’s policy toward the Indochinese refugee influxes, including Myanmar 
refugees, was framed by its interpretation of national interests and national security. At 
the same time, however, Thailand’s response to refugees is determined by multiple 
components at local, national and international levels, because the Thai government lacks 
an official policy and legal framework to cope with refugee arrivals (Rangkla 2012). In 
practice, the Thai government’s response to refugees from Myanmar can be characterised 
as providing for refugees’ physical safety, which is sometimes insecure; the Thai 
government does not provide them with universal refugee rights (Rangkla 2012). 
On the other hand, Rangkla does not move beyond refugee resettlement programs. He 
emphasises refugee resettlement to third countries. Statistically, more than 102,000 
Myanmar refugees from Thailand have been able to resettle in third countries16 since 
January 2005 (De Bruijn 2009; UNHCR 2015). Rangkla believes that the resettlement 
program is the only appropriate solution for the refugees, because their place of refuge in 
Thailand could be shut down by Thai authorities at any time. However, Rangkla does 
show that these displaced Karen people prefer to stay longer in Thailand and become Thai 
citizens, because they have developed a sense of being at home in their new place. This 
is because the displaced Karen people have embraced the translocal lifestyle as a way of 
making a living in Thai society (Rangkla 2012). 
2.3.2. Stateless Children and Youth  
The study of stateless children in Thailand has focused primarily on those who were born 
to migrant workers (Caouette, Atchawanitchakun and Pyne 2000; Sukkhaphap, 
Raengngan and Chattiphaa 2006; Yang 2006; Dudley 2011; Pinkaew 2009; Tang 2005; 
Brees 2008; Green, Jacobsen and Pyne 2008; Polutan 2012). In Sexuality, Reproductive 
Health, and Violence: Experiences of Migrants from Burma to Thailand, Caouette, 
Atchawanitchakun and Pyne (2000) investigate the situation of legal and illegal migrant 
workers from Myanmar to Thailand relating to the issues of violence, abuse, sexuality 
and reproductive health. The number of children born to the migrant workers in Thailand 
                                                             
16 Between 2005 and 2014, the main resettlement destinations of Myanmar refugees from 
temporary shelters in Thailand are USA, Australia, Canada, Finland, and Norway (UNHCR 
2015, p.10).  
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is discussed. However, these migrant workers have choices for their children, whether 
they want their children to stay with them, or leave their children with relatives back in 
Myanmar, or along the border. Caouette, Atchawanitchakun and Pyne (2000) show that 
most of the migrant workers leave their children with their relatives back in Myanmar, 
due to the unsanitary and unsafe living environments of migrant workers and the lack of 
educational opportunities (Caouette, Atchawanitchakun and Pyne 2000). Therefore, the 
study of stateless children is ignored due to the fact that there are comparatively few cases 
of stateless children born to migrant workers, and who choose to stay longer in Thailand. 
The recent situation respecting migrant children has changed due to changing social and 
economic conditions. Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia (2012) find in a survey of 
3,387 migrant workers17 that the average stay of a migrant worker is 5.3 years, but 
migrants in Chiang Mai and Tak provinces have stayed longer, approximately 9 years. 
Among married female migrants from Myanmar, 75.5 per cent have a child while in 
Thailand (Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia 2012, p.6). According to Huguet, 
Chamratrithirong and Claudia (2012), there were approximately 377,000 migrant 
children under 18 years of age (11 per cent of the total migrant population). They are 
comprised of 113,000 children of ethnic minorities and 128,000 children of registered 
migrant workers. About 54,000 are children of displaced persons and 82,000 are children 
of unregistered migrants. 
Moreover, the research shows that among them, about 150,000 children were actually 
born in Thailand. Accordingly, they fall under the same category as their parents who 
were not entitled to either long-term residence or citizenship. ‘As there is no provision 
for low-skilled migrant workers in Thailand to bring dependents with them, their children 
are not formally covered by the health-care system’ (Huguet, Chamratrithirong and 
Claudia 2012, pp.5–6) 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 This survey was conducted in 2008 by the Institute for Population and Social Research 
(IPSR), Mahidol University (Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia 2012). 
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Table 2.1: Number of migrant children in Thailand in 2012 
Categories Numbers 
1. Children of ethnic minorities 113,000 
2. Children of registered migrant workers 128,000 
3. Children of displaced persons 54,000 
4. Children of unregistered migrants 82,000 
Total estimated number of migrant children in Thailand in 2012 377,000 
Source: Adapted from Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia (2012) 
Although Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia (2012) show estimated figures of 
migrant workers and their children, they concentrate only on legal and illegal migrant 
workers who live outside the temporary shelter areas. The condition of migrant workers 
is different from the situation of forcibly displaced people from Myanmar living along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border. While migrant workers have choices for their children, 
the forcibly displaced people are left with no choice. They have to keep their children 
with them in the shelters. Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia (2012) fail to notice the 
different condition of children of displaced persons who live in the confined areas and are 
considered as illegal migrants by the Thai authorities, if they are found outside the camps, 
with serious consequences for them. 
Some research has focused on stateless children living in the confined temporary shelter 
areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border (Tang 2005; Huguet and Punpuing 2005; 
Wangsiriphaisan et al. 2010; Chia and Kenny 2012; Seltzer 2013; Carpeño and Feldman 
2015). This statelessness arises from political conflict such as civil war inside Myanmar 
and Thailand’s complex laws. 
Huguet and Punpuing (2005) provide a comprehensive update of migration statistics, 
policies and legislation in Thailand and explore the interrelationship between migration 
and aspects of development including health, the environment, gender, children and 
education. In addition, Huguet and Punpuing address the situation of the refugees in 
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Thailand’s nine border camps from the perspective that the refugees are totally restricted 
with regard to travel and are dependent on external aid. Moreover, migrant children and 
the children of migrant parents are not officially acknowledged. Finally, Huguet and 
Punpuing suggest that the refugees should be provided with more job opportunities to 
become self-sufficient (Huguet and Punpuing 2005).  
Wangsiriphaisan et al (2010) discuss the root causes that drove these children out of their 
original country as well as statistically demonstrate aspects of children’s lives as asylum 
seekers in Mae La shelter, Mae Hong Son shelter and outside the temporary shelter areas. 
Their aim is to reflect the impact of the political and armed conflict in Myanmar on these 
children along the Thailand–Myanmar border, and discuss the protection of displaced 
children in Thailand. According to Wangsiriphaisan et al (2010), children’s identity and 
basic rights such as the children’s rights to survival and access to basic education should 
be protected. Wangsiriphaisan et al focus on legal theory; nonetheless, they fail to discuss 
the actuality of state failure to protect the children. 
None of the displaced children, nor any of the shelter population, is entitled to Thai 
nationality because they were born of illegal migrants on Thai soil. The Thai government 
expects these children to return to Myanmar in the future (Wangsiriphaisan et al. 2010). 
The protection of these children’s rights and the implementation of the laws and 
regulations regarding their well-being are insufficient. The scenario of these children 
deciding to stay longer in Thailand after the end of the conflicts is not taken into account.  
Chia and Kenny (2012), Seltzer (2013), Ball and Moselle (2015) and Carpeño and 
Feldman (2015) confirm that children and youth who were born and grew up in temporary 
camps are stateless. Chia and Kenny (2012) show that the situation for Myanmar children 
is of particular concern. Nearly 140,000 refugees from Myanmar live in refugee camps in 
the countryside around Mae Sot, Tak province. However, an estimated number of the 
displaced children is not mentioned. Chia and Kenny only state that ‘there are numerous 
young adults who have lived their whole life within a camp, who have no immediate 
prospect of life outside the camp, either in Thailand or in a third country’ (Chia and Kenny 
2012, p.839). 
Some children are born in the refugee camps. Others cross the border with 
their families or on their own to escape the ethnic conflicts or due to the threat 
of conscription into the armed forces or forced labour. Other children cross 
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the border to join family members or to escape poverty and social deprivation 
and, in some cases, in search of an education they cannot find in their native 
state. Others are trafficked across the border for use in sex work and as 
beggars (Chia and Kenny 2012, p.841). 
Chia and Kenny (2012) express their concerns about stateless children by focusing on 
issues in the international regulation of migration such as economic, social and cultural 
rights; the right to work; the right to seek asylum and protection from trafficking and 
smuggling. The international community is very concerned about the situation of 
statelessness in Thailand, and calls for better treatment of stateless persons because 
Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, its 1967 
Protocol, and the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions. Moreover, Thailand does not 
have domestic laws related to asylum, refugees and stateless people (Chia and Kenny 
2012; Werret 2014). According to Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 
approximately 40 per cent of camp residents were unregistered in the Thai Government’s 
census in late May 2011(IRIN News 2011a). It means that they cannot access the health 
care service, education and other services that are available to registered residents. This 
also reflects on children living in the camps, especially in Mae Sot, which is well-known 
for its black market, including illicit drugs and people trafficking (Chia and Kenny 2012).  
However, Juaseekoon (2009) and Tan (2012) explain that the situation of statelessness in 
Thailand has changed due to Thailand’s revised Civil Registration Act in 2008 which 
provides all children born in Thailand with the right to registration at birth, including 
stateless children (Juaseekoon 2009). For example, under Thailand’s amended Civil 
Registration Act 2008, some 5,000 refugee babies in the nine refugee camps had received 
birth certificates by 2012 (Tan 2012). Consequently, there has been a dramatic rise in the 
issuance of birth certificates, from 50 per cent in 2011, to almost 70 per cent in 2012 
(UNHCR 2012; Tan 2012; Rapoport 2015). Although birth registration does not confer 
nationality upon a refugee child, this legal record of where a refugee was born and who 
his or her parents are ‘is a key way to prove if someone can acquire nationality when he 
or she can eventually return home’ (Tan 2012). 
Chia and Kenny (2012) investigate only the regional law, for instance the 1966 Bangkok 
Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees (a.k.a. ‘Bangkok Principles’) as a 
regional solution to refugees and statelessness. Moreover, they focus on regional 
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cooperation such as the refugee resettlement programme without realising that these 
children may decide to live in Thailand.  
Although Thailand is a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the 
government prior to 2008 ignored the responsibility to register children born to refugee 
parents (Seltzer 2013). As a result, children who were born to refugees in the camps in 
Thailand are viewed as illegal aliens rather than citizens of the country. At the same time, 
the government in Myanmar does not grant citizenship to these children due to the fact 
that their parents left the country illegally. Consequently, ‘many of the children [become] 
stateless and live their lives in limbo’ (Seltzer 2013, p.287).  
Seltzer states: 
…individual nationality laws may cause children born to refugees to become 
stateless. This lack of citizenship or nationality in any country reduces 
educational opportunities for children as they grow older, making them less 
able to support themselves through legal channels. In effect, risky migration 
tactics become one of the only ways out of their otherwise measly prospects. 
Perhaps the greatest risk, as mentioned above, is forceful recruitment by 
armed militias (Seltzer 2013, p. 281). 
Finally, Seltzer suggests that Thailand should have a refugee policy that is based on 
international law (Seltzer 2013). His recommendation includes the principle of non-
refoulement and assurance of a safe return to Myanmar on a wholly voluntary basis 
(Seltzer 2013). Moreover, he argues that children born in Thailand to Myanmar parents 
must be registered at birth by the Thai government, and must be given equal access to 
education regardless of whether they are Thai or Myanmar children (Seltzer 2013). 
Seltzer urges that ‘Thailand should put in place programs that allow trafficking victims 
who cannot safely return to Myanmar to stay in the country permanently, or until 
conditions permit safe repatriation’ (Seltzer 2013, p. 209). He fails to suggest what status 
or mechanism should be employed by the Thai government to ensure that the children 
will be able to stay in the country willingly, safely, freely and permanently, with equal 
status, treatment, dignity and rights as citizens of the state. 
Ball and Moselle (2015) focus on the livelihoods of forced migrant children living in the 
transnational borderland between Myanmar and Thailand. Migrant Myanmar children 
living in Thailand do not have identity documentation, social protection, mobility rights, 
or access to proper education. Their living conditions have limited their development and 
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potential. Ball and Moselle (2015) understand that these young people, who originated 
from Myanmar, ‘have been institutionally minoritised and politically excluded within 
Myanmar’ for the past several decades (Ball and Moselle 2015, p.434). For forced 
migrant Myanmar children, the problem of identity documentation may be solved with 
the help of organisations operated by Myanmar migrants for the migrant community. 
They ‘try to help children to acquire Myanmar identity documents’(Ball and Moselle 
2015, p.429).  
On the other hand, Ball and Moselle mention, but do not focus on, those young people 
who were born in Thailand, but do not have refugee status and are unable to be repatriated 
or resettled. For various reasons, their identity documentation cannot be re-issued. Their 
stateless status prevents their freedom of movement, access to education and legal 
employment (Ball and Moselle 2015). 
Carpeño and Feldman (2015) examine educational opportunities for young people who 
live in the borderland between Myanmar and Thailand. The refugees have access to 
human resources which improve education in the camps. Young people in the camp ‘have 
demonstrated their will to make the most of every opportunity they have’ (Carpeño and 
Feldman 2015, p.422), but there are several obstacles that reduce the quality of education 
in the camp. The Thai government does not support refugee education. The teacher 
turnover rate is high and quality of teaching is poor because training is limited. Moreover, 
internet access and technology are restricted, which make online courses very difficult 
for young adult refugees in the camps. Therefore, they lack motivation to study. 
Eventually, they are forced to leave school early to find a job and earn a little money.  
Carpeño and Feldman (2015) pay significant attention to education as it plays a key role 
in helping refugee children and young people to be ‘empowered actors in their own 
development’ (Carpeño and Feldman 2015, p.421). On the other hand, Carpeño and 
Feldman (2015) do not discuss the problem of statelessness which prevents these young 
adults obtaining access to proper educational opportunities.  
2.4. Thai Public Opinion  
Thai public opinion has been studied from many aspects, mostly related to political issues 
such as public opinion and political power  in Thailand (Albritton and Bureekul 2007) 
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and public satisfaction about the government’s performance (Holmes 2015; The 
Australian 2016); and national infrastructure and economic policies that affect local 
people’s lives, such as revision of Thailand’s proposed Mae Wong Dam construction 
whose benefits are unlikely to outweigh environmental costs (IUCN Secretariat 2015; 
Sueb Nakhasathien Foundation 2012). These is limited research studying the Thai 
perspective on stateless people living in Thailand. 
Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa’s work on Perception and Misperception: on Refugees and 
Migrants from Myanmar (2012) and The Survey of Thai Public Opinion toward Myanmar 
Refugees and Migrant Workers: An Overview (2014) touch on the issue of Thai public 
opinion towards non-Thai citizens. Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa conducted a survey of 
2,000 respondents from the general population and community leaders  living in the  four  
border  provinces  of  Mae  Hong  Son,  Tak,  Kanchanaburi  and Ratchaburi.  They 
discuss the Thai perspective on migrants and refugees, based on several issues such as 
personal safety, health service, job competition and the consumption of natural  resources 
(Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2012, 2014). They argue that many Thais have 
misperceptions and prejudices towards Myanmar refugees and migrants, especially 
irregular migrants, though Thai society still needs their labour. They asked participants if 
permanent residency (PR) and Thai citizenship should be granted to stateless persons. 
The total result showed that only 18.2 per cent of overall participants agreed to grant PR 
to those who have lived in Thailand for 10 years or more. In contrast, over half of the 
respondents (57.0 per cent) agreed to grant Thai citizenship to stateless persons 
(Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2014). 
However, their research is based on the opinions only of villagers and community leaders 
living in the Thai border provinces. Although their respondents are more familiar with 
the situation of refugees and migrant workers from Myanmar than those who live far from 
the border areas, they do not support the granting of permanent residency status to 
refugees and migrants. On the other hand, they have a different perspective on granting 
Thai citizenship to stateless persons. Therefore, the question has been raised whether 
there are any differences between Thai respondents nationwide. As Thailand is facing 
human rights challenges concerning stateless children and youth who were born in 
Thailand and have lived outside the refugee camps, it is important to know what Thai 
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respondents in general think about granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth and the 
reasons behind their decision.  
Finally, Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa suggest that Thai society requires training programs 
for media officials and public agencies to understand and provide balanced views of 
refugees and migrants (Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2012; Richter et al. 2012). They 
suggest that the Thai government should develop a comprehensive policy for refugees 
and migrants living in Thailand. For stateless children who live outside the camps, they 
emphasise local integration and encourage the Thai government to promote a 
multicultural policy to create a ‘more inclusive society where people of different ethnic 
origins can live and work together’ (Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2014, p.41). They do not 
mention the amendment to the nationality law which has a direct impact on stateless 
people. 
2.5. The Agency of Youth 
The research on children and youth discussed above has been done from the perspective 
that the children and youth are passive objects of adult instruction (Hart 2014).  On the 
other hand, Jampaklay (2011) suggests that ‘an important element in understanding the 
effects … on children is the perspective of the children themselves’ (Jampaklay 2011, 
p.103). Thus, further research on children’s perspectives is needed, especially in dealing 
with children and youth as agency. This helps the researcher to understand ‘how children 
improve their own well-being, take charge of their lives, create ways of coping with the 
absence of their parents, while keeping the family together at the same time’ (Jampaklay 
2011, p.103). 
Oswell (2013) provides significant research on the sociology of children. He argues that 
since the late 1980s the study of children has shifted from considering children as 
incomplete adults whose ‘caricatures [are] predicated on adult fantasies and projections’ 
to considering children as people who have value in their own rights (Oswell 2013). 
Oswell also agrees with James and Prout (1990) who recognise the importance of youth 
as ‘active in the construction and determination of their own social lives’ (James and 
Prout 1990). White and Choudhury (2007) suggest that the youth are ‘agents’ who are 
‘the holders of rights which must be respected’ (White and Choudhury 2007, p.540). 
Moreover, Redmond (2009) presents the idea of children as actors who have choice, and 
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who engage in actions that show some awareness of his or her actions in respect to others 
(Giddens 1984, p.90; Redmond 2009, p.55).  
Agency is not free. Therefore, we cannot understand youth’s agency alone, because it is 
situated in a ‘structure’ or context of social and economic constraint, and ‘in the context 
of dependence on, and submission to, the authority of adults’ (Redmond 2009). Oswell 
(2014) argues that 
[Children] are all born, and they are all born into structural relations not of 
their choosing. In that sense, the sociologists of childhood argue that children 
are necessarily born into the structural relations of childhood, into childhood 
as a structural form. The exact nature of that structural form, it is argued, may 
vary from society to society and across historical time, but the form itself is a 
constant (Oswell 2013, p.44). 
Giddens calls agency’s constraint a duality of structure; that is, the dialectical relation 
between structure and agency. In fact, the structure is not external to individuals, but 
structure and agency are actually two sides of the same coin which shape each other 
(Oswell 2013). To understand agency, Giddens suggests knowledge and reflexivity 
(Giddens 1984). Every social actor is knowledgeable about the social system of which 
they are a member, whilst, at the same time, they ‘concern the reflexive monitoring or 
rationalisation of action’ (Oswell 2013, p. 48). As a result, some children’s agency can 
be sanctioned or encouraged as positive actions by their social system, but some agency 
can also be seen as a rebellion against authorities or adults as negative actions (Redmond 
2009). 
Hart (2014) employs the notion of agency and age position to conduct research on 
reproductive health with refugee adolescents. Hart confirms that the notion of agency 
helps to ‘comprehend the particular needs and challenges of individuals while age helps 
to ‘make sense of the differential impact of larger historical processes’ (Hart 2014, p. 
230). The different ages of participants result in a different outcome. For example, while 
a 12-year-old refugee boy may concentrate only on schoolwork, sport and music, an 18-
year-old young man may be looking towards the prospects of attaining social adulthood 
in order to broaden his social, economic and political environment as well as awareness 
of societal expectations (Hart 2014). Finally, Hart recommends governments and 
humanitarian agencies take the refugee’s age, position and agency into account in 
engaging with a long-term solution for refugees. 
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Yarris and Castañeda (2015) distinguish ‘involuntary refugees’ from ‘economic migrants’ 
by using the idea of agency among two generations of Karen refugees who have resettled 
in California. The first older-generation Karen refugees have direct experience of political 
violence and displacement in Myanmar. They have been ‘on the run’ to the Thailand–
Myanmar refugee camp (Yarris and Castañeda 2015). The second younger generation 
Karen move to the camps because of their parents’ decision to seek a better life and better 
education. Some were born in refugee camps in Thailand. Both generations of refugees 
exert agency throughout their experiences of exile and displacement (Yarris and 
Castañeda 2015). On the one hand, the older generation is considered ‘involuntary 
refugees’ because they stay in refugee camps strategically for both physical safety and 
economic opportunity. They can travel across the border to financially support their 
family members in Myanmar (Yarris and Castañeda 2015). On the other hand, the 
younger generation is actually ‘economic migrants’ because they exert agency through 
their resettlement in the US, in order to pursue educational opportunities and their hopes 
for economic improvement in the future (Yarris and Castañeda 2015). 
Ball and Moselle (2016) challenge the view of migration scholars that generally 
‘children’s identity and aspirations are understood only through adult-lenses’ (Ball and 
Moselle 2016, p.120). They explored the capacity to make decisions of forced migrant 
youth from Myanmar aged between 12 and 17 years old who live in temporary shelters 
along the Thailand-Myanmar border by ‘listening to children in planning for their post-
migration social protection and normalization as citizens’ (Ball and Moselle 2016, p.120). 
These youth living in Mae Sot hope to have their lack of permanent residence resolved 
soon. Few youth expressed interest in going to a specific state (Ball and Moselle 2016, 
p.118). However, most youth are left out of the decision-making processes. Ball and 
Moselle (2016) challenge migration scholars to conduct research that focuses on and 
amplifies forced migrant youth’s self-articulated identities, capabilities and preferences. 
Forced migrant children’s voices, agencies and subjectivities must be heard in order to 
resolve their status as displaced and stateless persons (Ball and Moselle 2016). 
Putting young peoples’ perspective at the centre as actor or agency, one in the refugee 
camp, the other in the resettlement setting, enables refugee young people to express their 
thoughts and reveal their special requests. However, research from the perspective of 
stateless refugee youth is limited. The idea of agency is employed in the question of 
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resettlement, but not citizenship. Nonetheless, the question can be asked whether the 
stateless refugee young people exert their agencies through their request to stay in a host 
country such as Thailand and acquire Thai citizenship.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed various theories of citizenship relevant to the study of 
statelessness in Thailand.  While the concept of citizenship has been discussed since 
Ancient Greek political thought, T.H. Marshall links citizenship with the capacity to 
enjoy a set of rights. However, Turner argues that Marshall’s idea of citizenship is too 
narrow, so he expanded a range of citizenship rights by identifying citizenship as a set of 
practices, a result of socio-economic and political changes and globalisation in Asia. 
McCargo, on the other hand, argues that the concept of citizenship operates on multiple 
levels, especially citizenship in Thailand. He concludes that citizenship is a negotiation 
between individuals and the state.  
Most studies on stateless children mentioned in this chapter make suggestions on 
international and regional law, international and regional relief agencies and NGOs. 
However, some research pays attention to stateless children and youth, as agencies who 
have a right to choose to stay and to acquire the citizenship of the state18 where they were 
born (Doek 2006). Their perspective on how to tackle the problem is very important. No 
research suggests that the Thai government take serious action on the reduction of 
statelessness and grant citizenship to its stateless population. This research aims to bridge 
this gap by providing the stateless youth perspective. It will provide policy 
recommendations for the Thai government to balance its approach to national security, 
human rights and human security for stateless young adults, based on the perspectives of 
both the stateless youth and Thai respondents. 
                                                             
18 As it says in Article 7 in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989, p.3) that… 
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance 
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
stateless.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodologies 
3.1. Overall Research Method 
This research employs a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods research design for 
data collection. According to Morse (2003), mixed methods enable the researcher to have 
the ability to obtain a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of the social facts. 
This is because the combination of qualitative and quantitative data provides a better 
understanding of research problems compared to either approach alone (Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2007; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006; Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009). 
Mixed methods integrate qualitative and quantitative research strategies in data collection, 
interpretation and analysis of the same phenomenon (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009).  
Jones and Woolcock (2007) have also emphasised that by integrating mixed qualitative 
and quantitative strategies in doing social research, the researcher will gain a clearer and 
better understanding of the social and community context. The findings of research using 
mixed qualitative and quantitative methods can be used as a ‘source of empowerment, 
enabling better understanding of the present and potentially new visions for the future’ 
(Jones and Woolcock 2007). The researcher will use mixed method techniques to enhance 
the validity and reliability of research data. 
However, the major method used in this study is qualitative methodology in which 
quantitative methodology is applied to support the qualitative examination. More 
specifically, the qualitative method is used to answer the first, second and fourth research 
questions, which investigate the situation of the stateless young adults. The quantitative 
method is used to respond to the third research question, which investigates Thai 
respondents’ opinions to support or not support these stateless young adults to gain Thai 
citizenship and reasons underlying their opinions. 
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the research methodology  
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Data interpretation 
Source: Developed by Ladawan Khaikham, 2015 
3.2. Justification of the Fieldwork Sites 
The sites for the fieldwork have been selected based on accessibility, safety and 
population due to the need for a number of different types of data. The fieldwork was 
conducted in three different parts of Thailand with a variety of data collection techniques. 
Research locations are the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), Chiang Mai province 
and Tak province, where there are NGOs and stateless population who live along the 
Thailand–Myanmar border.  
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Figure 3.2: Map of the fieldwork sites in Thailand 
 
Source: Adapted from Carto GIS 2015, CAP, Australian National University  
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3.2.1. Thailand and Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) 
Statistically, Thailand has been hosting more than 400,000 stateless persons who have 
never registered as Thai citizens, because of legislative changes and the lack of legal 
knowledge of both local people and government officials (Park, Tanagho and Weicher 
2009; UNHCR 2016). Among Southeast Asian countries in the second half of the 
twentieth century, Thailand experienced the most significant migration and refugee 
arrivals. These refugees include Chinese, Indochinese, Laotians, Cambodians, 
Vietnamese and Myanmar refugees. They moved to Thailand because of its geographic 
position at the centre of the Greater Mekong Subregion. Thailand’s relative economic 
growth and stability made the country attractive as a primary destination for migrants in 
Southeast Asia. However, the pattern of immigration across international borders to 
Thailand changed significantly after the Cold-War era. The displaced persons in the 
second half of the twentieth century fled to Thailand because of genocide or civil war 
within their own countries, but current migrants flee to urban areas for a variety of reasons 
especially economic reasons (Shum 2014). Furthermore, Thailand hosts 1.3 million 
migrant workers from neighbouring countries, for example Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Laos (Nawarat 2012). This number is increasing because of bilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) on Cooperation in Employment of Workers, signed between 
Thailand and neighbouring countries and past cabinet resolutions of the Thai government. 
These allow undocumented migrants to obtain temporary work permits. The Thai 
government offers legal channels which encourage migrant workers to move to Thailand, 
although they are low-skilled cheap labourers (Palmgren 2014). This system of regulating 
migrant workers will continue among South East Asian countries ‘as ASEAN pursues its 
attempts to establish an interlinked and economically vital regional community’ 
(Palmgren 2014, p. 3). 
Bangkok has been selected as one of the fieldwork sites, because it is the capital city of 
Thailand and home of Thailand’s government and political institutions. The Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR) refers to the urban regions surrounding the Bangkok 
Metropolis which includes the five adjacent provinces of Nakhon Pathom, Pathum Thani, 
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Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon. In total, the BMR covers an area of 
7,761.50 square kilometres with approximately 10 million registered residents.19  
Furthermore, the population in Bangkok is considered well-educated and has powerful 
political networks. It is able to influence important acts of the government. Political unrest 
in Bangkok between December 2013 and May 2014 showed that urban Bangkok residents 
were able to disrupt the government institutions and offices with massive demonstrations. 
The incidents resulted in the declaration of martial law by the Thai army on 20 May 2014, 
just before the twelfth military coup (BBC News 2014). This large, influential population 
helped increase the number of respondents to the questionnaire survey and contributed to 
a variety of questionnaire answers. As in Chapter 7, the well-educated citizens of 
Bangkok were interested in contributing to the survey. Their responses also showed the 
variety of their opinions. 
Moreover, with a growing economy and relatively high opportunities for employment, 
the BMR attracts a large, diverse population which includes 36.40 per cent of foreign 
workers (9 per cent in Bangkok and 27.40 per cent in the BMR), as well as an unidentified 
but significant number of urban refugees and asylum seekers as irregular and illegal 
migrants in Thailand (Office of Foreign Workers Administration 2014; Palmgren 2014). 
The BMR’s population diversity has thus contributed to the variety of data available for 
this research.  
3.2.2. Chiang Mai Province 
Chiang Mai province has been selected because it has the second largest number of 
stateless persons with about 35,000 such people, according to the Faculty of Law, 
Thammasat University (Thairath Online 2015). Due to its mountainous location, Chiang 
Mai province also has the largest number of hill tribe people and Indigenous people who 
lack a sense of national identity and citizenship. According to the Bureau of Registration 
Administration (BORA), Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, 
                                                             
19 According to the Department of City Planning of Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, in 
2014, Bangkok and its region consisted of 10,376,753 registered residents; there are 5,674,843 
in Bangkok; and 4,701,910 in the five Metropolitan Regions (Department of City Planning 
2011). 
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in 2011 Chiang Mai had approximately 57,000 Indigenous adults together with their 
children, around 17,000 persons (Achavanitkul 2011, p.109).  
Table 3.1: Five provinces which have the most stateless people 
Provinces people20 
1. Chiang Rai Province  53,000 
2. Chiang Mai Province  35,000 
3. Tak Province  31,000 
4. Kanchanaburi Province  25,000 
5. Mae Hong Son Province 10,000 
Total21 154,000 
Source: Achavanitkul 2011; Thairath Online 2015 
The majority of the first-generation of hill tribe people has obtained Thai identity 
certificates. However authorities are cautious about granting Thai identity to newly 
arrived hill tribes, because Indigenous people and highland communities have often been 
associated with forest destruction, narcotics and national security issues such as political 
infiltration and insurgency (Fujioka 2002). Besides the difficulty in providing assistance 
to remote and scattered highland communities, cultural misunderstandings and 
communication barriers with people speaking distinctive languages are also problems.  
In addition, Chiang Mai is suitable for the data collection because it is the home of a 
number of international/national non-government agencies and organisations (INGOs) 
such as The Volunteers for Children’s Development Foundation, Stateless Children 
Protection Project and NGOs such as Mirror Foundation and Rak Dek Foundation, whose 
works focus on helping stateless persons and hill tribe people around the area with issues 
of citizenship, drug abuse, erosion of culture and the trafficking of women and children. 
On 8 January 2014, the twelfth Stateless Children’s Day was hosted at Lanna Wisdom 
School, Chiang Mai province, where about 32 NGOs and more than 50 stateless youth 
                                                             
20 This number is approximate and does not include unregistered stateless people. 
21 See the table of ten provinces which have the most stateless people at Appendix 5. 
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from different ethnicities such as Da ra-Ang 22 , Tai Yai and Kachin participated in 
activities and discussions which contributed to some progress on the situation of stateless 
persons in Thailand (Buaklee 2014; Rak Dek Foundation 2014). 
3.2.3. Tak Province  
Tak province is the home of nearly 31,000 stateless people (Achavanitkul 2011, p.111). 
This means Tak province has the third largest number of stateless people. Since Tak 
province is located between Thailand and Myanmar, it is an appropriate location to 
conduct the research. It used to be a strategic military region. Recently, Tak province has 
been considered an area of ‘bustling border markets, ethnic diversity and natural beauty’ 
by the Tourism Authority of Thailand (2015). 
Importantly, Tak province is suitable for the data collection because of its comparatively 
large number of young adult refugees from Myanmar. Tha Song Yang district, located in 
the northwestern part of Tak province, is the home of Mae La temporary shelter area 
which has hosted the largest number of refugee residents. In Mae La district alone, there 
are approximately 25,000 UNHCR registered refugees23 or about 30 per cent of the 
refugees in Thailand; 90 per cent are Karen from Myanmar (UNHCR 2015). Mae La 
temporary shelter area is located eight kilometres from the border. It was originally 
established at the Thai village of Mae La following the evacuation of Manerplaw village 
in Karen state and the fall of the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1995. Inside the camp, 
there is a wide range of educational opportunities provided by INGOs. It is considered a 
study centre24 for young refugees, so the current population includes a few thousand 
students who come to study in the camp, and some from other camps, but mostly from 
inside Myanmar. Most students are registered only as temporary inhabitants for schooling. 
                                                             
22 Da ra-Ang tribe, or Ta-ang, migrated from Myanmar to Thailand due to violent conflicts 
between the Burmese and various ethnic groups in Myanmar around the 1980’s. They usually 
live in the mountains. Myanmar people call them Palaung, whilst some Tai Yai groups call them 
Kunloi which generally means people who live in the mountain. Nowadays the Dara-Ang live in 
Shan state, Myanmar, some in south-western Yunnan, China and a small number in northern 
Thailand. Red Da ra-Ang is the main group living in many places in Thailand such as three 
districts of Chiang Mai province, Fang, Chiang Dao and Mae Ai districts, and Mae Sai district 
in Chiang Rai (Deepadung 2009).  
23 These figures are registered refugees. Most new arrivals after 2005 are not registered.  
24 Nonetheless, the education system inside the camp remains unrecognised by both the 
Thailand and Myanmar governments (Burma Link 2017).  
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As the home of the refugees’ schools and colleges, this huge number of young refugees 
in Tak province has also contributed to the variety of data collection for the research. 
3.3. Qualitative Approach 
The reason for dominant use of the qualitative method in this research is because this 
research is a case study. Neuman (2011) has pointed out that in case study research, a 
researcher investigates social features in depth and detail, often in a qualitative form. The 
qualitative method is an inquiry aiming to understand larger social phenomena of which 
the qualitative researcher is an integral part (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). The qualitative 
method is appropriate in this research because it is concerned primarily with process 
rather than outcomes (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007; Bogdan and Biklen 1982). The 
qualitative method is strongly focused on participant perspectives and seeks to uncover 
the essential meaning behind their life experiences (Bogdan and Biklen 1982). 
In this study, data collection involves primary and secondary data. Primary resources 
come from fieldwork involving observation, focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews. The main research tools are observation, focus group discussions (FGDs) 
among young adults aged between 18–24 years 25  and in-depth interviews with key 
informants. 
3.3.1. Participant Observation 
In fieldwork, it is important to gain insight into the political and socio-economic situation 
of the area and its surrounding borders. Participant observation is an excellent method for 
doing so. It is a form of sociological research methodology in which the researcher takes 
on a role in the social situation under observation. Researchers employing participant 
observation aim to experience events happening in the research field sites to understand 
participants’ perception and interpret the nature of social reality in the field. By 
immersing herself in the field through key actors in that location, the researcher can 
observe local community and group meetings including participants’ actions in everyday 
life (Neuman 2011). Participant observation is very useful not only because the researcher 
                                                             
25 According to the UN Secretariat, youth and young people refer to individuals aged between 
15–24 years old. However, the definition of youth changes with circumstances depending on 
‘demographic, financial, economic and socio-cultural settings’ (United Nations 2017). 
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can experience transnational forced migrants in their everyday life through direct 
observation, but also because it allows the researcher to examine, analyse, understand and 
explain the social world under study and the underlying logic of participants’ experiences 
and actions on a daily basis (Neuman 2011). 
Advantages of the use of participant observation include being able to observe the group 
of participants in its real-life field setting and data may also be openly recorded (Neuman 
2011). The most important problem with observation is, however, observer effect. The 
presence of the researcher may alter the behaviour of those under study as the participants 
may feel offended ‘once they know of an authorised invasion of their ‘privacy’26 for 
research purposes’ (Neuman 2011, p.150). On the other hand, they may enjoy it and play 
to the researcher. 
3.3.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
The focus group discussion (FGD) is a qualitative research technique ‘in which people 
are informally interviewed in a group discussion setting’ (Neuman 2011). The researcher 
can collect data through interaction with certain groups on a guided topic (Morgan 1997). 
FGDs provide an in-depth understanding of participants’ experience and knowledge 
relating to the topic. With FGDs, a structured group process is employed to obtain detailed 
data about certain circumstances. The focus group discussion is an effective tool, because 
it can obtain the consensus of groups about the discussed topics during the process 
(Kitzinger 1994). In the FGDs, the researcher acts in the context freely, and on the basis 
of a research theme can formulate a research question or checklist and employ neutral 
probing (Sarantakos 2012). Furthermore, Morgan (1997) points out that FGDs can be 
used in combination with participants’ observation. With a very clear approach and 
careful selection of participants, FGDs can provide useful data (Neuman 2011). 
In this research, qualitative methods applied to three focus group discussions with 
stateless youth were organised at local level. The target groups of FGDs were stateless 
young adults who were born and have lived in and around the areas along the Thailand–
Myanmar border. In this research, stateless young adults are aged between 18–24 years 
who are about to finish basic education and find their first job. The focus group 
                                                             
26 Emphasised by Neuman 2011. 
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discussions were scheduled by NGO and INGO officers who referred the researcher to a 
variety of community schools and public education institutions in order to select the 
participants. Snowball sampling was employed to identify a simple pattern of networks 
and relationships between the stateless youth in certain areas (Neuman 2011, p.209). 
For the FGDs involving young adults, the researcher used various techniques including 
games, plays and art to approach the youth and for youth to tell their stories and be able 
to express their feelings. The researcher also prepared an FGD guide prior to the event 
(see Appendix 2). However, it was important that the focus group participants be selected 
from different social groups in order to obtain a variety of experiences, and to avoid 
privacy and confidentiality issues; participants were not close friends or relatives, but 
around the same age level in order to minimise the sense of hierarchy (Neuman 2011, 
p.459). 
Figure 3.3: The diagram of focus group discussions 
 
Source: Developed by Ladawan Khaikham, 2016 
Each focus group discussion consisted of four to six youth participants aged between 18 
and 24 years. FGDs were conducted in two fieldwork sites: two groups of youth 
participants in Chiang Mai province and two groups of youth participants in Mae Sot 
district, Tak province. In total, there were 19 stateless youths who participated in FGDs. 
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Each FGD lasted for approximately one and a half hours in a community where 
participants were familiar with the atmosphere.  
3.3.3. Semi-structured In-Depth Interviews 
The semi-structured in-depth interview with key informants is a common qualitative 
method (Mack et al. 2005). It is essential for improving understanding of the problems of 
statelessness, lack of citizenship and their impact on stateless youth in temporary shelter 
areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border (the first research question) and national 
security policy (the second research question and part of the fourth research question). As 
Bouma (2000) has argued, the strength of in-depth interviews is their ability to ‘provide 
the greatest opportunity to find out individual thinking or feelings, or how they react to 
various issues and situations’ (Bouma 2000, p.180). As suggested by Kvale (1996), the 
research employs the process of thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, 
analysing, verifying and reporting data obtained by this method. 
The researcher prepared and used an in-depth interview guide (see Appendix 3) as 
instrument during the in-depth interview process. Some of the respondents were selected 
with assistance from the shelter committee and with the collaboration of local ethnic 
groups. The range of key informants interviewed in this research is as follows:  
1. Four parents of stateless youth 
2. Three school teachers teaching stateless youth 
3. Three NGO/INGO representatives working with/for these stateless youth 
4. Two government officials working with stateless youth  
In total, there were 12 various key informants in the in-depth interviews. The semi 
structured interviews were conducted by using open-ended questions as they were 
expected to gain an in-depth understanding of participants’ knowledge relating to 
statelessness and Thailand’s national security policies. This explored their views on the 
statelessness situation, the problem of statelessness, lack of citizenship and their impacts 
on the human rights of stateless young people. Each in-depth interview was conducted 
for one hour to one hour and a half. All respondents were interviewed in their community 
in Thailand where they felt safe. No one was interviewed in his/her home village in 
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Myanmar, although the interviewees were asked about conditions existing there before 
they fled. 
3.4. Quantitative Approach 
In the second phase of data collection, Thai citizens who lived and worked in and around 
the shelter and Thai citizens in Bangkok, were asked to complete a questionnaire survey 
concerning stateless young people. The quantitative method was used particularly in 
relation to the third research question to ascertain Thai respondents’ opinions towards the 
stateless young adults who wish to gain Thai citizenship, and investigate reasons 
underlying their opinions.  
Figure 3.4: Diagram of the paper questionnaire development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by Ladawan Khaikham, 2016 
In the questionnaire survey, the researcher started with a theoretical research problem. To 
process the survey research deductively, the researcher conceptualised variables and 
operationalised each variable to make sure that clear and complete questions were 
grouped and put in order systematically (Neuman 2011, p.131). The structure of the paper 
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questionnaire (see Appendix 4) was developed from data collected from participant 
observation, the focus group discussions and the in-depth interviews.  
3.4.1. Population and Sampling for Quantitative Approach 
The quantitative approach in this research is employed to investigate Thai respondents’ 
opinions towards the stateless young adults. The present study sought to know whether 
Thai respondents supported or did not support the stateless youth gaining Thai citizenship 
and why.  
The research instruments were pre-tested prior to the actual data collection. A pilot test 
was conducted with a small group of participants in Bangkok to test if the questions in 
the questionnaire were clear and respondents’ understanding of the questions were the 
same as the researcher’s understanding (Neuman 2011). The paper questionnaire survey 
was distributed to the target sample size of approximately 500 people, who were drawn 
from the population of Thai citizens nationwide. Thai participants who lived in the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) and around the border areas, were selected by 
using the snowball sampling technique. 
3.4.2. Unit of Analysis for Quantitative Approach 
In total, 315 Thai citizens completed the paper questionnaire survey between November 
2014 and April 2015 (i.e., response rate: 63 per cent). Analysis of the questionnaire 
responses enabled the researcher to explore the dynamics between different groups of 
Thai respondents. 
3.5. Research Instruments 
As noted, the mixed method research approach employs a combination of data sources. 
Qualitative and quantitative data complement each other to enhance the validity of the 
research findings. Different research instruments were used in accordance with the 
particular method outlined below. 
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3.5.1. Focus Group Discussion Guide 
An FGD guide was prepared prior to conducting the FGDs. This FGD guide (see 
Appendix 2) listed potential questions separated into four stages. The FGD guide was 
primarily used as a reference for the moderator to ask potential questions in the FGD. 
FGD guide components were: 
A. Ice Breaking 
B. Birth, Home, Family and the Sense of Belonging  
C. Decision to Stay or Leave 
D. Ending Session 
3.5.2. Interview Guide 
A list of Indicative Questions was prepared for the in-depth interview (see Appendix 3). 
The guide listed potential questions for the four stages of the interview based around the 
research questions. However, during the actual interview, the researcher employed semi-
structured in-depth interviews, which flow as a simple natural conversation. 
Interview guide components were: 
A. Self-introduction of Interview Participant 
B. Direct and Indirect Contact with Stateless Youth  
C. National Security Policies, Human Rights and Human Security 
D. Concluding Session 
3.5.3. Paper Questionnaires 
A set of paper questionnaire surveys was used in the second phase of data collection for 
the quantitative research method. The structured questionnaire was developed from data 
collected from the focus group discussion and the in-depth interviews. The pilot test of 
the questionnaires was undertaken with a small group of people whose characteristics 
matched the final respondents (De Vaus 2002). The pilot test helped to check if the 
questions were suitable, clear and understandable (Neuman 2011). It also helped the 
researcher to practice and familiarise herself with the research environment before doing 
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the actual study. The pre-test was organized in Bangkok at the beginning of September 
2014, prior to administering the actual questionnaire survey. 
The five sections of the questionnaire components were: 
Part I : A few brief questions about participants 
Part II : Awareness of the existence of temporary shelter areas and everyday life 
involving Myanmar/Karen/Shan workers, refugees and stateless youth 
Part III : The justification of the temporary shelter areas and national security 
concerning border issues 
Part IX : Participant’s opinion regarding stateless youth 
Part V : Short answer questions regarding stateless youth 
3.6. Data Analysis 
Data collection consisted of two phases. The qualitative data collection focused on FGDs 
and semi-structured in-depth interviews using guidelines. The target group was youth 
aged between 18 and 24 years who were actually born and live in the two research sites, 
Chiang Mai province and Tak province, Thailand. Although personal identifying 
information was asked, the data protected the identity of the informants. Questions were 
asked about the socio-demographic background of the stateless individuals, knowledge 
and understanding of their situation related to living conditions of the family, schools, 
access to hospitals and mobility. As the study focused on livelihoods of stateless youth, 
FGDs and semi-structured interviews were employed.  
To analyse the data, the researcher collected and sorted the data to be interpreted and 
coded. To code the data, the researcher used the NVivo programme to help create codes 
and categorise important data obtained during the fieldwork, before connecting the coding 
to a conceptual framework. Also, content analysis such as systematic textual analysis was 
used to operationalise the data (Neuman 2011) through Microsoft Office and Microsoft 
Excel. 
The second phase, quantitative data collection, involved a paper questionnaire survey. As 
this phase focused on the perspective of Thai respondents towards refugees and stateless 
youth, a modified Likert scale was employed to measure the understanding and opinions 
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of Thai respondents. Descriptive statistical analysis was employed to describe basic 
features of the data and to see the frequency of answers (Nicholas 2006). Microsoft Excel 
was used to analyse and present the data in the form of histograms, bar graphs, pie charts 
and tables. This is an appropriate statistical analysis to measure the percentage of the 
participants’ understanding of the issues that have been asked. Finally, as the 
questionnaire also asked about their opinions regarding stateless youth, this part was 
analysed as a small section of qualitative data analysis using content analysis, as 
systematic textual analysis, in order to understand the overall picture of Thai respondents’ 
understanding and opinions concerning stateless youth. In addition, quantitative findings 
were used to supplement findings for the qualitative data collection in the first phase. 
3.7. Potential Risks and Challenges  
When conducting research by fieldwork that involves youth, in particular stateless youth, 
there are at least three potential risks. The primary risk of the research is unbalanced 
power relations between adults and youth. The second potential risk relates to the 
vulnerability of the youth, especially the stateless youth along the Thailand and Myanmar 
border who have been excluded from the society surrounding them. The last risk is the 
gap in understanding between adults and youth. The final risk applies directly to the 
researcher concerning personal security in a volatile context. 
Unbalanced power relations between adults and youth are the primary risk of the research. 
Naturally adults in all societies have power over children and youth (Greig, Taylor and 
MacKay 2012). The dominating power relations between adults and youth may make 
them avoid answering questions honestly. In a particular culture, youth may be afraid that 
if adults are not satisfied with their answer, the youth may be punished. This problem can 
be minimised by the development of trust between the researcher and the youth 
participants. 
As a result of the researcher’s past experience in the temporary shelter areas in Mae La 
refugee camp, she has developed excellent communication skills and a strong connection 
with local people. She also has deep local knowledge of the fieldwork sites and a robust 
understanding of the socioeconomic, cultural and environmental situation of the forcibly 
displaced people in her research areas. A communal meal as an incentive for research 
participation helped the researcher to gain in-depth understanding of local people’s 
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livelihoods, as well as trust from the local community. The researcher believed that with 
strong trust gained from the targeted youth, her power over the youth would be minimised. 
Consequently, the researcher believes that the targeted youth provided her with honest 
answers. Moreover, the researcher always kept in mind that she was working ‘with’ the 
youth in a partnership. It is important to consider the inclusion and participation of youth 
in all aspects. This research could be seen as being in the best interests of the displaced 
youth, especially the fact that this research may have a significant beneficial impact on 
their future lives. 
Youth participation is important because the research aimed to ensure that the opinions 
and experiences of the youth are not only listened to, but understood by outsiders (Tisdall, 
Davis and Gallagher 2009). Doing research with youth, the researcher ensured that the 
youth contributed to the activities so that their interests and views were not forgotten. 
Furthermore, according to article 12–13 in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Youth participants have a right 
to say what they think should happen when adults are making decisions that affect them, 
and to have their opinions taken into account. This right also includes freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and all kinds of ideas, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media. Also the youth were assured that their 
views are given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. For this purpose, 
the youth participants in this research were provided with the opportunity to hear the 
research proceedings and results that affect them, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national and international law. 
The second risk of this research is the vulnerability of the youth. All youth are vulnerable 
and this vulnerability is heightened in some groups (Greig, Taylor and MacKay 2012). 
The researcher acknowledged the fact that stateless youth were more vulnerable, because 
they were already singled out and different from other youth in Thai society. Therefore, 
word usage in a set of focus group questions for the youth, was selected and developed 
carefully. For example, instead of asking ‘where is your home?’ the researcher reframed 
the question by asking ‘where do you live now?’ to avoid the emphasis on ‘home’ which 
they would probably not have. This also avoids the youth feeling embarrassed, if they are 
reluctant to answer about home. The researcher also encouraged the youth to express their 
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thoughts through drawing and simple story-telling, if they prefer, instead of giving a direct 
answer, in order to minimise the risk that the process may do harm to their minds. 
Drawing and simple story-telling by the groups of stateless youth led to the third potential 
risk. The third risk is the gap in understanding between the researcher and the youth 
participants. During data collection and analysis, the researcher’s interpretation of events 
may be significantly different from the perspectives of participants (Flewitt 2005). It is 
very important to note that youth understanding, concept interpreting, languages and 
cultures are developed in different ways from those of the adult world. To ensure 
appropriate understanding of their intentions, behaviours, drawings and story-telling, the 
researcher always consulted with their parents, teachers, and the NGO/INGO 
representatives who were working with them. This qualitative method is designed 
particularly for youth participating in an attempt to prevent potential harm and to avoid 
the ‘thwarting biases’ of researcher subjectivity  that can mar interpretive research 
(Peshkin 1988, p.21).  
In focus group discussions, each participant was provided equal time to explain meanings 
which underpin their behaviour, drawing and story-telling according to their own 
understanding. This activity can give the researcher better knowledge, information and a 
greater understanding of issues and concerns underlying that information. However, this 
activity was based on equality. It is emphasised here that it is their right and the 
researcher’s responsibility to ensure that all youth were treated the same (Greig, Taylor 
and MacKay 2012). The researcher ensured that all the youth were provided with equal 
access to information and resources. 
The final risk applied directly to the researcher. Personal security was one of the key 
concerns for the conduct of the research. The researcher’s fieldwork was in confined 
temporary shelter areas. As mentioned before, the fieldwork location is in one of the most 
politically sensitive areas for Thailand’s national security as the areas are surrounded by 
the Royal Thai Army. In this regard, outsiders are not allowed to gain access to these 
areas easily. The researcher acknowledges this fact, so that she chose to conduct the 
research fieldwork in certain provinces where the refugees were allowed to work outside 
the camps on a temporary basis during the day. This means outsiders are allowed to visit 
the camp during the day. Some areas allow outsiders to access development projects as 
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volunteers, yet not stay overnight. Importantly, the researcher’s past experience in 
temporary shelter areas has developed her communication skills. Her ability to speak Thai 
and her position as a civil servant working in a leading university in Thailand allow her 
to gain access to the areas and communicate with the participant. At the same time, she 
was aware that these practices may be introducing biases to the openness of respondents, 
so that the development of trust between the researcher and the participants could 
minimise this risk. Furthermore, this research project has been supported by the Royal 
Thai Government scholarship. Therefore, the process of gaining permission to access the 
areas was well managed through the bureaucratic system of the Thai Government to 
ensure that there was no legal harm from the research practice. 
3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the mixed method approach adopted in the study. Multi-site 
fieldwork for the case study of stateless young adults was undertaken in order to answer 
the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1. The research data collection employed 
several qualitative methods; most notably, participant observation, focus group 
discussions with stateless youth and semi-structured in-depth interviews with stateless 
youth and key informants who work closely with stateless young people (including 
parents of stateless youth, school teachers and local government officers in the field). 
Since the research uses mixed-methods with the qualitative method as the dominant 
approach, the quantitative method is also used to answer the research question on Thai 
respondents’ opinions relating to the statelessness issue. Finally, potential risks and 
challenges were discussed. The next chapter discusses the problem of citizenship, 
statelessness and livelihood vulnerability along the Thailand–Myanmar border.
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Chapter 4: Becoming Stateless in Thailand  
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter identifies and discusses the main reasons for people becoming stateless in 
Thailand. The chapter begins with the context of Thai nationality law. It then discusses 
the main elements of statelessness in Thailand. First, the complexity of Thailand’s 
nationality law and problems with law enforcement are presented. Secondly, the chapter 
discusses how the borderlines have been drawn across the groups of Indigenous people, 
leaving many groups stranded on opposite sides of the border. Thirdly, the chapter 
discusses the consequences of the Thai government’s failure to include everyone in the 
civil registration survey in 1965 due to the registration errors. Fourthly, the chapter shows 
how some officials in Thailand’s bureaucratic administrative system either lack 
understanding of the nationality laws, or overtly obstruct them. Then political changes 
which have resulted in unsettled citizenship policy are discussed. The final aspect pertains 
to children failing to obtain their birth certificates due to many difficulties in accessing 
the birth register at the time of birth. These elements in combination contribute to 
statelessness in Thailand. 
4.2. The Context of Thailand’s Citizenship Law 
Citizenship and nationality are used interchangably as they both refer to the legal notion 
of individuals who either are, or are not, citizens of a specific country (McCargo 2011, p. 
833). McCargo (2011) argues that citizenship in Thailand can be viewed as ‘two parallel 
and graduated dimensions’ (McCargo 2011, p. 838). The first dimension inheres to the 
legal aspect based solely on formal legal status and rights. The second is the informal 
aspect based on attitude, self-representation and behaviour (McCargo 2011). 
Historically, the terms ‘Thai citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ were not known among Thai 
people. The idea of folk or people of the Kingdom of Siam was first mentioned in the 
Sukhothai Period (1238–1438) (Sucharitkul 1990). Siamese stone inscriptions state the 
right of everyone to be free (Bastian 1864). In 1909, Siam’s civil registration law entitled 
Census of People in the Kingdom Act Ror Sor 128 (1909) ‘established the nationality of 
the population by applying the principle of jus sanguinis and the principle of loyalty’ 
(Saisoonthorn 2006, p. 41). 
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Thailand had no practice of issuing documents to certify that a person was a 
national and there was no proposal to legislate to allow people to request 
permission to immigrate to the Kingdom. Therefore, classification of natural 
persons of the Thai State was implemented by traditional nationality law. 
Exercising sovereignty on nationals by means of civil registration and identity 
cards did not begin until 1976 (Saisoonthorn 2006, p. 42). 
At that time there were certain laws and policies that distinguished the duties and 
responsibilities of the people from those of other societies, but these laws and policies did 
not grant any special protection to Siamese people (Saisoonthorn 2006, p.41). It is worth 
noting here that citizenship of Siam was originally understood from a traditional Siamese 
social aspect, rather than a political one. Thus, there was no person in Siam who had ever 
faced the problem of statelessness, because there was no law about citizenship until 1913, 
when the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913) was enacted. 
The phrase, ‘Siamese citizenship’, was introduced by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI, 1910–
1925) who released the first modern Siamese family law (Surname Act 2456 (1913)) in 
March 1913. Siam's first citizenship (sanchat) law, or the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 
(1913), was enacted on 10 April 1913, prior to the establishment of the Siamese 
Parliament in 1932 (Loos 2006, p.133; Saisoonthorn 2006).This is the first time that the 
Siamese state, as a modern nation-state in Asia, attempted to bind the nation and its 
subjects, thus characterising the ethnic groups as minorities within a majority 
Thai/Siamese state (Reynolds 1991; Keyes 2002). The idea of citizenship was relatively 
new and ambiguous to the Siamese court. Instead of defining clearly what made Siamese 
citizenship, King Vajiravudh was more concerned about turning non-Siamese subjects 
into Siamese citizens by enacting Naturalisation Act Ror Sor 130 (1911) (Laungaramsri 
2014, pp.145–146) in 1913. Besides loyalty, aliens, who had either fully assimilated or 
clearly showed the potential of assimilation into Siamese society, were eligible for 
naturalisation (Sucharitkul 1990, p.472). At that time, granting Siamese citizenship  to 
aliens by naturalisation was the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on 
the sui juris principle27 with the approval of the government (Saisoonthorn 2006, p.41). 
With the implementation of this Act, the Siamese state accepted dual nationality, because 
an alien would not lose his/her former nationality after naturalisation. 
                                                             
27 The principle of an individual who is independent and has all the rights as a freeman. He/she 
is not under the power of another, as a slave, a minor and the like. 
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4.2.1. Overseas Chinese, as the Majority of Non-Thai Migrants in 
Thailand 
Overseas Chinese in Thailand are an important example of the Siamese/Thai 
government’s success in assimilating people from other cultures, essentially making 
Chinese Thai (Suryadinata 2014, p.65). However, the history of the Chinese in Thailand 
is neither smooth nor peaceful. Chinese have been active in all areas of Siamese/Thai 
society since the thirteenth century. They have been free to reside and travel throughout 
the country. Nevertheless, at the same time they have had to face many difficult situations 
in Siamese/Thai society. 
In the early Rattanakosin period, especially between 1844 and 1845, a good relationship 
developed between a group of Chinese businessmen and the Siamese court as the trade 
between Siam and China was expanding (Bualek 2008). Chinese merchants played an 
important role in Siam’s economic development. The Chinese migrants provided 
manpower in the agricultural, shipping and trading sectors (Bun and Kiong 1993). 
Chinese became taxation officers. In 1855, Chinese businessmen adapted themselves 
when Siam’s economic policy shifted to free trade with the British Empire due to the 
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the British Empire and the Kingdom of Siam 
(The Bowring Treaty) (Siriphisal 2010). Later on, Chinese in Siam became involved in 
the political issues of mainland China when, with support from a group of overseas 
Chinese in Siam, Dr Sun Yat-sen28  visited Bangkok twice between 1903 and 1908 
(Murashima 2013). The Siamese government was aware of the Chinese political 
movement and began to place legal controls on the migration of Chinese people to Siam 
(Barnett 1954). 
The construction of ‘Chineseness’ and anti-Chinese sentiment became increasingly 
apparent in Siamese society from the time of King Chulalongkorn’s reign (King Rama V, 
1868–1910) (Skinner 1957; Jiang 1966; Reynolds 1991). Many discriminatory 
government policies were introduced. For the first time the Chinese were required by law 
to pay the same capitation tax as other foreign residents in Siam (Barnett 1954). King 
                                                             
28 Dr Sun Yat-sen was known as a Chinese revolutionary. He was the first president of the 
Republic of China (ROC). He visited Bangkok to collect funds for his revolution in mainland 
China. 
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Vajiravudh (King Rama VI, 1910–1925), who felt uncomfortable with Chinese, 
composed several works29 to convey a negative view of Chinese people. He saw them as 
‘politically disloyal, expecting undue privileges, worshipping wealth as a god and being 
parasites on the [Siamese] economy’ (Baker and Phongpaichit 2014, p.115). However, 
the discriminatory policies did not reduce the number of Chinese arrivals in Siam. The 
economic boom in the 1920’s and natural disaster and civil strife in China encouraged a 
large number of Chinese arrivals in Siam between 1918 and 1931. The government 
showed no attempt to control the numbers of Chinese immigrants until 1947, when an 
annual quota of 10,000 Chinese was enforced (Thomson 1993). 
In terms of education, Chinese schools were restricted as they were considered a source 
of political ideas that might harm Siamese society. As a result, the Private School Act B.E. 
2479 (1936) was enforced to monitor and control private schools’ curricula and textbooks, 
particularly those of Chinese schools. This Act required all private schools to teach the 
Siamese language, geography and history (Siriphisal 2010, p.86). It also restricted the 
teaching of Chinese to no more than two hours each week in Chinese primary schools and 
18 hours in secondary schools (Barnett 1954; Coughlin 1976). This was the government’s 
attempt to transform descendants of Chinese immigrants into Siamese by forcing them to 
learn the Siamese language and think like Siamese people.  
This policy promoted the development of social intercourse between the Chinese and the 
Siamese. According to Skinner (1957, p. 311), at the social level, Chinese showed many 
attributes of social integration and assimilation into Siamese society, because Siamese 
and Chinese shared some similarities in cultural background. Bun and Kiong (1993) also 
argue that the social transactions within and between ethnic Siamese and Chinese 
contributed to the assimilation process of the Chinese into Siamese society. In addition, 
the Siamese government was successful in integrating ethnic Chinese into Siamese 
society by law (Skinner 1957; Thomson 1993; Siriphisal 2010).  
In terms of citizenship, the government has changed its policy several times. A liberal 
concept of rights was shown in the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913), the first written 
Siamese nationality law (Coughlin 1976, p.170). This law, which restricted Siamese 
                                                             
29 These writings include ‘The Jews of the East’, ‘Wake up, Thailand’, ‘The Real Nation’, ‘Thai 
were forced to mix with Chinese’ (Siriphisal 2010, p.84). 
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citizenship based on jus sanguinis and naturalisation, remained the same as in customary 
law, but it ‘was the first time in Thai history that [Siamese] citizenship could be granted 
on the basis of the jus soli principle (i.e. by virtue of being born in Thailand)’ 
(Saisoonthorn 2006, p.42).  
At that time,  
[t]he citizenship law claimed as Siamese citizens all persons born in Siam; all 
persons born to a Siamese father regardless of birthplace; all persons born to 
Siamese mothers when the father was unknown, and all foreign women 
married to Siamese subjects (Loos 2006, p.134).  
Therefore, Siamese citizenship was automatically granted to locally-born Chinese. 
Skinner argues that the Chinese businessmen identified themselves with the ruling and 
administrative elites in Siam (Skinner 1957; Bun and Kiong 1993). Importantly, the 
Phibunsongkhram government needed to stop political affiliation between Chinese in 
Thailand and mainland China for security reasons (Chantavanich 1997, p.243). In 
addition, inter-marriage between Chinese business men and local Thai women, or 
Chinese women in Thailand, was successful in increasing the number of second 
generation Thai Chinese children. Thai schools were compulsory. Consequently, the 
second generation Thai Chinese children became Thai citizens automatically as the 
Siamese government advocated a policy of giving citizenship to the immigrant Chinese 
by amending the Nationality Act 1913 ‘in conformity with the government’s liberal policy 
toward the Chinese so that all persons born in Thailand were automatically Thai citizens’ 
(Skinner 1957, p. 378).  
In fact, the jus soli principle to determine the citizenship of persons born in its territory 
existed in Siam since the Sukhothai Period (1238–1438). In addition, the huge number of 
Chinese immigrants encouraged integration between the Chinese and the Siamese 
(Thomson 1993, p.403). The Siamese government used several means to assimilate those 
who were already in the country and to prepare for future arrivals. The most significant 
step was the granting of citizenship to Chinese descendants on the basis of the jus soli 
principle as well as setting a naturalisation policy, in accordance with the Naturalisation 
Act Ror Sor 130 (1911), which became effective in 1913, to encourage identification with 
the state, not the ethnic group (Thomson 1993). Thus, after five years of residence, a 
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Chinese migrant could apply for naturalisation, if he could show ‘good character’ and had 
enough financial support (Skinner 1957, p.250; McCargo 2011, p.838). 
However, the Chinese migrants had a very hard time after the 1932 Siamese Revolution 
when the constitutional government replaced the absolute monarchy. After the 
establishment of a constitutional regime in 1932 by the Revolutionary People’s Party, the 
government sought to achieve a common identity among various ethnic groups. In doing 
so, Siam was not unique. As Reynolds (1991) explains, the boundaries of the nation-state 
do not coincide with the extent of a single ethnic population or one speech group. 
Territory and people are the first two components listed in the constructed national 
identity, but there is a tension between ethnicity and territory. The government therefore 
tried to manage this problem by favouring ethnic Siamese in order ‘to exclude or 
subordinate other ethnic groups’ (Reynolds 1991, p.18).  
The Phibunsongkhram governments (1938–1944 and 1948–1957) gave preferential 
treatment to ethnic Thai as against ethnic Chinese. The government changed the nation’s 
name from ‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ in 1939 to make it clearer that the country belonged to 
the Thais with their culture, citizenship and territory (Batson 1974; Terwiel 2002; 
Reynolds 1991; Laungaramsri 2014). The government sought to encourage a pan-Thai 
movement that included the Thai of Thailand, the Thai peoples of Laos and the Shan 
States of northern Myanmar in a single Thai state (‘Proceedings of the National Assembly, 
26 August B.E 2482’ 1939; Winichakul 1994; Nallu 2012). Meanwhile many ethnic 
minorities felt uneasy within the modern Thai state, especially the most numerous and 
possibly most influential, the ethnic Chinese (Batson 1974; Connors 2004). After the 
communist victory in China in 1949, anti-communist policies were carried out by the Thai 
authorities (Chinvanno 1992; Thomson 1993; Baker and Phongpaichit 2014). The Thai 
government sought to limit Chinese influence and power in political activities. This 
limitation is evident in citizenship policy that restricted the children of aliens and their 
descendants. Legal changes between 1953 and 1956 meant that those who were born to 
two Chinese parents, or to an alien father, were non-Thai.  
However, under the Naturalisation Act Ror Sor 130 (1911), which was later replaced by 
the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913), children born in Siam to alien parents were granted 
citizenship ‘regardless of whether or not the alien parents had entered the Kingdom 
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legally or illegally, or the alien parents had the right to reside in the Kingdom temporarily 
or permanently’ (Saisoonthorn 2006, p.42).  
In the early 1960s, however, China and Thailand agreed to recognize Thai 
citizenship for ethnic Chinese born in Thailand. Many of them had already 
registered as Thai citizens in the aftermath of the communist takeover in 
China in 1949. ...The policy has been successful. Many ethnic Chinese who 
are Thai citizens identify themselves as Thai (Thomson 1993, pp.403–404). 
Besides the Naturalisation Act Ror Sor 130 (1911) that allowed these migrants to be 
naturalised as Thai nationals, if they could satisfy the legal requirements, the Nationality 
Act B.E. 2456 (1913) also granted citizenship to children born in Thailand. These laws 
can be seen as successful tools to unite people of different ethnicities and backgrounds. 
By allowing aliens and children of aliens born in Thailand to obtain Thai citizenship, it 
was thought that ethnic conflict would be less, while a higher level of assimilation would 
be achieved (Saisoonthorn 2006). In the Chinese case, it has been found that a majority 
of the descendants of Chinese immigrants in each generation merges into Thai society 
and becomes indistinguishable, especially the fourth and later generations who identify 
themselves as completely Thai; 30  this is called ‘Thai-isation’ (karn klai pen Thai) 
(Skinner 1957; McCargo 2011). The policy towards overseas Chinese is an important 
example of the success of the Siamese/Thai governments in assimilating aliens into Thai 
society.  
Even though many people claimed Siamese/Thai citizenship under the Nationality Act 
B.E. 2456 (1913), there were still millions of stateless persons arising from the main 
elements of statelessness in Thailand. The first element is the complexity of Thai 
nationality law. The second element is stateless people arising from the borderline that 
was drawn across the groups of Indigenous people. The failure of Thailand’s civil 
registration survey in 1965 is the third element. The fourth element is the lack of 
understanding of nationality laws among officials. Political change and unsettled 
citizenship policy 1965 is the fifth element. Lastly, the failure to obtain a birth certificate 
makes these stateless people unable to prove their birth and apply for Thai citizenship. 
                                                             
30 Being Chinese in Thailand is viewed negatively. Although young Sino-Thais identify 
themselves as Thai, the anti-Chinese bias still exists (Tejapira 2009; McCargo 2011). 
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4.3. Complexity of Thai Nationality Law and Law 
Enforcement 
The notion of citizenship in Thailand is ambiguous due to the complexity and frequent 
changes in Thai nationality law. The government keeps changing its law due to national 
security reasons. These changes reflect not only the relations between the state and its 
subjects, but also the state’s anxiety about people’s mobility (Laungaramsri 2014, p.154). 
In total, since it was first implemented in 1913, Thailand’s nationality law has changed 
12 times in 104 years. As a result, a number of people from ethnic minorities who no 
longer come within the scope of the law and aliens who have immigrated to Thailand 
from Myanmar have been excluded. Presently, the stateless status of the first generation 
of migrants inheres to their descendants as well. 
There are two ways of acquiring Thai citizenship: by birth and by naturalisation. 
According to Section 2 of the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913), Siamese/Thai citizenship 
could be granted to a person who was: 
1) a child of a lawful father who had Thai nationality; 
2) a child of a lawful mother who had Thai nationality; 
3) born in Thailand; 
4) a woman legally married to a man who had Thai nationality 31;  or 
5) eligible for naturalization under the Naturalization Act Ror Sor 130 (1911)32 
In 1965, Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913) was replaced by the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 
(1965) which was later amended several times.33  However, the turning point in the 
evolution of the Thai nationality acts was when the Thai government feared the influx of 
refugees and displaced people from neighbouring communist countries in the 1970’s. The 
Regulation of Revolutionary Party No. 337 (called Por Wor 337, or Order 337) of 13 
December 1972 became operative. Requests for Thai citizenship became difficult because 
                                                             
31 This law automatically granted Thai nationality to an alien woman who legally married a 
husband of Thai nationality. 
32 The Naturalization Act Ror Sor 130 was cancelled and replaced by Nationality Act B.E. 2456 
(1913). 
33 The Nationality Act B.E. 2508 as amended by Acts No. 2 and 3 B.E. 2535 (1992), Act No. 4, 
B.E. 2551 (2008) and Act No. 5 B.E. 2555 (2012). 
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Order 337 made radical changes to acquisition and revocation of Thai citizenship as a 
result of its objective to protect and preserve national security (Sucharitkul 1990; Tang 
2005). As Sucharitkul (1990) states, Order 337  
…prescribed the automatic revocation of Thai citizenship from a certain 
category of persons previously born in Thailand of alien parentage, while 
suspending the attribution of Thai citizenship with regard to persons born after 
the entry into force of the Order (Sucharitkul 1990, p.174).  
Order 337 strengthened gaining Thai citizenship by means of the jus sanguinis principle. 
According to Order 337, any child born in Thailand to foreign parents, must have both 
parents reside permanently in Thailand for the child to be granted Thai citizenship. 
Obviously, this Order was intended to prevent the children of refugees and displaced 
people from neighbouring countries from acquiring Thai citizenship. However, Order 
337 affected all aliens including many people who came from non-communist countries, 
because it applied not only to children born after this date, but also to those whose parents 
were not permanent residents at the time of their birth. Hence, this regulation resulted in 
many cases of statelessness since it was implemented on 14 December 1972. Although 
Order 337 was abolished in 1992, the jus sanguinis principle was firmly established and 
remains in force in Thailand’s nationality law until today  (Saisoonthorn 2006, p.48; 
Nationality Act (No.5), B.E. 2555 (2012)). 
Under the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965) Thai citizenship is determined, if either the 
child’s father or mother holds Thai citizenship, regardless of where the birth occurs 
(Sucharitkul 1990, p.465). Chapter 1 Acquisition of Thai Nationality in Section 7 states 
that 
The following persons acquire Thai nationality by birth: 
(1) A person born of a father or a mother of Thai nationality, whether within 
or outside the Thai Kingdom; 
(2) A person born within the Thai Kingdom except the person under Section 
7 bis paragraph one (Nationality Act B.E. 2508 1965, p.5). 
For children of alien parents, Thai citizenship cannot be obtained even though the child 
has been born within Thai territory (jus soli) because of Section 7 bis which states that   
Section 7 bis. A person born within the Thai Kingdom of alien parents does 
not acquire Thai nationality if at the time of his birth, his lawful father or his 
father who did not marry his mother, or his mother was: 
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(1) the person having been given leniency for temporary residence in 
Kingdom as a special case; 
(2) the person having been permitted to stay temporarily in the Kingdom; 
(3) the person having entered and resided in the Thai Kingdom without 
permission under the law on immigration. 
… The person who was born within the Thai Kingdom and has not acquired 
Thai nationality under paragraph one shall be deemed to have entered and 
resided in the Thai Kingdom without permission under the law on 
immigration, unless an order is given otherwise according to the law on that 
particular matter (Nationality Act B.E. 2508 1965, p.5). 
Consequently, the legal definition of a Thai citizen is based only on birth to one or both 
Thai parents, marriage to a Thai man, or naturalisation. 
In 2008, the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 was amended by the Nationality Act (No.4) 
B.E.2551 (2008). This law is expected to help solve many cases of statelessness arising 
from Order 337, because it allows anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn by Order 
337 between 1972 and 1992, or who failed to acquire Thai citizenship because of Order 
337, to be able to acquire Thai citizenship. In order to gain citizenship, applicants are 
required to provide evidence of their birth, their permanent residency in Thailand and be 
able to demonstrate good behaviour.  
Although the Nationality Act (No. 4) B.E. 2551 (2008) can provide Thai citizenship to 
those who were previously unable to access it due to Order 337, as well as to their children, 
there are some problems about the proof of their birth registration, their permanent 
residency and the clarification of ‘good behaviour’, which may undermine their right to 
obtain Thai citizenship. Implementation of the Nationality Act B.E. 2551 (2008) faces 
many challenges, especially paragraph two of Chapter 1 Section 7 which states the 
following: 
In case the Minister deems it appropriate, he may consider and give an order 
for each particular case granting Thai nationality to any person under 
paragraph one, in conformity with the rules prescribed by the Cabinet 
(Nationality Act (No. 4), B.E. 2551 2008, p. 2). 
This Act gives full authority to the Minister to decide case by case regarding children 
who were born to an alien parent and whether they are approved to receive Thai 
citizenship.  
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Recently, Thailand applied the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 as amended by Nationality Act 
(No.5) B.E. 2555 (2012) in Section 4 to allow displaced Thai people outside the country 
to migrate to, and reside in the Kingdom of Thailand, and regain Thai citizenship. The 
requirements for obtaining Thai citizenship have not changed. Chapter 1 section 7 and 
section 7 bis remain the same. This new act adds a new definition of ‘Displaced Thai 
Persons’ in between the definitions of ‘Alien’ and ‘Committee’ in section 4. It is expected 
to solve problems relating to the citizenship of displaced Thai persons, because of the 
change in the territorial boundary of Thailand34, whilst the problem of stateless persons 
who were born in Thailand remains unresolved. 
Table 4.1: Significant Changes in Thailand’s Nationality Law 
Year Siam/Thailand’s Nationality Act Changes 
1909 Census of People in The Kingdom 
Act Ror Sor 128 
Civil Registration Law: Siamese 
nationality based on jus sanguinis 
principle and the principle of loyalty 
1911 Naturalisation Act Ror Sor 130  Naturalisation based on the sui juris 
principle 
1913 Nationality Act B.E. 2456  Jus sanguinis principle and jus soli 
principle 
1965 Nationality Act B.E. 2508  Emphasis on jus sanguinis principle; 
jus soli principle with restrictions 
1972 Regulation of Revolutionary Party 
No. 337  
Jus sanguinis principle due to the fear 
of displaced people from communist 
countries 
2008 Nationality Act (No. 4), B.E. 2551  Jus sanguinis principle: restores Thai 
nationality to those who were affected 
by Order 337  
2012 Nationality Act (No.5) B.E. 2555  Jus sanguinis principle: restores Thai 
nationality to displaced Thais who used 
                                                             
34 Published in Royal Thai Government Gazette, 21 May 2012, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 128–130. 
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Year Siam/Thailand’s Nationality Act Changes 
to live outside the country and decided 
to move to Thailand in the 1980’s 
Source: Developed by Ladawan Khaikham, 2016 
The legal status of a Thai citizen is subject to change in accordance with the changing 
law. Thai citizenship can be granted to those who were born to Thai parentage regardless 
of the place of birth, while anyone who was born in Thailand can request Thai citizenship 
with many restrictions, justified by the state due to national security reasons. The legal 
changes reflect the unstable notion of citizenship. The relationship between the state and 
its people has also changed. The law excludes a number of people who were unable to 
access the law in the past and the current aliens who immigrated into Thailand from 
neighbouring countries. Consequently, the law leads to statelessness in Thailand. Later 
on, their descendants, who were born in Thai territory, are inevitably also stateless and 
are deemed to have entered and resided in the country illegally. As a result, their rights 
and freedoms are restricted and they are faced with deportation to the place where they 
have never been. 
The release of Order 337 in 1972 represented the fear of the Thai Government that there 
would be an influx of refugees and displaced people from neighbouring communist 
countries. Although Order 337 was withdrawn in 1992, and Thai citizenship was returned 
in 2008 to those who were affected by Order 337, the fear remains.  
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) still considers that stateless people, as individuals 
without legal status, pose an important threat to national security. It is stated in the 
Nationality Act (No. 4), B.E. 2551 (2008) Chapter 1, section 7 bis that  
The person who is born within the Thai Kingdom and has not acquired Thai 
nationality under paragraph one shall reside in the Thai Kingdom under 
conditions stated in the Ministerial Regulation, but principles of national 
security and human rights have to be considered as well. Nevertheless, the 
person shall be deemed to have entered and resided in the Thai Kingdom 
without permission under the law on immigration when there is no such 
Ministerial Regulation (Nationality Act (No. 4), B.E. 2551 2008, p. 2). 
This is because the Thai government assumes that these people entered the kingdom to 
seek better lives. The government believes that they would do anything illegal in order to 
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survive. Therefore, the government resorted to ‘every means’ to shut the door on these 
people by invoking Thai domestic law that prevents children born to illegal migrant 
parents from gaining citizenship.  
4.4. Borderlines Drawn between the Groups of Indigenous 
People 
The statelessness problem has occurred because of the birth of modern states and 
borderlines that have been drawn between Thailand and neighbouring countries. As 
mentioned before, the Siamese court had no notion of a boundary. When a representative 
of the British government, Henry Burney, in 1825 requested the court to negotiate the 
borderline on the western frontier of Siam, the court instead allowed those who resided 
in the areas to decide where the boundaries between the English and Siamese should be 
(Winichakul 1994). This practice shows that the Siamese court paid no attention to the 
boundary, and the residents around the border saw no significant purpose in fixing the 
border between the two political powers.  
Figure 4.1: Natural border between Thailand and Myanmar in Kanchanaburi 
province 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 December 2014 
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The development of Western-style political mapping techniques and the emergence of a 
modern state forced the Siamese court to fix the borderline (Winichakul 1994). 
Consequently, new national boundaries were established in accordance with the 1909 
treaty between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam. The legal borderlines have 
enforced legal separation between states, as a symbol of the state’s power which attempts 
to control ‘space, movement, sequence and position’ (Gainsborough 2009, p.4). 
Physically, the lines did not appear on the ground of the earth’s surface, but these lines 
were drawn on a map without attention to the people living on the frontier. The existence 
of the borders reflects the central role of the state and reinforces a sense of the state’s 
existence, as if it is entirely free from society (Gainsborough 2009). The modernist view 
of the state has celebrated its success in the possession of land and control of its subjects 
through its territory. State control of human movement, particularly the restricted flows 
of goods and people across borders, has been established to ensure the state’s security, an 
important correlative of which is to seek to ensure the subject’s loyalty to the state 
(Laungaramsri 2014). 
Figure 4.2: Natural Border between Thailand and Myanmar in Mae La refugee 
camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 20 August 2014 
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On the other hand, according to Keyes (2002), this project created a new problem of 
ethnic division, because the legal borderlines served not only to enforce legal separation 
between states, but also disconnected the groups of Indigenous people who have lived in-
between. The legal lines ignored the traditional cultural and economic relations of the 
people who ‘see themselves and are recognized as belonging to border-crossing 
communities’ (Keyes 2002, p.1187). It also makes them become ‘people who live along 
the border’, although most of them can trace their ancestors and history from the other 
side of the border.  
Case Study 1: Por Tu’s Parents 
Por Tu’s parents are an example of people whose family was separated 
because of the border being drawn between Tak province and Karen 
state, Myanmar. Due to free movement prior to the boundary control, 
many Karen people escaped conflict and poverty in neighbouring 
Myanmar and came to Thailand. Some travelled across the border 
between Thailand and Myanmar on an everyday basis. Por Tu’s mother 
made regular visits to their family in Karen state in Myanmar, although 
she and her husband are farmers and have already settled down in Tak 
province. Por Tu’s parents were not conscious of the differences 
between Karen state in Myanmar and Tak province, until the Thai 
government began to pay more attention to the people who crossed the 
border regularly, due to Thailand’s border security policy. Without proof 
of Thai or Myanmar citizenship, Por Tu’s family is unable to cross the 
border to visit their family in Myanmar.  
The immigration police did not let me pass the border to 
Myanmar. I cannot visit my grandparents, because I have 
no citizenship document to show the police. In fact, I have 
had no document at all since I was born. Some people 
suggest that I make a passport, but some say a passport is 
useless too. 
Source: Stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 17 November 2014 
Border checks began because the government wanted to control people at the border due 
to the production and trade in opium in Thailand (Keyes 2002). The people of ethnic 
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groups such as Karen, Hmong and a few others were provided with a 13-digit ID Code, 
different from that of a ‘Thai citizen’ (Keyes 2002, p.1171). The process of identity check 
is very risky for ‘a person with no roots’ such as Por Tu’s parents, because they face 
deportation, if the police find out their legal status. After the border control was 
established, Por Tu’s family had to stop visiting their family in Myanmar. Nineteen years 
after her birth, Por Tu has never visited her grandparents, or been to Karen state in 
Myanmar at all. 
The situation for Por Tu’s family applies to many migrant families along the Thailand–
Myanmar border. From the government’s perspective, state control at the border has 
operated very well, as it makes people without an identity card feel very uneasy about 
crossing the border. People can no longer freely cross the border because of the many 
documents required and, for illegal persons, fear of deportation, which would make them 
lose everything they have on the Thai side.  
Figure 4.3: Tha Song Yang natural border crossing in Tak province 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014 
However, local practice is different from the official picture. What shows on a map is a 
closed borderline drawn all over the state. In reality, it is impossible to close the border 
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completely. A 1,700 km long mountain chain of the Tenasserim Hills or Thiokhao 
Tanaosi and the low-lying Kraburi River, which runs along the southern border of 
Myanmar and  the western border of Thailand, have served as the natural separation line 
between the two states. The natural areas have never been closed, because it is impossible 
for the government to establish check points all along the border. On the other hand, 
people of both countries continue to seek and use natural space for border crossing and 
exchanging products and other supplies. People always find their own ways to manage 
and access the border crossing points, although it takes more time, around 5–8 days, 
mostly at night, and more effort to do it, such as walking and boating (stateless youth, 
FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
Figure 4.4: Rented boat in Moei River between Tak province, Thailand and 
Myawaddy, Myanmar 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014 
4.5. Failure of the Civil Registration Survey  
Statelessness in Thailand also arises from the failure of the civil registration survey due 
to registering errors. The Phibunsongkhram government (1938–1944) thought about 
issuing a national identity card in 1942 followed by the National Identity Card Act B.E. 
2486 (1943). However, implementation was delayed for 10 years due to lack of resources. 
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The first Thai identity card was issued in 1953 for the residents of Bangkok and Thon 
Buri ‘to furnish a legal proof of identity, to facilitate law enforcement officials’ efforts to 
combat crime, to indicate eligibility for social services and to be a means of verifying 
voting rights at elections’ (Ramasoota 2000, p.87). The nationwide ID card was issued 
by the Sarit government in 1962–1965 as a result of the large influx of refugees from 
Laos and Cambodia who migrated into Thai territory (Ramasoota 2000). The card was 
meant to prevent and control illegal border crossings, although it was difficult to 
differentiate the Thais from the non-Thai who already lived in the country.  
In 1956, the Civil Registration Act B.E. 2499 (1956) was passed to underpin the conduct 
of a nationwide civil registration survey. Civil registration aims ‘to serve as legal evidence 
of [an] individual’ and ‘to promote national security’ (Ramasoota 2000, p.99). However, 
this survey failed to include everyone in the country due to the restructure of the census 
office of the Ministry of Interior’s Local Administration Department into the Registration 
Administration Bureau. Insufficient technology for record keeping, difficult access to the 
local villages in  remote areas, and lack of government interest contributed to this outcome 
(Waas et al. 2015). At the same time, with limited access to government information, 
many Indigenous people along the border had difficulty accessing the survey. As a result, 
they remained unregistered and undocumented. Without an identity document, they are 
invisible to the Thai authorities. Hence, local officials categorised them as stateless people 
(NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 7 September 2014). 
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Case Study 2: Boon’s Case 
Boon’s parents were born before the Nationality Act 1913 was put into 
effect. They should be recognised as Thai nationals according to customary 
law, and Boon should have Thai citizenship derived from his parents 
according to the jus sanguinis principle. Unfortunately, Boon’s mother was 
away when the survey was conducted in 1956.  She was then excluded from 
the survey and deprived of Thai citizenship. Boon was born in 1941 in 
Chiang Mai province, and has been facing the problem of being a stateless 
person since birth up to 1999.  Boon has tried very hard to provide 
1. His parents’ birth certificates to prove that they were born in 
Thailand before 1913. 
2. His connection with his parents such as local witnesses in his 
communities or his DNA result that connects him with his parents. 
Source: NGO representative, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 20 November 
2014 
Boon’s case is exceptional. Eventually, after struggling for a long time to prove his Thai 
citizenship, through the civil register survey and nationality law combined, Boon’s 
statelessness ended in 1999, when his first Thai identity card was issued. Since his 58th 
birthday, he has been able to enjoy his Thai citizenship (stateless person, in-depth 
interview, Chiang Mai province, 2014). 
This good fortune has not applied in every case. Many people missed the survey. The 
Thai authorities forced them to hold an identification document entitled ‘Displaced 
Person with Burmese Nationality’ during 1977–1979 to end the survey process quickly.  
The identity card and household registration perform important roles in demonstrating 
the state’s power over its subjects. As Laungaramsri (2014) argues, these documents 
reflect on ‘the establishment of citizenship by binding body, identity and citizenship 
together’ (p. 147). The practice of issuing identity cards and household registration allows 
the state to have fixed, direct contact and enforcement ‘between its ruling bureaucracy 
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and its citizenry’ (Laungaramsri 2014, p.147). Without the official document, the 
government does not recognise the individual’s existence.  
Case Study 3: Sun Sun’s Case 
Sun Sun’s father is one of the ethnic minority people who has been going 
back and forth between Thailand and Myanmar. When the household survey 
was conducted in his province, he was away in Myanmar. Without knowing 
that the survey was being conducted, he could not make his way to 
participate in the survey on time, even though his settlement was in Tak 
province. Only a month later, after returning to Thailand, his name was 
absent from the household registration document. Sun Sun’s father was 
forced to accept the ‘Displaced Person with Burmese Nationality’ card. By 
holding this card, Sun Sun’s father is categorised as an alien who entered 
Thailand illegally, but is permitted to reside in Thailand temporarily. This 
card deprived him and his children of acquiring Thai citizenship. As his 
child, Sun Sun is not recognised as a Thai citizen, although she was born in 
Thailand. 
Source: Stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014 
The Thai government has divided a group of stateless persons or ‘a person with no roots’ 
into four categories. According to limited data provided publicly in 2011 by the 
Registration Administration, Ministry of Interior, these people are assumed to have 
entered the country illegally, because they have no proof of identification. These people 
are categorised into different groups due to different places and times when registration 
has occurred. However, the four groups can be categorised by the identity number that 
appears in identity documents provided by the Thai government (Achavanitkul 2011). 
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Table 4.2: Number of people who are registered as ‘stateless people and people 
with no roots’ in Thailand in 2010 
Registration  Categories Number 
1. Total ethnic minority and descendants 303,610 
2. Absent from household registration  210,182 
3. Transnational migrant labourers from Myanmar, Cambodia 
and Laos 
2,487,015 
4. Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand who live in temporary 
shelters provided by the Government 
102,664 
Total 3,103,471 
Source: Achavanitkul (2011) 
Figure 4.5: Percentage of people registered as ‘stateless people and people with no 
roots’ in Thailand in 2010 
 
Source: Achavanitkul (2011) 
The recent official number of registered stateless people in Thailand is 438,821 
(Jedsadachaiyut and Al-jasem 2016; Rakkanam 2017). However UNHCR believed that 
the total number of stateless people in Thailand ranges between two to three and a half 
million, because many people, including Karen, Mon, Hmong and Rohingya Muslims 
from Myanmar, are not registered with the Thai government (Waas et al. 2015; Rakkanam 
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2017). According to the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University (Thairath Online 2015; 
Saisoonthorn 2003), stateless people in Thailand are of two kinds. The first group is about 
200,000–300,000 children who do not have citizenship. Most are from neighbouring 
countries, including Myanmar. The second group is stateless people who are not 
registered in the civil registration system of any country. Without the official data, 
UNHCR (2013) estimated that there are more than 54,000 unregistered asylum-seekers 
in nine camps along the Thailand–Myanmar border. Most of them are ethnic minorities 
such as Karen and Mon in Thailand. 
Their statelessness has been transferred to their descendants. The problem of law 
enforcement and the narrow legal category applied in the past have negative 
consequences for the recent generation of stateless children and young adults who were 
born and reside in the country.  
Case Study  4: Mon Mon’s Case 
Mon Mon’s father was one of those who missed the civil register 
survey. Mon Mon was born in 1994 in Thailand’s public hospital in 
Chiang Mai. Due to his father not being in the household 
registration document, Mon Mon’s birth registration indicated his 
status as ‘the person who was absent from the household 
registration’. Because of this, he was excluded from acquiring Thai 
citizenship. His right was limited to being a stateless person residing 
in Thailand.  
Source: Parent of stateless youth, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 18 November 
2014 
This situation also applies to at least 210,182 people who were absent from the household 
registration (Achavanitkul 2011). 
Case Study 5: Saw Pu’s Case 
Parents of Saw Pu are ethnic Karen living along the Thailand–
Myanmar border. Before Saw Pu was born, her parents regularly 
visited their family in Karen state in Myanmar. Saw Pu’s mother 
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was examined by the Thai authorities. Since she could not provide 
any evidence of her birth to the state, she received the identity 
number from the Thai authorities beginning with the number ‘6’. 
Without knowing it, Saw Pu’s mother was already legally 
categorised as ethnic minority, or stateless person, by the Thai state. 
Since it did not make any change to her life, she paid no attention 
to it.  
However, when Saw Pu was born in a public hospital in Mae Sot, 
her mother’s identity number made Saw Pu hold an identity number 
beginning with number ‘7’ as she is recognised as a child of an 
ethnic minority, but not a Thai citizen, although she was born in 
Thailand, educated in Thai schools, and speaks and writes Thai 
perfectly. Her rights and freedoms are restricted by the state 
authority. 
Source: Stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014 
4.6. Problems in Understanding the Nationality Laws  
The lack of understanding of the Thai nationality laws among local officials can also 
contribute to the stateless situation in Thailand. To begin with, there is no official 
guideline for the hospital to issue birth certificates to children of illegal alien parents, 
particularly babies born to parents who are illegal migrants in Thailand (Waas et al. 2015). 
In the bureaucratic process, all children, including those who are born to foreign parents, 
are now allowed to obtain a birth certificate, if they are born in Thailand. Many of the 
hospitals, however, simply do not record the births of the children of illegal alien parents 
(Nyo 2001, p.54). 
My mom told me that it was very difficult to have my birth certificate because 
the hospital did not provide it to her. She had to pay a lot of money for them 
to give her my birth certificate. If I do not have the birth certificate, I will have 
nothing. But it is indicated in my birth certificate that I have ‘no nationality’ 
because my mom is not Thai and I do not have a father either (stateless youth, 
FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014). 
At hospitals in areas with large numbers of migrants, such as in Ranong and Samut Sakorn, 
‘pregnant Burmese women are allowed to deliver their babies … [and] the babies are 
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given health and medical support based on humanitarian principles’ (Nyo 2001, p.54). 
However, some hospital staff ‘remove the birth records of these babies from the doctor’s 
appointment book to prevent the children from claiming Thai nationality’ (Yang 2006, 
p.523). 
In addition, the legal status of a Thai citizen was subject to withdrawal. The phenomenon 
of citizenship withdrawal from 1,243 villagers in Mae Ai district, Chiang Mai province 
in 2002 demonstrates the lack of understanding of Thai nationality laws among local 
officials and officials of the Department of Public Administration (Saisoonthorn 2006, 
p.45). In this case, the addition of 1,243 names of villagers to the household registration 
in Mae Ai district approved by a previous district chief officer during 1996–2000 was 
cancelled by an order from the Department of Public Administration (Manager Online 
2005; Saisoonthorn 2006). This cancellation made these villagers lose Thai citizenship 
and become stateless aliens due to the absence of their name in the household registration. 
Mae Ai villagers protested in front of the Administration Court building in Chiang Mai 
province to defend their legal status. These cases happened because the Mae Ai district 
officials did not see these people as ‘Thai’ (Laungaramsri 2014, p. 143). They have been 
living along the border and are seen as people from Myanmar who are ethnically and 
culturally different from the Thai (Manager Online 2005). Consequently, these people 
had to file a case against the cancellation order. 
To help the villagers regain Thai citizenship, academics and NGOs intervened to advise 
and assist villagers to prove that they have the right to be on the household registration 
and have Thai citizenship. With the support of lawyers from the Lawyers Council of 
Thailand and a previous district chief official, this case was brought to the Administrative 
Court in Chiang Mai province between 2002 and 2005. Thai citizenship is very hard to 
regain, because the process involves examining an individual’s family history, the 
evidence of official documents, witnesses from their community and finally the district 
official’s discretion to approve each individual receiving Thai citizenship. 
After three years, a result was released. The Administrative Court disagreed with the 
Department of Public Administration’s withdrawal of villagers’ names from the 
household registration in 2002. Eventually, the court ordered that the Thai citizenship 
cancellation of the Mae Ai villagers was illegal (Manager Online 2005).  
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...An administrative order was issued unlawfully. The court ordered that the 
announcement of Mae Ai district, dated February 5, 2545 be dismissed and 
the order affects everyone who was affected by the announcement (Sa-
Nguanwong 2005, p. 9). 
The court assumed that the villagers have Thai citizenship by birth. By order of the court, 
Thai citizenship was returned to the 1,243 villagers of Mae Ai district On 8 September 
2005. This lack of understanding of the citizenship law among local officials can 
contribute significantly to the statelessness situation in Thailand.  
4.7. Political Changes and Unsettled Citizenship Policy 
Statelessness also arises from political changes which make national policy on granting 
citizenship unstable. Political instability since 1988 and armed ethnic struggles in 
Myanmar have resulted in the influx of displaced persons from Myanmar to Thailand. As 
the Thai government has not ratified the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, 
approximately 140,000 displaced people from Myanmar do not have official refugee 
status. In principle, they are allowed to stay only in the areas called a ‘temporary shelter’ 
along the Thailand–Myanmar border with the assistance of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Refugees without identity proof found outside 
the camp are considered illegal migrants who are subject to deportation.  
In practice, these refugees go to a nearby border town for work on a daily basis. The 
labour shortage in certain sectors of Thai industries since 1992 has encouraged the Thai 
state to introduce a new category of registered illegal migrant worker from Myanmar, 
Laos and Cambodia (Pongsawat 2007). This process has become one of the many pull 
factors that transfers refugees to the status of being illegal migrant workers in the border 
towns. Since 1992, Thailand has adopted an immigration policy which allows illegal 
unskilled foreign migrant workers to work temporarily in Thailand (Chantavanich 2007). 
A number of their children has been born in Thailand. It was estimated in 2012 that there 
were approximately 377,000 migrant children under 18 years old, while about 82,000 
children were born to unregistered migrant parents (Huguet, Chamratrithirong and 
Claudia 2012, pp.5–6). Refugees who work outside the camps have to keep their children 
with them, or send them to a relative in the shelters. These children are considered as 
stateless persons, who are unable to obtain Thai citizenship. They are allowed to live in a 
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specific area, while waiting for deportation or any further policy change (Pongsawat 
2007). 
In 2001, the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001–2006), made some changes to 
granting Thai citizenship. The Thai Cabinet allowed individuals who have taken part in a 
previous government survey and lack identification to stay for one year in Thailand with 
temporary residency. To apply for Thai citizenship, however, they have to prove that they 
have been born in Thailand and that one of their parents is Thai. People born in remote 
and mountainous areas found these requirements very difficult as they lacked documents 
and other evidence to prove their birthplace and parental relationship. A one year deadline 
was too short to prove their status. Consequently, many people have been left stateless by 
being considered merely as illegal migrants. Although a number of refugees has been 
allowed to live in temporary refugee camps, there are more than two million people who 
live and work outside the camps illegally. Children born to these people in Thailand are 
ineligible for citizenship, either in Myanmar or in Thailand (Nyo 2001; Quinnell and Perri 
2014). 
On Thailand’s Children’s Day 2006, a stateless girl from Sop Moei Wittayakom School 
in Mae Hong Son’s Sop Moei district sent a letter to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
begging for Thai citizenship (Noonoon 2006). The letter was the first step that led Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to declare that Thai citizenship would be granted to two 
million stateless people living on Thai territory (The Nation 2006). This policy was 
expected to cover different groups of stateless people, including children studying in 
Thailand and other migrants, who have been living in the kingdom for at least 10 
consecutive years. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown 
later in 2006, and processes for obtaining citizenship in Thailand were not continued as 
the policy was not considered an urgent issue (Polutan 2012).  
The lives of stateless young adults were at risk again in 2013. Thailand’s Ministry of 
Interior planned to release a draft Ministerial Regulation to specify the status and 
conditions to stay in Thailand for persons who have been born in Thailand but do not 
have Thai citizenship (Asian Human Rights Commission 2013; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2017). This draft prescribes the legal status and conditions for residing in Thailand 
of persons born in Thailand who have not yet acquired Thai citizenship. It would deprive 
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children born to non-Thai parents of citizenship. Under the draft regulation, anyone born 
in Thailand, to non-Thai parents would be deemed to have entered and resided in Thailand 
without permission under the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979). This includes those 
children and young adults who were born in Thailand and have not left the country, so 
that they have not entered the country, whether legally or illegally. As a result, stateless 
children would be forced to leave the country without being able to choose between 
staying in Thailand or moving to Myanmar. This would be the case even though they 
were born in Thailand; they have no right to stay (Asian Human Rights Commission 
2013). 
Fortunately, political unrest in Thailand in 2014 delayed the draft as well as the approval 
process for citizenship. As one of the informants said, it is very easy to notice that 
[c]ompared to the elected government, the Thai government resulting from 
the Coup sees the request for Thai citizenship as important. When an elected 
government puts more concentration on economic development, the request 
for Thai citizenship is always delayed. For my understanding, the delay is 
because of the inflexible main policy from the central government. I would 
suggest local government participate in the approval of citizenship (NGO 
representative, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014). 
In 2015, the Royal Thai Government announced that 18,773 (about 4.2 per cent) stateless 
people in Thailand have been granted Thai citizenship in the last three years (Rakkanam 
2017). Many of them are hill tribe persons who have ancestral ties to their territory and 
are ethnically different from the Thai majority. Granting citizenship to hill tribe people is 
a matter for Thailand’s national security, as these stateless people are seen as being 
involved in the drug trade and other illegal activities along the borders. A few children of 
illegal migrants, who fled from Myanmar to Thailand, were granted citizenship in 2015. 
This granting of citizenship is a result of Thailand’s establishment of a legal framework 
such as the National Strategy on Administration of Legal Status and Rights of Persons in 
2005 and its nationality law reform in 2008 (Batha 2015; Spindler 2016; Jedsadachaiyut 
and Al-jasem 2016). 
In reality, seeking Thai citizenship is fraught with difficulties. According to national 
security policy 2015–2021, the government is focused on external threats which involve 
the border management, illegal migrants and stateless people. The government aims to 
solve the problem of illegal border crossing by non-Thai immigrants and individuals 
without legal status (stateless people) (Office of the National Security Council 2015, 
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pp.13–25). The government’s database shows that Thailand has a total registered 
population of 438,821 stateless people which is very different from the number of de facto 
stateless persons estimated by the UNHCR (506,197 persons) (Jedsadachaiyut and  
Al-jasem 2016; Kneebone 2017). It is unlikely that the statelessness situation in Thailand 
will be solved by 2024, in line with the UNHCR’s campaign to end statelessness by 2024 
(Bloom 2014). 
The process of applying for Thai citizenship is very difficult. Some people 
have to wait more than 10 years. Thailand has more than ten thousand stateless 
children. They are born in Thailand or along Thailand’s border. These 
children and young adults are living in Thailand. They are studying in Thai 
schools. They have grown up as Thais, but their rights are limited because 
they cannot choose to be born. There are many limitations on their lives. Not 
being granted Thai citizenship only because of their non-Thai parents, is 
really inhumane (NGO representative, Mae Sot, Tak province, in-depth 
interview, 10 September 2014).    
4.8. The Failure to Obtain a Birth Certificate 
In 1992, The Thai government ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) (1989) and instructed all state hospitals to issue birth registration documents to all 
parents. According to Article 7 of the Convention (1989, p. 3)  
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance 
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
stateless. 
In reality, stateless minorities are not aware that, because they do not have citizenship, 
their children fail to have citizenship as well.  There are two main reasons for this failure. 
Firstly, there are many difficulties in accessing the birth certificate at the time of birth. 
Secondly, many migrant parents overlook the importance of their child’s birth registration. 
4.8.1. Difficulties in Accessing the Birth Certificate  
Thousands of people have been living in highland and remote areas where the original 
census surveys have never been available to them. Many policies relating to their rights 
have never been translated into their original languages (Calderbank 2008). The problems 
of access and translation have occurred in terms of birth certificates. In practice, many 
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parents did not obtain birth certificates for their children due to the complexity of the 
process. For example, the parents need to travel from remote areas to district offices for 
registration. Also there are reports of some local officials charging fees for the certificate 
from local parents, although it was supposed to be free.  
Many local people have given birth to their children in remote areas. They did 
not have time to travel to the hospital in the city. People prefer to have a 
midwife to help them deliver. When a child is born, people are too busy to 
travel to the government office which is located far away from their house, so 
they do not bother to register their new born baby. These people are ethnic 
minority too. They do not want to get themselves in trouble by seeing officials. 
They do not understand and cannot write Thai much. Going there is time 
consuming. They would rather work for a living than waste their time getting 
their child registered (Government official, Mae Sot, Tak province, in-depth 
interview, 20 September 2014).  
Along the Thailand–Myanmar border, particularly in Mae Sot district, migrant parents 
can go to Thai hospitals or health care centres provided by NGOs for delivery. Some 
migrant parents are provided a delivery letter or certificate after birth. Some parents can 
ask for birth registration for their child. However, most illegal migrant workers, especially 
those who are out of the camp seeking a job, are not keen to request a birth registration 
certificate for their children, because they are afraid that they will be asked to provide 
proof of identity. Although illegal migrant parents and refugees are entitled to request a 
delivery certificate and birth registration, it is very risky for them to return to the hospital 
three days after the request to collect it, because they are afraid of deportation, if the 
government officials know of their existence. 
Birth registration had never operated in refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar 
border previously. This is because the Thai government was unaware that these people 
were staying a long time in the camps. The Thai government believed that most displaced 
people were attached to their homeland in Myanmar, so they might return home after a 
short stay. (Wangsiriphaisan et al. 2010). However, after the first refugee settlements in 
Tak province were established in 1984, the Thai government realised that many people 
stayed for a long time. Consequently, many infant children and youth aged 0 up to 20 
years old have been born in temporary shelter areas. In fact, these children have never left 
the temporary shelter areas or refugee camps on the Thai side of the border. Since 2001 
the situation regarding birth registration has changed. Government authorities have tried 
to provide birth certificates for new born babies in refugee camps. As of the end of 
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November 2001, 1,700 birth certificates had been issued to new born babies in the camps. 
However, birth certificates are issued only to children of registered refugees and only 
registered parents can register the birth of their child at the Thai municipality office 
(Committee for the Protection and Promotion of Child Rights (Burma) 2009). 
Moreover, the government officials are often unable to reach them to provide birth 
certificates. Some people from the camp try very hard to make their way to Mae Sot 
Hospital (MSH) for delivery.  
My mom came from Karen state in Myanmar. She moved to live in a refugee 
camp in Mae La refugee camp in Tha Song Yang District, but I was not born 
in the camp. My mom was very lucky to come to Mae Sot Hospital to give 
birth to me. My mom did not want me to be born in the camp. I was born in 
the hospital. I do not know if my mom was given my birth certificate or not. 
Now I do not have my birth certificate (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 12 September 2014). 
Since opening in 1989, Mae Tao Clinic (MTC) has been widely recognised among 
refugees and migrant workers as a community hospital run by Dr. Cynthia Maung, who 
was displaced in 1988. The clinic has been providing health care services to the Myanmar 
refugees, legal and illegal migrant population in Mae Sot province and around the area. 
At the clinic, all babies are provided with birth documents. With this document, the 
parents can apply for a Thai birth certificate and 13-digit ID Code at the municipality 
office, although this number does not confer Thai citizenship35 (Mae Tao Clinic’s officer, 
in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 16 September 2014).  
Case Study 6: Ma: A Mother of a Stateless Youth 
Ma, 35 years old, from Karen state, came to live in a refugee camp 
for a while before she searched for a job outside the camp. She has 
now been working on a farm in Phop Pra District, Thailand, for 
more than 8 years. During her pregnancy, she went to visit Mae Tao 
Clinic once because she was aware of her status as an illegal worker. 
                                                             
35 Children born to migrant parents in Mae Tao Clinic are provided with birth documents with 
the13-digit ID Code beginning with number ‘0’ which categorises them as stateless people 
without civil registration records, and who have not been granted Thai citizenship. They have 
been permitted to live temporarily in Thailand (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae 
Sot, Tak province, 10 September 2014). 
 101 
She was afraid of being arrested by the police along the way since 
she does not have any legal document. 
I was seven months into my pregnancy when I decided 
to come to the clinic to give birth. After the birth, I 
processed my baby to get a Thai birth certificate and 
ID number. With the help of the clinic staff and the 
birth document from the clinic, I hope my baby will 
get them soon. 
Source: A mother of a stateless youth, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 8 
September 2014 
Since the establishment of the Committee for Protection and Promotion of Child Rights 
(CPPCR) in 2002, all babies who are born in the clinic are registered with the CPPCR. 
This service is also for unregistered migrants who are afraid of going to the municipality 
office for their child’s registration. According to CPPCR (2009), more than 13,400 
children registered with CPPCR between July 2003 and December 2008. With the 
objective of decreasing the number of children without documents, registered children 
are provided with either a Birth Registration Record 36  or a Child Record 37 . These 
documents are recognised by UNHCR’s resettlement programme and some community-
based migrant learning centres (Committee for the Protection and Promotion of Child 
Rights (Burma) 2009; Mae Tao Clinic’s officer, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 16 September 2014).  
4.8.2. Recognition of the Importance of Birth Registration  
Many migrant parents fail to recognise the importance of their child’s birth registration. 
Even though the birth registration service has been provided conveniently at hospitals, 
the clinic and the Thai municipality office, local people, especially illegal migrant 
workers, fail to register their child, because they do not think that their child’s birth 
certificate is important. Consequently, their child is not registered at birth, or the birth 
certificate is not carefully kept.   
                                                             
36 Any children who already have a delivery certificate from any hospital in Thailand or 
Myanmar and babies who are registered with CPPCR within 15 days of birth are provided with 
a Birth Registration Record. 
37 A Child Record is provided to any registered children who are under 15 years old and do not 
have any document. 
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The majority of children born in remote areas are delivered by local midwives who have 
no knowledge of the importance of the birth certificate. The parents are not advised to get 
their child registered and to process the birth certificate correctly after the birth of the 
child. Thai authorities attempt to reach them and provide birth certificates, but it is 
impossible to get everyone registered due to difficulties of access and distance. On the 
other hand, parents in remote areas do not want to travel to the municipality office located 
in the city. Moreover, support from the NGOs such as CPPCR is not totally successful. 
CPPCR is accessible to everyone, but more than 25 per cent of babies are left unregistered 
because their parents do not know that the birth certificate is important (Committee for 
the Protection and Promotion of Child Rights (Burma) 2009).Therefore, these babies are 
unable to receive their birth registration. 
Many illegal migrants can make their way to a Thai hospital. Normally, parents are 
provided with their child’s birth certificate at the hospital. These parents can use the birth 
certificate to register their child at the municipality office within 15 days, but they avoid 
doing so. Their reluctance in going to the office can be seen as a problem that comes with 
the language barrier, the cost of travel, being time consuming, the cost of a translator and 
helper, and, importantly, their risk in facing the Thai authorities. 
I do not know if this [birth certificate] document is important for my child. At 
first, I do not want to have it because I need to ask someone to help me to get 
it. Everything was written in Thai. I cannot read Thai. But my Thai boss said 
this is important because my child can go to school and go to hospital with 
this paper, so I should keep it (a parent of a stateless youth, in-depth interview, 
Mae Sot, Tak province, 7 September 2014). 
The birth certificate is not carefully kept because the parents do not think the document 
is important.  It is important to note that illegal parents have to move between the camps 
or towns frequently. Consequently, the birth certificate is lost easily.  
I asked my mom where I was born. She said I was born in Mae Sot Hospital. 
I asked her again if I have my birth registration or my birth certificate. She 
was not sure because we have moved around, so she does not care to keep it. 
Now I do not have my birth certificate, so cannot prove that I was born here 
(stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014). 
The lack of a birth certificate at the time of birth and the loss of the birth certificate, 
because the parents do not think the document is important make these young adults 
unable to prove their birth. Without the birth certificate, it is hard for these young adults 
to access public services and apply for their Thai citizenship in the future.  
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4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the context of Thailand’s citizenship law. The 
discussion of the overseas Chinese in Thailand reflects the success of the Siamese/Thai 
government’s policy in assimilating aliens into Siamese/Thai society. The main elements 
of statelessness in Thailand are presented. The first element is the complexity of 
Thailand’s nationality law and law enforcement. The second element is the borderlines 
that were drawn across the groups of Indigenous people. The third element is the failure 
of the civil registration survey in 1956. Later on, statelessness arising from Thailand’s 
bureaucratic administration and political changes is presented. The final aspect relates to 
children failing to obtain their birth certificates. Stateless minorities have many 
difficulties in accessing their birth certificates at the time of birth.  
Many stateless young adults were born in Thailand and have never left the country at all. 
Their stateless status is not their fault. However, without citizenship they are considered 
as illegal migrants who have entered and resided in Thailand without permission. 
Accordingly, stateless young adults are not only deprived of their basic rights, including 
the right to be a citizen, but also are forced to leave the country. The mechanism employed 
by the Thai state to provide a legal mantle for non-Thai citizens and stateless people is 
discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Legalising Statelessness: National 
Security Policies towards Stateless People in Thailand 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses mechanisms employed by the Thai government to legalise non-
Thai migrants and stateless people. This chapter argues that Thailand’s national security 
policies play an important role in legalising non-Thai migrants. In practice, the Thai 
government has legally categorised stateless people as having semi-legal status which 
limits their access to rights under Thailand’s domestic law. ‘Categorisation’ is used as a 
form of state surveillance to control the mobility of the population in the border areas and 
border crossings as part of national security policies. It restricts these people’s lives and 
makes them subject to the law. However, the lack of a consistent rationale in the 
categorisation results in marginalising stateless people and places their lives at the mercy 
of Thailand’s domestic law. 
5.2. National Security  
The concept of national security ‘represents the traditional understanding of security, to 
include the protection of territory and citizens from external threats’ such as other states 
and transnational actors (Liotta and Bilgin 2013, p.111). However, it is one of a number 
of security concepts which are diverse and contested (Nasu 2011; Suhrke 1999). Since 
the 1980s, and increasingly since the end of the Cold War, many international relations 
scholars and foreign policy academics have attempted to construct comprehensive and 
scientific studies which define the concept of security both from the perception of security 
threats and the way threats are addressed (Edwards and Waas 2014). However, it is not 
easy to reach an agreement on the substantive meaning of the concept (Suhrke 1999, p.93).  
From the traditional point of view, security is defined in military terms. It primarily 
focuses ‘on state protection from threats to national interests’ (Nasu 2011, p.16). In 1957, 
Hans Kelsen defined security as ‘the protection of men against the use of force by other 
men’ (Kelsen 1957, p. 1). This concept strongly connects with national security. It is 
defined as the physical protection of state territory and national survival by using military 
power to defend the country. As the ultimate raison d’être of sovereign states, national 
security aims to protect territory from external military threats and attacks (Nasu 2011). 
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In the late twentieth century, the security concept was adjusted and expanded to include 
various forms of security such as international security, human security, economic 
security, environmental security, food security and health security in accordance with 
international laws. 
As a traditional concept of security, national security has been at the centre of security 
studies for many years. Traditionally, national security focuses mainly on collective self-
defence for the survival of a sovereign state. However, the contemporary political 
situation and public concerns have diversified national security towards wider issues that 
pose greater threats to the state (Nasu 2011). The contemporary development of the 
national security concept reflects challenges of interpretation and application of 
traditional norms and rules in order to be able to incorporate non-traditional security 
threats such as ‘economic vulnerabilities, environmental challenges, political and societal 
instabilities’(Brauch 2011, p. 64).  
As a contested concept, national security has been heavily critiqued. It is difficult to 
define whose security it is and which dimension of security is being discussed. A vague 
definition of threats to the nation can be ‘used to defend or promote a range of 
particularistic interests’ which may have nothing to do with national interests at all 
(Suhrke 1999, p.93). The contemporary international political system has been designed 
to encourage downgrading of the traditional importance of national security in terms of 
its military aspect. The Western states employ non-military pressures such as law 
enforcement to handle new forms of insecurity (Suhrke 1999). As a result, non-traditional 
and non-military usage of security have become the central focus.  
On the other hand, the threats posed by non-state transnational terrorists challenge the 
conventional understanding of the right to self-defence. States have returned to employing 
military responses instead of law enforcement (Nasu 2011). The right of self-defence 
allows an armed attack by one against others to be justified. As the concept of national 
security is changeable, the misuse of it diversifies the security discourse and justifies 
states in distancing themselves from international legal obligations (Nasu 2011). As a 
result, national security may pose threats to individuals and may violate their human rights 
and human security. 
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5.3. National Security Policies in the Thai Context 
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) prioritises national security as an emergency issue 
that requires immediate action. In Thailand, the concept of national security is 
controversial and changeable depending on the government’s objective. It has been 
politicised and dominated by the power struggle between the Thai elites, the military-
bureaucracy and the capitalist-politicians. McCargo (2002) argues that national security 
discourses are used to serve the immediate interests of the military and defence elite, 
rather than protecting the country from genuine threats to the nation. 
During the colonial era in Southeast Asia, national security defence was considered 
successful as Siam was able to maintain its independence throughout the period. Although 
there were numbers of power struggles, territorial disputes, armed insurgency and wars 
along the border, the Thai military always found ‘strategies to avoid having to fight 
anyone’ (McCargo 2002, p. 55). In fact, the military in Thailand, as an armed bureaucracy, 
does not usually fight wars or defend national sovereignty. The Thai military exists to 
exercise control over the civilian population. 
Throughout the 1970’s, the success of communism in Indochina caused serious concerns 
for the Thai government, both because of the communist insurgencies in the jungles of 
Thailand and the influx of refugees from neighbouring Communist countries. The 
government’s anxiety was reflected in Thailand’s national security policies, as a result of 
a series of battles between Royal Thai Army troops and communists, who were 
considered as ‘a threat to the nation, its religion, and its monarchy’ (Ettinger 2007, p. 
663). Limits on refugees from neighbouring Communist countries, particularly from 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were imposed to maintain Thailand’s national security. 
Since then, the national security policies have focused on controlling populations crossing 
the borders.  
5.3.1. Stateless People as a Threat to National Security 
The Thai government believes that the country faces several major security threats. 
Between 2007 and 2011 national security strategy focused on two priorities. Firstly, 
internal security and stability were to be protected. Secondly, national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity were to be maintained (Chongkittavorn 2012). The Thai government 
considered security threats from neighbouring countries such as Myanmar and Cambodia 
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as major national security challenges that required immediate action (Chachavalpongpun 
2014, p.50).  
From a national security perspective, during the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001–
2006), perceived threats from Myanmar included ethnic insurgencies resulting in forcibly 
displaced people from Myanmar, drug trafficking and illegal immigrants. They often 
ended up in refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar border, all of which are directly 
administrated by the Thai government. Refugee policy is set by the National Security 
Council (NSC) and implemented by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Moreover, other 
government agencies such as the Royal Thai Army Paramilitary Rangers and the Border 
Patrol Police control the camps (The Border Consortium (TBC) 2014). 
On the other hand, more than two million migrants from Myanmar have made a huge 
contribution to Thailand’s rapid economic growth. Nevertheless, the government 
considers them as threats to local Thai society (Chachavalpongpun 2014, p. 57). As 
shown regularly in the Thai media, some non-Thai migrant workers have committed 
serious crimes in various forms including drug and human trafficking, rape, kidnapping 
and murder. National security policy towards these illegal migrant workers, however, can 
have a serious impact on the socio-economic sector in Thailand. 
Since the military coup in May 2014, the junta government has pursued two main security 
policies (Office of the National Security Council 2015). Firstly, the national security 
policy has focused on peace building in the deep-south conflict zones in Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat. Secondly, the policy focuses on external threats involving the border 
management and illegal migrants in an attempt to solve the problem of illegal border 
crossing. This focus demonstrates that Thai national security policy is concerned with the 
border and illegal non-Thai immigrants.  
For the government, the problems of illegal immigration and individuals without legal 
status (stateless people) need to be resolved so ‘that [they do] not affect national security’ 
(Shinawatra 2011, p.10). As stated in Thailand’s National Security Strategies, 
The problem of ethnic insurgencies involves battles along the Thailand–
Cambodia border and the Thailand–Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(Myanmar) border. The ethnic insurgencies in neighbouring countries cause 
many problems which have negative impact on the development and national 
security of Thailand. These problems are (1) displaced people fleeing from 
fighting and (2) the movement of minority people across the Thailand–
Myanmar border. They immigrate across borders into Thailand and are living 
 109 
in temporary shelter areas along the border between Thailand and Myanmar. 
In total, nine temporary shelter camps house more than 100,000 people 
(Office of the National Security Council 2015, p. 47) 
There is a number of domestic laws and policies concerning non-Thai citizens including 
illegal migrants and stateless people in Thailand which derive from the Thai national 
security policies. Aspects of these are discussed below. 
5.4. Legalising Statelessness 
The issue of statelessness has raised several concerns in terms of national security. 
Stateless people, by definition, are individuals without legal status; no state recognises 
them. Legalising stateless individuals is a challenging idea for the Thai state, although 
states have the responsibility of Recognition of Legal Personality according to 
international law (Saisoonthorn 2006). In Thailand, stateless people have no 
constitutional rights. They are subjected to Thailand’s national policies which play 
important roles in legalising and controlling stateless people. 
From the national security perspective, the issue of belonging or not belonging is very 
important. Before the enactment of the Nationality Act 1913, Thailand had never faced 
the problem of statelessness, but after the enactment, the status of undocumented persons 
or stateless individuals became problematic, because they were considered as not 
belonging to Thai society and might do harm to the nation. Due to the nation-state’s 
requirements, the definition of non-citizen was needed (Toyota 2006). The process of 
‘categorisation’ among non-Thai migrants was employed. However, before the 1960’s 
the government did not attempt to document non-Thai individuals. Later on, ‘a person 
without legal status in civil registration’ was documented. The issuing of a non-Thai 
identity document means that the Thai state admits this legal personality as one who is 
not yet proved to be a Thai citizen, or aliens who are unable to return to their home country. 
McCargo (2011) argues that citizenship in Southeast Asia is complicated, particularly in 
Thailand where the 1997 constitution ‘explicitly assigned rights only to citizens: non-
citizens had no constitutional rights’ (McCargo 2011, p.842). In Thailand a person 
without identification papers, especially many ethnic minority groups of stateless people 
in Northern Thailand and large numbers of Myanmar population along the Western 
border of Thailand, may have experienced being harassed, or asked to pay bribes. They 
are  vulnerable to changing regulation or a rotation of individual officials (McCargo 2011). 
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Laungaramsri (2003) and McKinnon (2005) argue that hundreds of thousands of stateless 
Karen people along the Thailand-Myanmar border have been constructed as subject to 
the state rather than as Thai citizens. They have been randomly checked by police officials 
on an everyday basis and regularly forced to demonstrate evidence of being Thai. 
Although Karens are born in Thailand, increasingly speak Thai as their native language, 
and are educated in the Thai education system, they are not considered as Thais, because 
they are unable to show their Thai ID card to the state authorities.  
Pongsawat (2007) considers the process of issuing the non-Thai citizen identity document 
as the contemporary Thai state’s invention to create ‘partial citizenship’ of the ethnic 
minority group. It is a result of the flexibility of the Thai state in handling the situation its 
own way (Pongsawat 2007). This partial citizenship allows non-Thai individuals to be 
subjected to Thailand’s domestic laws. In exchange, they are allowed to stay temporarily 
in Thailand, which ‘has a tremendous impact on the urban development trajectories at the 
Thai–Myanmar [border crossing] regions’ (Pongsawat 2007, p. 141), because this policy 
has added numbers of cheap labourers from minority immigrants and registered illegal 
migrant workers to the Thai economy. Due to national security policy, non-Thai citizens 
are controlled under a form of state surveillance such as the non-Thai identity document. 
This document is expected to control the mobility of the population in the border areas 
and border crossings (Pongsawat 2007). 
5.4.1. Coin Identification 
The Thai government uses two significant methods in order to legalise non-Thai migrants. 
Firstly, Coin and Colour ID Card identification are issued to those who are already in 
Thailand. A non-Thai identity coin was first issued to Vietnamese refugees in 1967 
(Pongsawat 2007; Laungaramsri 2014).  At the same time, the Thai government initially 
introduced and provided non-Thai hill tribe individuals and families with hill tribe coins 
or Rien chao khao. Due to the lack of record keeping technology and the frequent 
movement of hill tribe people, the processes of identification, household registration and 
proof of citizenship were difficult. The coin contains the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s 
image on the front and the abbreviation of the province of residency followed by ID 
number on the back. This coin was provided and used as de facto national ID card to 
separate Thai subjects from non-Thai subjects. However, the coin cannot confer Thai 
citizenship. The government used the coin as ‘a means of securing the border through 
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certifying individual identity and controlling movement across the border’ (Laungaramsri 
2014, p.150) without granting Thai citizenship to non-Thai subjects. 
The hill tribe coin was issued by the government to hill tribe people including 
Karen people in 1969. The Thai government at that time was afraid that the 
hill tribe people would convert to Communism, so that the coins were 
provided to be used as ID cards. As you can see, there is the King’s image in 
the front. The back of the coin was endorsed ‘ชม’ which stands for Chiang Mai 
with ID number following (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, 
Tak province, 6 September 2014). 
Figure 5.1: Hill tribe coin 
 
Source: Mongyasu 2013 
The coin was used as verification of individual and family settlement in Thailand since 
1969. Although it was used widely as a national ID along the border and in the 
mountainous areas, issuing of the coin stopped a year later. The high demand for the coin 
made it widely stolen. As a result, true ownership of the coin was difficult to prove. 
5.4.2. Colour Identification Card  
With advances in the technology of record keeping, registered non-Thai migrants are 
provided with different colour cards (Bat Si) for identification according to the various 
groups to which they are assigned (Laungaramsri 2014). The Thai government recognised 
16 groups of non-Thai migrants. They are either minority Indigenous groups such as hill-
tribe people or individual illegal immigrants, including asylum seekers from 
neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia (Pongsawat 
2007).  
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The Thai government recognised minority migrants, who stayed in Thailand before the 
Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), as certain groups38 of non-Thai populations. After the 
implementation of the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), illegal migrants were either not 
allowed to enter the kingdom, or entered the kingdom without the normal legal 
immigration processes at ‘immigration check points, designated landing stations or areas 
and in accordance with the prescribed time as published in the Royal Government Gazette 
by the Minister’ (Immigration Act B.E. 2522 1979, p.6). If they had already entered the 
country, they were subjected to being arrested and deported.  
For illegal non-Thai populations who had already entered the country, the government 
instituted two processes. Firstly, they were registered with the government as minority 
immigrants in order not to be arrested or deported. Secondly, their mobility was limited 
while waiting for the government’s decision on their legal status. In the meantime, they 
had to get permission from a district officer or a governor, if they wanted to leave the 
district or province where they were registered (Pongsawat 2007).  
Since the enactment of the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), the legal status of non-Thai 
migrants has been resolved on a case by case basis. Granting legal status to non-Thai 
migrants has depended heavily on a series of cabinet resolutions. According to the 
outcomes at different times, cabinet resolutions concerning non-Thai migrants consist of 
three different decisions. The first decision is that the Thai government can grant legal or 
illegal immigrant status to non-Thai migrants. The series of cabinet resolutions that grants 
legal immigrant status apply to Haw Chinese39, Nepalese and Thai Lue migrants. 
It is worth noting here that these card holders are not eligible for Thai citizenship, but 
their children are eligible for Thai citizenship. For example, Independent Haw Chinese40 
ID Card holders, Nepalese Immigration ID Card holders and Thai Lue ID Card holders 
are assigned the status of legal immigrants, but not Thai citizenship, according to cabinet 
resolutions in 1998 and 2000 respectively. However, their children who were born at 
specific times in Thailand are eligible for Thai citizenship. The children of Independent 
                                                             
38 These are non-Thai minority immigrants including hill-tribe people. 
39 This group is the family of ex-soldiers of the Kuomintang army who identified as the ethnic 
Haw or the Yunannese. They came to live in the northern part of Thailand 1950–1961 
(Pongsawat 2007, p.171). 
40 This group consists of the Kuomintang soldiers who illegally migrated to stay in Thailand’s 
Northern provinces such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hongson, and Phayao during 1962–
1978 (Pongsawat 2007, p.171) 
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Haw Chinese ID Card holders and Nepalese Immigration ID Card holders who were born 
between 1972 and 1992 are eligible for Thai citizenship, whilst the children of Thai Lue 
ID Card holders born in Thailand after 1994 are also eligible for Thai citizenship. 
On the other hand, illegal immigrant status is granted to those who have to renew their 
status annually. Highlanders, who participated in the government’s survey in 1999 are 
provided with a green card with red border which was replaced by a pink card in 2007. 
They are required to verify their status within one year, according to a cabinet resolution 
in 2000. Moreover, an Aliens Labour Card was provided to illegal migrant workers 
between 1992 and 2004 in accordance with a cabinet resolution in 1992. Illegal migrant 
workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos were granted temporary residency in 
Thailand’s four industrial provinces.41 This was later extended to 43 provinces in 1996, 
in order to fill the shortage of cheap labourers in some sectors of Thailand’s industries 
(Martin 2007; Lim and Yamada 2013). Later in 2006, the government required employers 
in all 76 provinces to register migrant workers. As a result, 668,576 migrant workers were 
registered. An additional 53,202 work permits were issued. In total, Thailand registered 
about 722,000 migrant workers in 2006 (Martin 2007, pp.2–4). According to the 2014 
Myanmar Population and Housing Census (Taw 2015), 1,418,472 former Myanmar 
residents were living in Thailand. These numbers are only registered migrants. They are 
allowed to extend their residency annually. However, their children are not eligible for 
Thai citizenship. 
The second decision enables the Thai government to permit legal naturalisation of non-
Thai citizen card holders and grant Thai citizenship to their children, who were born in 
Thailand at a certain time, or those who entered the kingdom at a specific time. The 
cabinet decision allows legal naturalisation to those who hold a Vietnamese Refugee ID 
Card 1967–1999, Kuo Min Tang (KMT) Soldier ID Card 1984, Displaced People with 
Myanmar Nationality ID Card 1976, ex-Malayu Communist ID Card 1989–1990, 
Highlander ID Cards including Mulbri ID Card in 1990 and ID Card of Displaced Person 
with Thai Race and Myanmar Nationality, who entered Thailand before 1976.  
Thai citizenship was returned to two groups of displaced people with Thai origin in Kong 
Island, Cambodia and Myanmar, if they decided to move back to Thai territory. They 
                                                             
41 These industrial provinces are Chiang Rai, Tak, Kanchanaburi, and Ranong. 
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were displaced as a result of the border and territory negotiations in the past. Kong Island 
was part of the Siamese Kingdom before it was returned to modern Cambodia after the 
decolonisation of French Indochina. In 1975, the political conflict in Cambodia resulted 
in an influx of Thai people to Thailand. The government accepted these people of Thai 
origin and granted Thai citizenship in 1983, 1984 and 1991 respectively (Pongsawat 
2007). Displaced persons of Thai origin who hold Burmese nationality are a result of the 
boundary demarcation between Siam and British Burma during the reign of King Rama 
VI (1910–1925). These people refused to move across the border to Thailand initially. 
However, political conflict and ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar since 1948 precipitated 
their move to provinces on the Thai side. According to a cabinet resolution in 1991, 
individuals who entered Thailand before 1976 are allowed legal naturalisation 
(Laungaramsri 2014, p.154). Moreover, their children were eligible to acquire Thai 
citizenship, if they were born in Thailand at a certain time. For example, the children of 
those who hold Displaced People with Myanmar Nationality ID Cards, who entered the 
kingdom before 1976, are eligible for Thai citizenship automatically.  
The third decision is an outcome of the Thai government’s decision not to assign any 
status or deport non-Thai migrants to a third country. There are three groups of non-Thai 
migrants who are affected by this decision. Lao immigrants who have moved to live with 
relatives outside the refugee camps in provinces along the Thailand–Laos border were 
firstly provided a Highlander Card in 1977, but later the card was replaced by a Laotian 
immigrant ID Card which confers no special legal status on the holder. Illegal migrants 
from Cambodia in 1977 have not yet been assigned any official status. The Thai 
government set 1977 as the deadline for entering the Kingdom to distinguish legal and 
illegal migrants from Cambodia. The majority are living in Trat province, however, they 
have not yet been assigned any official status. Their children are not eligible for Thai 
citizenship. The third group includes Hmong refugees from Cambodia who lived in Wat 
Tham Krabok temple, Saraburi province, for 30 years after the Vietnam War. Two batches 
of cabinet resolutions issued in 2003 deported approximately 15,000 Hmong people to 
the United States of America (Grigoleit 2006). 
In total, 14 of 16 non-Thai migrant groups have been resolved. Most of them have been 
granted legal or illegal migrant status, whilst their children are eligible for Thai 
citizenship. Apparently, two groups have not yet been resolved. The legal status of Lao 
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Immigrant ID Card holders and Illegal Migrants from Cambodia ID Card holders have 
not been settled. No official legal status has been assigned to them. 
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Table 5.1: Cabinet resolutions toward non-Thai migrants 
 Cabinet Decisions Non-Thai Citizen ID Card Holders Children of Non-Thai Migrants 
1 Grants Immigrant Status 
  Legal immigrant status 1) Haw Chinese Refugees  Immigrant ID Card  Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  2) Nepalese Immigrant ID Cards Born between 1972 and 1992 are eligible for 
Thai citizenship. 
  3) Independent Haw Chinese ID Card Born between 1972 and 1992 are eligible for 
Thai citizenship. 
  4) Thai Lue ID Card Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  Illegal immigrant status 5) Highlander’s survey ID card (pink card) Not eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  6) Aliens Labour Card Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
2 Legal Naturalisation  
  1) Vietnamese Refugees ID Card  Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  2) Kuo Min Tang (KMT) Solider ID Card  Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
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 Cabinet Decisions Non-Thai Citizen ID Card Holders Children of Non-Thai Migrants 
  3) Displaced People with Myanmar Nationality 
ID Card  
Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  4) Highlander ID Card Born between 1972 and 1985 are eligible for 
Thai citizenship. 
  5) Ex-Malayu Communist ID Card Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  6) Displaced People of Thai Origin in Kong 
Island, Cambodia ID Card 
Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  7) Displaced Person of Thai Origin and 
Burmese Nationality ID Card 
Eligible for Thai citizenship. 
3 Not Yet Assigned any Status or Deported to Third Country 
  Not yet assigned any status 1) Lao Immigrant ID Card Not eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  2) Illegal Migrants from Cambodia ID Card Not eligible for Thai citizenship. 
  Deported to a third country 3) Hmong Refugees ID Card Not eligible for Thai citizenship. 
Source: Adapted from Pongsawat (2007) and Laungaramsri (2014) 
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5.4.3. National Identification Number or 13-digit ID Code 
The Thai government issues 13-digit Identification Code to Thai and non-Thai subjects. 
In 1956, the Civil Registration Act B.E. 2508 (1965)42 was implemented. The Act allowed 
the Thai government to register people in the civil registration system nationwide. Since 
1976, the Local Administration Department, Ministry of Interior (MOI), has issued the 
Population Identification Code (PIC) or 13-digit ID Code. A specific number indicated 
on an individual’s birth registration means that person is recognised by Thai law. 
However, unlike the non-Thai citizen colour identification card, the type of Thai 
citizenship is indicated with a specific number. In accordance with the government’s 
regulation, the code is to prove the card holder’s identity. The 13-digit Identification Code 
classifies laws and regulations including government services and other entitlements that 
apply to the various types of citizenship.  
This Population Identification Code is widely known as ‘13-digit ID Code’ because it 
consists of a 13-digit code in this format. 
Figure 5.2: The format of Thai national identification number 
 
 
 
X - XXXX  - XXXXX - XX - X 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Office of Civil Registration (2009) 
Each number means something different. The first digit indicates the type of citizenship 
which ranges from 0 to 9.  The second to fifth digits signify the office where the number 
was issued. The sixth to twelfth digits are group and sequence numbers, whilst the last 
digit is a check digit (Office of Civil Registration 2009). 
                                                             
42 This Act was revised and replaced by the Civil Registration Act (No.2), B.E. 2551 (2008). 
The type of Thai citizenship. Number 
can range from number 0 to 9 
The registration 
office Group and Sequence numbers 
A last check 
digit 
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Figure 5.3: Thai citizen ID cards with 13-Digit ID code 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 11 August 2015 
The government uses this 13-digit ID Code as an important instrument to categorise 
population in the kingdom, emphasising the first digit that indicates type of citizenship. 
All individuals living in the country are issued with this code, if they are registered at a 
clinic, hospital or municipality office. Stateless people in Thailand, such as Indigenous 
people, displaced people who are fleeing from fighting and have been living in Thailand 
for a long time, or migrant workers are also provided with a 13-digit ID Code 
(Napaumporn 2014). However, these numbers do not necessarily indicate their status as 
a Thai citizen.  
According to the Thai Law, when a person was born, one of her parents has 
to go to related government institutions to record their personal data in order 
to get her birth certificate. This record is kept in the civil registration to 
indicate their status as a legal person. When her name is in the civil 
registration record, she has a right to stay in the district where she is registered. 
This legal person can be a Thai citizen, other state’s citizen, or no state’s 
citizen (Government official, in-depth interview, Mae Hong Son, 2014). 
Any new born baby can get a 13-digit ID Code along with his/her birth registration 
document. In practice, any child born in public and private hospitals in Thailand is 
provided with a birth certificate. The parent later needs to take this document to the 
municipality office for their birth registration document and 13-digit ID Code. If the baby 
is born outside a hospital without a birth certificate, parents can nevertheless present at 
the municipality office for the birth registration. By advising the district officer, the 
parents can get their new child registered in their household registration.  
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Issued by the municipality office, Ministry of Interior, the birth registration is a very 
important document which must not be lost or used by another person (Office of Civil 
Registration 2009). Any lost birth registration document can be replaced by advising the 
municipality office and requesting a replacement. However, the process of replacement 
is complex and requires many supporting documents, including a police report, witnesses 
and a small amount of processing fees (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Chiang 
Mai province, 4 November 2014). Once the 13-digit ID Code is issued by the Office of 
Civil Registration, it is unchangeable and is used as a representative of the individual 
when dealing with government offices, institutions and agencies. This number is very 
important as it certifies the individual as a legal person guaranteed by Thai law. 
In contrast, for stateless people, the birth registration is very difficult to use as a reference 
document for Thai citizenship. In theory, the 13-digit ID Code is for preparation in 
applying for Thai citizenship. However, in reality, there are three different types of birth 
registration. The first is the document for children born to a Thai citizen (see Appendix 
6). The second is for children born to alien parents who obtain temporary residency in the 
kingdom (see Appendix 7). The third document is for children born to parents without 
legal status in civil registration (see Appendix 8) (Office of Civil Registration 2009). The 
reason behind this is because the government aims to limit Thai nationality exclusively 
to the individuals who are born to at least one Thai parent. 
A stateless person is recorded in the Thai civil registration as an alien 
indicated by the Thai authority or registrar. The problem happens here when 
the law allows the record of ‘the status of stateless person’. These persons 
who may have entered the kingdom legally or illegally, are allowed to stay 
temporarily in Thailand. On the other hand, those who have temporary 
residency are possibly born in the country, but are considered by nationality 
law as illegal migrants too (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, 
7 September 2014). 
My biological mother is from Karen state and I do not have a father. When I 
was born, I was left with my adoptive Thai mother who was a good friend of 
my biological mother. Now I have only my birth registration, which indicates 
clearly that I have ‘no nationality.’ A lawyer said that I am a stateless person. 
I have to apply for permanent residence in Thailand first and later apply for 
Thai citizenship, which is very difficult and expensive (a stateless youth, FGD, 
Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014). 
As mentioned before, a different 13-digit ID code indicates different status. The important 
number relating to a stateless person or non-Thai migrant is the first digit code that 
indicates the type of citizenship. A non-Thai citizen person whose 13-digit ID code begins 
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with number ‘6’ or ‘7’ is considered an ethnic minority or the child of an ethnic minority 
respectively. According to the Thai government, a person who holds an ID Code 
beginning with ‘000’, ‘00’ and ‘0’ is considered a stateless person. Such a person may be 
a child born to refugees in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand–Myanmar border, 
an illegal migrant, or a person with no legal status, respectively (Government official, in-
depth interview,  Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014).  
When I first arrived in Thailand. I did not know who I was. I was categorised 
as an alien migrant worker from Myanmar. I first got number ‘00’ on my ID 
because whoever enters the country is accused of being an alien migrant 
worker.  I have to work just like an alien migrant worker. When I was a 
freshman in university, I was helped to change my number from ‘00’ to ‘0’ as 
a person without legal status in civil registration. As for other stateless 
children and youth nationwide, it is like an ID Card. The number ‘0’ indicates 
my status. (Stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 14 November 2014). 
5.4.4. ‘There is No Refugee in Thailand’ 
The process of registering ‘a person without legal status’ in different categories indicated 
by the 13-digit ID code can be understood as the invention of the Thai state to create the 
partial legal status of a non-Thai citizen (Pongsawat 2007, p.170). This process allows 
the Thai state to manage the situation according to its own domestic law. In terms of 
refugees from neighbouring countries, the Thai government refuses to ratify the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, together with the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2011). In addition, Thailand does not have 
administrative mechanisms concerning asylum and refugee affairs ‘and the refugee status 
determination procedures in place are extremely weak’ (Baek and Subramanium 2008, 
p.1). All refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar border are under the direct 
administration of the Thai government agencies, such as the National Security Council 
(NSC) and the Ministry of the Interior (MOI).          
In addition, the Thai government has never developed domestic policies on granting 
refugee status or providing permanent residency for displaced people (Amarapibal, 
Beesey and Germershausen 2003). Therefore, displaced persons from Myanmar to 
Thailand are not recognised as refugees at all. 
[T]he 1951 Convention endorses a single definition of the term ‘refugee’ in 
Article 1. The emphasis of this definition is on the protection of persons from 
political or other forms of persecution. A refugee, according to the 
Convention, is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country 
of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
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religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion (UNHCR 1951, p. 5). 
From Thailand’s national security perspective, refugees from a neighbouring country are 
considered illegal immigrants. In fact, displaced persons are defined by a specific name 
according to the Thai domestic law. Burmese who came to Thailand before 1976 are 
referred to as ‘Burmese displaced person’ but those who came to Thailand after 1976 and 
later are referred to as ‘displaced person fleeing fighting’ (Wangsiriphaisan et al. 2010). 
These terms do not comply with any international law and exclude large numbers of 
Myanmar refugees from domestic and international protection. According to Thai law, 
those villagers who fled from forced labour practices and forced relocation in Myanmar 
during the military dictatorship provided invalid reasons to obtain refugee status. This 
narrow interpretation by the Thai government deemed the vast majority of Myanmar 
displaced people who have not been designated as refugees, as ‘illegal migrants’, 
regardless of the person’s reason for entering Thai territory (Pyne 2007, p.85). Due to 
Thai government policy, however, these people do not have official refugee status.  
...Despite disputes about including migrants as unrecognized refugees, one 
important link undergirds the migrants and refugees in Thailand. In crossing 
a border without permission they are stateless people; they ‘no longer enjoy 
the privileges and responsibilities associated with the state (Waters and 
Leblanc, 2005, p. 130, cited in Pyne 2007, p.85). 
Living in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand–Myanmar border, people are limited 
in their basic rights, chance of a normal life, and achieving the status of citizenship. They 
have fled human rights abuses, but remain unrecognised as refugees or asylum seekers 
(World Refugee Survey 2004). 
Displaced persons fleeing fighting from neighbouring countries, particularly Myanmar, 
have lived in confined camps along the Thailand–Myanmar border where the Thai 
government defines the areas as ‘temporary shelters’. The temporary shelters are unique 
and special areas. Displaced people fleeing the conflict zone in Myanmar are granted the 
temporary right to stay, but not permanent residence (Fink 2015). These persons have no 
official means of earning income or gaining employment. During their stay in the camps, 
permanent structures cannot be built, the environmental impact must be minimised, and 
they are not allowed to leave the camps (Brees 2008). 
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Figure 5.4: Wooden houses built in Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 27 September 2014 
Figure 5.5: Wooden buildings in Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 27 September 2014 
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In reality, most refugees have to survive as migrant workers (Fink 2015). Some displaced 
persons are allowed to work outside the camps on a temporary basis during the day in 
certain provinces. Some are not allowed to work at all, except doing simple jobs within 
the camps. Because of the labour shortage in Thai industries, especially since 1998, illegal 
migrants are welcome to work at dirty, dangerous and difficult (3D) jobs which Thais 
avoid (Baek and Subramanium 2008). This is one of the pull factors that encourages many 
refugees to go to nearby border towns or Bangkok to seek a job (NGO representative, in-
depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 7 September 2014).  
Many refugee children along the Thailand–Myanmar border have a problem under Thai 
law. Children born to stateless parents inside Thailand face the possibility of also being 
stateless persons. As the parents are stateless people who have migrated to Thailand 
owing to the ethnic conflict in Myanmar, they do not have any connection with Thailand 
and are not granted right of residence in the kingdom. According to the immigration law, 
if the parents enter Thailand illegally, their children are stateless aliens the same as their 
parents (Saisoonthorn 2003). However, Thai law has accepted the third generation of 
these migrants born in Thailand by granting the right to Thai nationality to a child born 
in Thailand before 26 February 1992, because the government believes that these children 
have been assimilated into Thai society  (Saisoonthorn 2003). In contrast, children born 
after the cut-off date no longer have this right. Their ability to obtain Thai nationality 
depends on a series of cabinet resolutions as a result of current government policy. 
The Thai government had never issued a birth certificate for anyone born in any refugee 
camp before 2010. According to an in-depth interview, none of the stateless young adults 
aged more than 18 years who were born in the refugee camp has obtained a birth 
certificate (a mother of a stateless youth, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 17 
September 2014).  
I know someone who has resettled in a third country. He was born in Thailand 
29 years ago in a refugee camp. Back then they did not give him a birth 
certificate. He wanted to ask for one by contacting the Royal Thai Embassy 
there. They said that the Thai government never issued birth certificates for 
people born in the refugee camps (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 12 September 2014). 
I was born in the 1980’s in a Thai refugee camp. No birth certificate was 
provided to me or my parents. A birth certificate was not issued to refugees. 
It caused me a problem when I wanted to apply for a visa. The best solution 
was that I had to ask the United Nations to write me a letter to confirm my 
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birth details (a mother of a stateless youth, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 10 September 2014).  
Figure 5.6: Children in Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 27 September 2014 
Thailand is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that allow all children 
born in Thailand to acquire birth registration. In practice, Thailand has a reservation on 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Articles 7, 22 and 29 by stating that 
‘[T]he application of Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989  shall be subject to the national laws, regulations and prevailing practices in Thailand’ 
(UNHCR 1994). In 1993, Thailand removed its reservation on Article 29 about children’s 
education, but maintains its reservation on Article 7 43  about registration, name, 
                                                             
43 Article 7: 
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a 
name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for 
by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national 
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular 
where the child would otherwise be stateless (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, p.3). 
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nationality, care and Article 2244 about refugee children to allow Thailand to ‘deal with 
child refugees according to its own policies and domestic laws’ (Collins 2015, p.82). 
As of August 2008, the revision of Civil Registration Act (No.2), B.E. 2551 (2008) 
allowed all children born in Thai territory to be entitled to birth registration regardless of 
their parents’ status. Consequently, the withdrawal of Thailand’s reservation to Article 7 
was proposed by the Thai Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and 
approved by the cabinet on 21 September 2010 ‘based on the assessment that relevant 
laws and policies have already been put in place to fulfil the country’s obligations under 
Article 7 of the CRC’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). Thailand’s domestic law 
includes Nationality Act B.E. 2551 (2008), Civil Registration Act (No.2) B.E. 2551 (2008), 
National Strategy to Address the Problem of Legal Status and Rights of Individuals B.E. 
2548 (2005) and Nationality Verification for Migrant Workers (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2011). 
However, the official implementation of birth registration and issuing birth certificates 
was not active until 2010 (Tan 2012). Due to the special characteristics of temporary 
shelters which are under the co-responsibility of the Thai government and the UNHCR, 
the birth registration is provided by a camp commander or district registration staff, 
appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Parents of a child need to provide their identification 
including UNHCR ID and the child’s birth certificate. After inspecting documents and 
examining witnesses, the official child’s names are added to the civil registration record 
specified at the temporary shelter area by the camp commander. Finally, the birth 
                                                             
44 Article 22: 
1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee 
status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic 
law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by 
any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment 
of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights 
or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.  
2. For this purpose, States Parties shall provide, as they consider appropriate, co-operation in 
any efforts by the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations or non-
governmental organizations co-operating with the United Nations to protect and assist such a 
child and to trace the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to 
obtain information necessary for reunification with his or her family. In cases where no parents 
or other members of the family can be found, the child shall be accorded the same protection as 
any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his or her family environment for any 
reason, as set forth in the present Convention (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, p.6). 
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registration document and 13-digit ID code are provided to the child’s parents. The ID 
code is specified in this format (Seesook 2011). 
0 – XXXX - 75XXX – XX - X 
 
The 13-digit ID code begins with number ‘0’ as the child is a stateless person who has no 
legal status in civil registration. Number 75 in the group section indicates that the child is 
born to displaced parents who have fled fighting and live in a temporary shelter area 
(Seesook 2011). The code beginning with number ‘0’ is commonly referred to as the ‘10-
year ID card’ issued to illegal migrants nationwide since 2005. This is active under the 
cabinet resolution passed in 2005 which outlined the Strategy on Legal Status and Rights 
for Undocumented Persons. It aimed to solve the problem of undocumented persons by 
ensuring that ‘everyone residing in Thailand has the proper identification documents’ 
(UNESCO 2008, p.97). 
In 2000, the Thai government granted the right of temporary residence to stateless 
Myanmar refugees in Thailand. However, children of these parents still lack citizenship. 
In 2008, the Thai government started to register the illegal migrants in order to reduce the 
number of stateless people in Thailand. It provided an ID card for them to use as an 
identification document, which expires 10 years after issue. The card holders are allowed 
to stay temporarily in the kingdom whilst they are waiting for the government to assign 
new legal status or deport them. It does not refer to Thai citizenship at all.  
By 2011, approximately 1,600 new-born babies were registered in nine refugee camps 
along the border. According to the UNHCR 2012 report, approximately 5,000 babies have 
received birth certificates whilst many children are waiting to register. This process is 
expected to register ‘children born to [Myanmar] refugees between 2008 and September 
2010 and then further back to 1984 when the first major waves of refugees [came] into 
Thailand’ (IRIN News 2011b). In total, it has to deal with more than 25 years of birth 
registrations which can be a slow process in registering migrants. Although some refugee 
parents ignore the importance of a birth certificate, this is ‘an important step to prevent 
statelessness among a new generation of refugees’ (Tan 2012, p.1).  
Even though the birth certificate and 13-digit ID Code are provided to individuals by the 
Thai government, in practice it is the first step in being able to apply for Thai citizenship. 
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However, in reality, these children are not guaranteed an ID card, or their ID card status 
is specified as a person without legal status which does not enable them to become Thai 
citizens.  
Figure 5.7: Non-Thai citizen ID card (‘a person without legal status’) 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 November 2016 
As Laungaramsri (2014) argues, the process of categorisation implemented by the Thai 
state is known among non-Thai migrants to lack consistency and is confusing. The system 
was poorly designed, and the number of stateless categories is overlapping and unclear. 
Some family members are divided into different groups. For example, a father is 
considered a hill tribe person who has an ID card beginning with number ‘6’. A mother, 
on the other hand, may be classed as an undocumented ‘refugee’. Their first child holds 
an ID card beginning with the number ‘7’ as a person without legal status, whilst their 
second child is considered an illegal migrant with number ‘0’ (stateless youth, FGD, Mae 
Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014). Consequently, the process of categorisation in 
fact marginalises the stateless people as it limits their access to citizenship rights. 
As mentioned above, the Thai government has legalised the non-legal status of 
individuals, making them subject to Thai domestic law, although they are not yet proven 
to be Thai citizens. Some are proven to be aliens, but are unable to return home. Their 
lives are not stable due to the regular changes in Thailand’s domestic law. For instance, 
in 2013, the Ministry of Interior proposed a draft ministerial regulation concerning 
stateless children who are born and live in the Kingdom of Thailand (Asian Human Rights 
Commission 2013). If the regulation were implemented, all children and adults born to 
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non-Thai parents in Thailand would be deemed to have entered and resided in Thailand 
without permission under the Immigration Act B.E.2522 (1979). 
After Thailand’s coup in May 2014, the military government focused heavily on illegal 
migrants because it claimed the ‘undocumented workforce is prone to exploitation and is 
also a source of crime’ (Chaichalearmmongkol and Chomchuen 2014, p.1). They are 
considered as a threat to national security. The large number of illegal migrant workers 
from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia who work in the fishing industry is considered an 
urgent problem that must be solved immediately. In 2014, Thailand’s junta government 
cracked down on undocumented workers and encouraged them to be registered within 
one year. Undocumented migrant workers were subject to being arrested and deported 
(Hodal 2014). As a result, about twenty thousand migrant workers from Cambodia fled 
Thailand to their home country upon rumours that the military was using force against 
illegal migrants (Chaichalearmmongkol and Chomchuen 2014). The Thailand–Cambodia 
border become chaotic as there was not enough infrastructure to deal with the numbers. 
A labour shortage in some sectors in Thailand is unavoidable, as some Thai business 
groups depend heavily on these migrant workers (Loughlin and Tapper 2014; Park 2015).  
The 2014 coup also changed the situation in the refugee camps. The Thai military 
government aims to close the refugee camps permanently as soon as possible (NGO 
representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, 10 September 2014). Most refugees are 
reluctant to return home, because they are afraid of being relocated to a new industrial 
zone assigned by the Myanmar government. Voluntary repatriation of the first group of 
68 Myanmar refugees from Nupo Camp in Tak province and Ratchaburi province on 
Thailand’s Western border began on 25 October 2016 with the endorsement of the Thai 
and Myanmar governments (Lefevre 2016). The next group of about 100 refugees from 
the Nu Po camp in Tak province is expected to return to Myanmar in 2017 (Mon 2016). 
The Myanmar government is ready to receive the returnees, if they are issued certificates 
of identification as Myanmar citizens. Most returnees may travel back to their homes in 
various states, but the Myanmar government does not have an appropriate mechanism to 
relocate refugees who are unable to find their hometown. The government may place 
them in ‘low-cost housing at Shwe Linn Ban industrial zone in Hlaing Tharyar township 
and pay [about K9.8 million (US$7540)] for their accommodation at an unspecified date 
later on’ (Mon 2016, p.1). 
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Although it is too early to assess the consequences, these people have the right to return 
home. On the other hand, there is a number of refugee residents who are born on the Thai 
side and have never left the country. They are unable to be identified as Myanmar citizens, 
nor do they not want to become Myanmar citizens. They prefer to stay in Thailand and 
acquire Thai citizenship (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 
2014). The repatriation programme is not their choice for three reasons. Firstly, they 
cannot be categorised as returnees, because they have not crossed the border from the 
Myanmar side to the Thai side in the beginning. Secondly, it is difficult for them to prove 
that they are Myanmar citizens, as they may live outside the refugee camps and they are 
born and have lived in Thailand for a long time. In some cases, their parents lost their 
Myanmar identity document long ago, when they fled the conflict zone. Children and 
youth of ethnic minorities may not speak Myanmar language at all, which makes it very 
difficult for them to begin their lives in Myanmar (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai 
province, 14 November 2014). Thirdly, stateless youth consider themselves as Thai, 
although the Thai government considers them as illegal migrants and tries to force them 
to leave the country involuntarily based on national security policies. They were born in, 
and choose to stay in Thailand (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 
September 2014).  
5.5. Conclusion 
The concept of national security in the Thai context is controversial and changeable; 
however, it has played an important role in the Thai government’s policies towards the 
non-Thai migrants including stateless youth who were born and live in Thailand. These 
people are considered as a threat to national security, so the Thai government employs 
several mechanisms to legalise the ‘individual without legal status’ through different 
categories. However, the categorisation is confusing, because it lacks a consistent 
underlying rationale. Consequently, the process of legalising non-Thai migrants cannot 
solve the problem of stateless people. At the same time, it marginalises stateless people 
as it limits their access to public services and citizenship rights, and makes their lives 
subject to Thai domestic law. The negotiation between the government and the stateless 
youth who choose to live in Thailand is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: A Life in Waiting: Negotiating Basic 
Rights Among Stateless Youth in Thailand 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the negotiations for basic rights between stateless youth and the 
Thai government through four different aspects of life: education, health care service, law 
protection and mobility, as limited by Thai law. In order to access basic rights, these 
negotiations by the stateless youth involve both legal and illegal activities. Legal activities 
concern setting up community-based schools and relying on local private medical 
practitioners and clinics. Their final choice is to use a foreign ID card to live in Thailand. 
Illegal activities include ID scams, illegal personal substitution, and use of a fake ID card 
which paradoxically both protects and jeopardizes their lives. However, this chapter does 
not discuss economic and political rights because they are not yet a high priority for the 
stateless youth. Finally, this chapter points out that these stateless youth prefer to stay in 
Thailand and to apply for Thai citizenship, although the application process can take more 
than a decade. 
6.2. A Life in Waiting: Negotiating Access to Basic Rights 
Since the Thai coup in May 2014, the military government has paid strong attention to 
the migrant and stateless population living along the Thai border. Ethnic minority 
migrants, refugees along the Thailand–Myanmar border, transnational migrant workers 
and their stateless children attract close attention from the government. This is because 
the Thai government is strengthening its national security policy to ensure that potential 
threats from outsiders are minimised (Office of the National Security Council 2015). 
In terms of the stateless situation in the country, the Thai government’s official data 
identify 443,862 stateless people45 who may seek Thai nationality (Batha 2015; Spindler 
2016). During 2012–2015, over 18,770 stateless people (about 4.2 per cent) were granted 
Thai citizenship in line with the government’s aim to end statelessness by 2024 ( Bloom 
2014; Batha 2015;Spindler 2016). They are the so-called ‘hill tribe’ people, ethnic 
minorities, the Indigenous population and some stateless students who are registered in 
                                                             
45 The stateless population in Thailand is difficult to estimate accurately, because the Thai 
official database is limited, and depends on what kinds of statelessness are included. 
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Thai public schools (Bangkok Post 2016). The children of illegal migrants and refugees, 
particularly from Myanmar, who live along the Thailand–Myanmar border, are not yet 
included in the government’s plan. 
Stateless people who have already entered and lived in the country for some time are 
required to register in order not to be arrested or deported. Once registered, stateless 
people46 are recoded and recognised by the Thai government as ‘a person without legal 
status’. Although they are not granted Thai citizenship, the government provides them 
with semi-legal status which makes them subject to Thailand’s domestic law.  
Their semi-legal status has great impact on stateless people’s lives in Thailand. Their 
rights are limited because their legal status is not yet confirmed. Data from focus group 
discussions among stateless young adults aged between 18 and 24 years show that they 
describe their lives as ‘a life in waiting’ (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 
20 September 2014). They are waiting for the government’s confirmation of their legal 
status. However, despite their wait, it is not guaranteed that their status will be confirmed 
soon. Furthermore, the result may not be what they want.  
Throughout several years of waiting, these young adults cannot do very much. During the 
process of verifying their legal status, they can ‘have access to basic human rights, 
although they are not yet considered a Thai national’ (Napaumporn 2014, p.139). 
However, the government does not provide enough facilities and public services for them. 
Some services are limited to registered stateless people only,47 whilst the stateless status 
deprives stateless youth of the opportunity to access the full education and public facilities 
provided by the Thai state. On the other hand, stateless young adults have their own way 
of negotiating their basic rights through education, the health care system, law protection 
and freedom of movement, despite being limited by Thai law. Most of the participants in 
the in-depth interviews, who were born in Thailand and have lived in Thailand for more 
than 10 years, expressed their anger and irritation during the interview. They do not know 
                                                             
46 According to the Thai government’s understanding of statelessness, stateless people and 
registered stateless people are in different categories. Stateless people are people who are not 
recognised by any state in the world, whilst registered stateless people are ones without 
citizenship. They are stateless, but have registered in Thailand’s civil registration system. 
47 Refugee children are not allowed to attend public schools outside the refugee camp, although 
the Education for All programme has been implemented nationwide since 2005. The 
government recognised the right to guaranteed health for registered stateless people, but not for 
all stateless people (Napaumporn 2014, p.147). 
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when these difficulties will end (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 
September 2014). 
Now, I still do not have Thai citizenship. Sometimes I feel hurt too. I want to 
do many things that I cannot do. I want to study abroad. …I have applied for 
Thai citizenship since I was in elementary school. Now I am almost 21 years 
old. I still do not get a result (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 
November 2014). 
6.3. Negotiating Access to Education Rights  
Education is the central focus for stateless youth. It is a basic human right and an 
important tool to help children and youth improve their livelihoods. However, educational 
opportunities for stateless young adults in Thailand have been restricted. Before 2005 
most stateless children in Thailand were not able to access education (NGO representative, 
in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 6 November 2014).  
According to the focus group discussions (2014), 19 stateless youth participants have 
participated in one of the three educational options available to them since 2005. Firstly, 
in Mae La refugee camp, five stateless young adult participants have been able to access 
the education provided by INGOs and refugee communities. Secondly, six stateless 
young adults have been able to attend community-based Migrant Learning Centres 
(MLCs) established along the Thailand–Myanmar border. Thirdly, eight young adult 
participants have attended non-formal education schools or a public school under 
Thailand’s Ministry of Education. Of these, two stateless young adult participants have 
furthered their education to university level (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province 
and Mae Sot, Tak province, 2014).  
6.3.1. Migrant Learning Centres (MLCs) 
Before 2005, children of undocumented migrants and stateless children were prohibited 
from accessing the public education provided by the Thai government. To negotiate their 
right to education, poor parents, whose legal status is uncertain, sometimes voluntarily 
give their stateless children to Thai citizens to be adopted. As adopted children of a Thai 
citizen, they are entitled to Thai citizenship and able to attend the school system in 
Thailand. This common practice is concentrated along the Thai border (Laungaramsri 
2014, p.160). 
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Stateless students have to pay their own tuition fee to be able to access the educational 
system in Thailand. One stateless youth said: 
I was left stateless because I was born into a Karen family while my parents 
were waiting for their status as Thai citizens. I remember my parents have to 
pay for my education because my status as a Thai citizen was not confirmed. 
When I grew up, I had to work after school to support my family (stateless 
youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014). 
Thailand hosted the World Conference on Education for All in 1990 and ratified the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1992. Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand B.E. 2534 (1991), Section 40 states that  
Every person shall have equal rights to receive primary education according 
to the law on compulsory education.  
Every person shall enjoy liberty of education; provided that such education is 
not contrary to his civic duties under the Constitution, and to the law relating 
to compulsory education and the law relating to the organization of 
educational establishments (Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 
2534 (1991)). 
However, ‘every person’ refers only to those who have identity documents issued by the 
Thai government. At that time, the majority of stateless children of undocumented 
migrant workers had to stay at home, work in the labour market, or attend classes at 
learning centres organised by non-government organisations (Arphattananon 2012). 
Migrants and stateless children can access education via community-based centres 
operated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the so-called Migrant Learning 
Centres (MLCs) which have been established in many provinces along the Thailand–
Myanmar border. Approximately 150 Migrant Learning Centres (MLCs) have provided 
learning opportunities for young children, while their parents are out working (Myanmar 
Education Integration Initiative 2013; Education Committee 2014; Nawarat 2012, 2014a). 
Most stateless young adults prefer to go to MLCs rather than to public schools, mainly 
because they can socialise with their peers. They feel comfortable in the centres as most 
classes are conducted in their native language. Although most centres follow the 
Myanmar national curriculum and teach in the Myanmar language, English and Thai 
languages are also taught (Win 2014; Worland 2014). Teachers and parents believe that 
MLCs can help the young people to maintain their native language, even though they are 
not living in Myanmar. MLCs can prepare these children in case their parents return to 
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Myanmar (parents of a stateless youth, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 
September 2014).  
For the Thai government, MLCs are considered temporary and semi-official institutions 
to address the educational gap for migrants, stateless children and youth. After the 
education reform in 2005, the Thai Ministry of Education became involved in the contents 
of the curriculum taught at MLCs through the Primary Education Service Area (PESA). 
The Thai government’s main concern was to ensure that the MLCs taught Thai language 
and the Thai curriculum for nationalistic reasons. On the other hand, the Thai government 
is unwilling to provide effective teaching staff and material to non-Thai speaking schools 
(Nawarat 2014a, p.875). As a result, MLCs face problems in the shortage of teaching 
resources and the weak curriculum resulting in a high failure rate of students who transfer 
from MLCs to Thai state schools (Nawarat 2014b, p.877). 
6.3.2. Education in the Refugee Camp  
Due to Thai migration laws, displaced people are considered to have special legal status 
and are allowed to stay only within the confined shelter areas. They need short-term travel 
approval to leave the camp at a specific time. The Thai government does not allow 
children living in refugee camps to enrol in Thai public schools, as the Thai government 
maintains its ‘de facto policy of no-access to Thai public schooling’ (Oh 2010, p. 4). 
To negotiate their right to education, the refugee children can access some forms of non-
formal education within the limited support for refugee services (Ball and Moselle 2015). 
Refugee parents and adults are very proactive in setting up schools when they are allowed 
to.48  However, education in the refugee camp is controlled by the Thai policies on 
education based in the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
and the Ministry of Education (MOE) (Oh 2010b). In principle, permanent school 
buildings cannot be constructed. Semi-permanent buildings using iron poles and small 
wooden poles can be used, but concrete is not allowed. According to Oh (2010), there are 
more than 70 schools in the seven Karen refugee camps and 11 schools in two Karenni 
refugee camps along the Thailand–Myanmar border. In 2010, there were more than 
34,000 students in the refugee schools (Oh 2010a). 
                                                             
48 The Thai government allowed refugees to set up schools in 1984 when it became obvious that 
the return to Myanmar of Karen refugees would be unlikely in the near future (Oh, 2014). 
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Mae La refugee camp is well known as a centre of education for refugee children and 
youth. It offers a wide range of educational opportunities which have been established 
and run by refugee communities, with support from outside and private contributors. Mae 
La’s current population includes refugee residents and temporary residents numbering a 
few thousand students who come from other refugee camps to study, along with students 
from inside Myanmar (stateless youth, FGD, Mae sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). 
In 2014, more than 2,700 students lived in boarding schools whilst many other students 
stayed with their relatives in Mae La refugee camp (Burma Link 2017). However, funding 
for education is a long term future project, which is difficult to guarantee. With a minimal 
income, refugee communities contribute bamboo leaves, poles and labour for school 
maintenance. Knowledgeable parents may take part in teaching at a college such as at the 
Leadership and Management Training College (LMTC) (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, 
Tak province, 20 September 2014).   
Figure 6.1 : Primary school in Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014 
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Figure 6.2: Leadership and Management Training College (LMTC) in Mae La 
refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014 
Importantly, about 38 per cent of the refugees in Mae La refugee camp remain 
unregistered with the UNHCR; they are unable to apply for most university scholarships 
abroad (The Border Consortium (TBC) 2014). Moreover, the education in Mae La 
refugee camp remains unrecognised by the Thai and Myanmar governments. Therefore, 
it is very difficult for stateless teenagers to further their higher education outside the 
camps (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). Although a 
few refugee teenagers have successfully managed to get international scholarships to 
study abroad, this opportunity is very difficult and limited. Once the stateless youth is 
accepted by the scholarship agency, he/she has to negotiate a difficult and complicated 
process to leave the camp. Eventually, they often encounter restrictions on their 
movements. Consequently, after the education in the camp, their choices are limited. Most 
can work only with ethnic nationality armies, international organisations, or simple jobs 
in the camps (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). 
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6.3.3. Thailand’s Education for All Programme 
As mentioned above, until 2005 children of undocumented migrants and stateless children 
were unable to participate in the public education provided by the Thai government. 
Although the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) was the first Thai 
constitution that guarantees at least 12 years49 of free, quality, basic education, provided 
by the state countrywide, the public education is for Thai citizens only. 
Section 43. A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive the fundamental 
education for the duration of not less than twelve years which shall be 
provided by the State thoroughly, up to [high] quality, and without charge. 
In providing education by the State, regard shall be had to participation of 
local government organisations and the private sector as provided by law. 
The provision of education by professional organisations and the private 
sector under the supervision of the State shall be protected as provided by law 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 1997, p.7).  
In 2005, the Thai Education for All programme was implemented. The programme 
allowed all children, regardless of their legal status, to access free public education 
(Office of the Education Council 2008). However, this programme was initiated in 
accordance with Thai national security policy. From the national security perspective, 
stateless people along the borders are considered a threat to the nation (Office of the 
National Security Council 2015). Education is a logical resource to address problems that 
may come from the stateless population such as crime, drug addiction and prostitution. 
Promoting education for stateless children enables the government to monitor their 
behaviour and evaluate the stateless situation under the government’s education system. 
Children grow older every day. They are not returned to Myanmar as long as 
their parents are here, or they never plan to go to Myanmar. Without education, 
these children and young adults risk being child labourers, drug addicts and 
prostitutes as is happening to other young adults on the border (NGO 
representative, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 11 November 2014)  
This was the first time that stateless children and young adults were able to access public 
state education in Thailand, although they were undocumented (Office of the Education 
Council 2008; Ministry of Education 2010). 
                                                             
49 This free education was extended to 15 years from kindergarten to high school grade 12 by 
the Abhisit Vejjajiva government in 2010 (Arthornprachachit 2013). 
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Table 6.1: The Thai education system 
Student’s Age 
(years old) 
Grade Level of 
Education 
Free 
Education50 
Vocational 
Education 
3   
Pre-elementary 
 
 
4   
5   
6 1  
 
 
Primary 
 
7 2  
8 3  
9 4  
10 5  
11 6  
12 7  
Lower-secondary 
 
13 8  
14 9  
15 10  
Upper-secondary 
Lower 
vocational 
and technical 
16 11 
17 12 
18   
Undergraduate 
 Tertiary 
vocational 
19   
20    
21    
Source: Adapted from the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999); Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2013) 
                                                             
50 The Thai basic education is a 6-3-3 system with 4 years at the tertiary level. The first 9 years 
of basic education are compulsory. The government subsidises 15 years of free education 
including pre-elementary level education. 
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In terms of the right to study, since 5 July, 2005, the Education for All policy 
allows all people, stateless or with no legal status to attend school. Schools 
cannot reject students. But the funding for each student is provided only for 
the basic education. When children are accepted in school, the government 
pays for them. Stateless children are treated the same as children of Thai 
citizens. But they have to pay for the higher education (government officer, 
Ministry of Interior, Bangkok, 2016).  
School admission policy is very flexible with regard to supporting documents (Johnson 
et al. 2015). Each school is responsible for admitting all children, including children 
without identification documents. For instance, when a birth registration document is 
unavailable, parents can provide an illegal migrants ID or UNHCR ID as supporting 
documents. In some cases, children can certify themselves in order to be admitted to 
school. In return, the schools receive funding from the government based on each 
student’s acceptance. Additionally, all students are entitled to receive a certificate of 
education upon completion of their studies. Importantly, undocumented students can 
receive travel approval to move to find a suitable school in the country (Office of the 
Education Council 2008). 
In reality, acceptance is made on a case by case basis. The flexibility in admission is 
different depending on the practice of each local education area. Some ‘schools still often 
refuse to admit migrant children’ (Nawarat 2014a, p.4). Thai standard education focuses 
on the national history and culture of Thailand by using Thai as the main language. 
English is taught as a second language. Stateless youth who have attended Thai schools 
since they were very young can successfully complete their education. Few can pursue 
higher education to a university degree (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 
November 2014). 
Although Thai formal education is free, most migrant parents are reluctant to send their 
undocumented child to a formal Thai school, because large numbers of parents do not 
have information about free education. Being stateless, stateless parents lack confidence 
to enrol their children in Thai schools. Moreover, the rate of student drop-out is high. 
According to an in-depth interview with the parents of a stateless young adult in Chiang 
Mai province (parent of a stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 
2014), the main reason for school drop-outs is that poor stateless parents are unable to 
find enough income to cover other education related costs such as the transportation 
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fee 51  and educational materials such as the school uniform, books and stationery. 
Moreover, the 15 years of free basic education is not totally free. Some schools transform 
their tuition fees to other school fees such as parent-teacher association charges, school 
staff fees, school maintenance charges and payments for hiring foreign teachers 
(Liamcharasakul 2012). This cost puts a significant burden on poor families. 
Consequently, parents prefer their stateless young adult children to stay out of school to 
avoid the costs and to work in order to earn more money. 
The language barrier and discrimination are also significant problems that prevent 
stateless children attending a formal Thai school. Since classrooms are conducted in Thai 
as the medium of instruction to teach Thai national history and culture, most children 
from Myanmar families have difficulties as they are unable to understand, read or write 
Thai (Ball and Moselle 2015). For focus group participants who attended a Thai school 
when they were young, the language barrier is no longer a problem, but discrimination 
continues. As a stateless youth participant said,  
…my Thai friends at school make fun of me because I am not Thai. I don’t 
have a Thai ID card. I am annoyed and feel insulted, but I cannot do anything 
about it because it is true… (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 
November 2014). 
Likewise, some parents fear ethnic discrimination emanating from Thai citizens. Most 
stateless young adults experience discrimination and bullying in Thai schools. This is 
because some Thai people look down on non-Thai migrants from neighbouring countries. 
After graduation, stateless young adults have to face an uncertain future. Firstly, the lack 
of an identification document can be an obstacle for stateless people in obtaining school 
records and a school certificate verifying their educational achievement (Ball and Moselle 
2015). In order to solve this problem, some stateless young adults contact their parents’ 
country of origin for an identification document such as a passport as the easiest and 
quickest way to obtain their document of citizenship from their parents. They believe that 
at least it is better than being stateless (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Chiang 
Mai province, 6 November 2014).  
                                                             
51 In 2009, transportation costs averaged THB3,500 (US$104) per year for a student who lived 
far away to attend school (‘Structural Policy Challenges for Southeast Asian Countries’ 2013). 
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When a stateless person has any proof of their identity, the passport for 
instance, they can return to school to receive their school certificate. We have 
to deal with the school first, then the Primary Educational Service Area, the 
Ministry of Education. Now it depends on the government officials whether 
they are helpful. For some cases, the school is very unhelpful and ignorant. 
They keep referring us to the Educational Service Area. Fortunately, some 
officials there are very kind. Their suggestions and kindness help the stateless 
youth to receive the education certificate. This is case by case, and we have 
to be very persistent (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 14 
November 2014).  
Higher education, such as university level and tertiary vocational, is open for all students. 
However, as non-Thai citizens, stateless youth have to struggle to find their own funding.  
The problem for the stateless young adults when they attend undergraduate 
education is that they are unable to apply for education funding supported by 
the government, because the regulation states that it is provided to Thai 
citizens exclusively (Government official, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai 
province, 13 November 2014).  
Therefore, as a result of these difficulties, there are few stateless youth who can further 
their education at the university level.  
In addition, stateless youth are limited to finding a low paid job in their district regardless 
of their educational level. Although migrant labourers are essential for Thailand’s 
national development, the government has a restricted list of 27 jobs that are available for 
non-Thai citizens to do  (Working of Alien Act B.E. 2551 2008). Therefore, the number 
of jobs available is limited and unrelated to the field of their study. Tour guide jobs are 
unavailable for aliens, even though Shan stateless youth in Chang Mai province may 
spend a long time studying hard to become a tour guide (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang 
Mai province, 20 November 2014). As a result, after graduation, most stateless youth can 
work only in low paid jobs, or simple jobs which are not related to their education 
(stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
I had a difficulty. My school registered me as a ‘person without legal status’ 
card. My graduation from tertiary vocational means nothing. It is very hard 
for me to find a job. The problem is that my ID card begins with number ‘0’. 
I feel so hurt. I tried very hard to study, but there is no job for me. They said 
I was not Thai. I want to prove that I am not a rootless person, but I don’t 
know how to do this (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 
September 2014). 
After several years of negotiation, the careers restriction was cancelled in November 2016 
as a new regulation was passed to ‘allow stateless people to enter formal employment in 
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professions not reserved for Thais’ (Bangkok Post 2016). The government allows long-
term migrants, such as hill tribes, displaced Thai and Indigenous people who have lived 
in Thailand for a long time and their children who were born and live in Thailand to work 
freely according to their profession (Srimode 2016). However, according to the Working 
of Aliens ACT B.E. 2551 (2008), short-term migrants who are citizens of Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar are restricted to work only in 27 labouring jobs (Post Today 2016).  
6.4. Negotiating the Right to Guaranteed Health 
Health care service is not a central concern of stateless young adult participants, although 
the stateless status has a significant impact on their health. On the other hand, stateless 
young adult participants focus on maintaining the health of their parents. 
The different types of identity cards are connected to different benefits. Health care 
services are provided to ‘those with certain types of identity papers, but not to others’ 
(Schearf 2011). The Thai government recognises the right to health only for stateless 
people who are registered in the household registration. According to a cabinet resolution 
dated 23 March 2010, the Thai government recognised the right to guaranteed health, but 
it does not cover all stateless people.  
For public health, Thai citizens are eligible for the government’s THB30 
health policy, stated in the National Health Security Act B.E. 2545. Aliens 
such as registered ethnic minorities who are holding an ID card beginning 
with number ‘6’, ‘7’ and ‘0’ (of ethnic minority) have the right to access 
public health according to cabinet resolutions in 2010 and 2015. They are 
treated the same as Thai citizens. Thai citizens get free public health care 
according to the National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, whilst registered 
ethnic minorities get free public health care according to the cabinet resolution 
(Government officer, the Ministry of Interior, Bangkok, 2016). 
Ethnic minorities are allowed to access public health services because the government 
believes that they have already assimilated into Thai society52, and registered children in 
an educational institution of Thailand can access the health care service provided by the 
                                                             
52 The Thai government believes that registered stateless people have lived in Thailand for a 
very long time. They have assimilated to Thai society, and have made many social contributions 
to Thailand such as paying tax. ‘Therefore, they should not be discriminated against and denied 
the right to health’ (Napaumporn 2014, p.147). 
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Thai government, whilst those with number ‘0’53 are not eligible for the government’s 
health insurance (Napaumporn 2014).  
6.4.1. INGO-based Clinics in Refugee Camps 
On the other hand, the Thai government pays no attention to health care services in the 
camps. Refugees living inside the temporary shelter areas cannot access hospitals outside 
the camp, because they must get travel approval documents from the Thai authorities, if 
they wish to visit the hospital. Only refugee patients, who need emergency medical 
attention, are allowed to leave the camps (Werret 2014, p.12).  
Before INGOs were allowed to work in the camps, refugees did not receive adequate 
health care services. Without citizenship documents, stateless children were unable to 
receive the free vaccines provided by the government at public health centres. Some 
children suffered from malaria and were undernourished because they did not have 
enough food. Refugees depended for food such as rice and clean drinking water on INGO 
assistance and the few agricultural crops produced in the camps. They lacked access to a 
variety of foods and the inadequate health care service resulted in malnourished children 
among the refugee population (a parent of stateless youth, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, 
Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
Establishing a health centre requires medical knowledge. To be able to access the health 
care service, refugees have to rely on international organisations such as UNHCR and the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC). They play an important role in providing medical 
care for refugees, undocumented migrants and their stateless offspring. For example, the 
IRC provides approximately 23,000 residents of Ban Kwai and Ban Mae Surin camps in 
Mae Hong Son province and around 8,000 refugees in the Tham Hin camp in Ratchaburi 
province with health care, water and sanitation services. INGO-based clinics, established 
in the camp, offer reproductive health service, child health care and basic health care. 
Refugees receive additional training as health workers. With all the INGO assistance, the 
health status of refugees from Myanmar in the camps has improved (INGO representative, 
in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 7 September 2014).  
                                                             
53 These people include children without legal status and transnational migrant workers from 
neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. 
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Figure 6.3: UN hospital in Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014 
6.4.2. Community-based Clinics outside the Camps 
Stateless people and their offspring, who have ID cards beginning with number ‘0’, are 
not covered by the government’s health insurance, because the government has no health 
insurance policies for stateless people and does not facilitate stateless children accessing 
health insurance. Stateless youth who attend non-government schools are excluded from 
the civil survey. Since they are not registered in the household registration list, they are 
not eligible for health insurance and cannot receive the treatment provided by public 
hospitals or health care centres. In addition, most health centres are located in the city, 
whilst most stateless people live in rural areas. This makes some local stateless people 
unable to access the medical services.  
Stateless people are left to take care of themselves. The government allows stateless 
people, including transnational migrant workers from neighbouring countries such as 
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, to buy their own health insurance. However, they are 
unable to afford the cost. Since they work in low paid jobs, health insurance is not a high 
priority. 
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On the other hand, stateless people are not very proactive in accessing health care 
insurance. Most young adult participants pay little attention to the health care service for 
themselves, but focus on their parents’ health (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 12 September 2014). Some stateless communities also do not understand the 
importance of the vaccine service for infants and the appropriate medical treatment for 
mother and child after birth. In addition, the limitation in language skills contributes to 
their difficulty in accessing public hospitals. 
To be able to access health care services whilst avoiding contact with Thai government 
authorities, most stateless people in Mae Sot district prefer the nearby pharmacy, the 
private medical practitioner and local clinics over the public hospital for basic treatment.  
My parents do not go to the hospital. I was born at our house in the village 
with a local midwife. My parents took me to a clinic when I was sick. Our 
health problems are not serious so the nearby pharmacy is enough. We do not 
need to go to the hospital (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 
September 2014) 
The migrant population also has a few of its own health centres for basic health services. 
Mae Tao Clinic is a good example of a migrant community-based clinic in Mae Sot, Tak 
province. It plays a very important role in providing health care facilities and activities. 
As it is run by a forcibly displaced person from Myanmar, Dr Cynthia Maung, Mae Tao 
Clinic has gained more trust among legal and illegal migrants, including refugees and the 
stateless population. Every day 400–500 people come to the clinic to receive 
comprehensive health care services and child protection services. In total, over 150,000 
displaced persons per year are treated at Mae Tao Clinic (NGO representative, in-depth 
interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 16 September 2014).  
6.5. Negotiating the Right to be Protected 
Legally, all Thai people are protected under Thailand’s constitution. It is confirmed in 
Chapter 1, Section 4, that ‘[h]uman dignity, rights, liberties and equality of the people 
shall be protected. The Thai people shall enjoy equal protection under the Constitution’ 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 2017, p. 4). In terms of protection, 
this applies only to Thai citizens. Moreover, all children aged below 18 years in Thailand 
are protected by the Child Protection Act B.E. 2546 (2003) which guarantees the rights 
of children. The Thai government is very active in legalising protection for children, but 
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since the laws apply only to Thai citizens, the non-Thai population, including stateless 
children residing in the country, are not protected by any law. 
Migrant and refugee children and youth in Thailand are left without legal protection from 
physical and sexual abuse, neglect, hazardous labour and trafficking. They are the most 
vulnerable groups. Undocumented people, who are considered a subject of the Thai state, 
may have experiences of harassment and being asked to pay bribes. Some focus group 
participants have been frequently asked by police to check their ID card in the main street 
of Mae Sot border town. They have been randomly checked by police officials and forced 
to show their evidence of being Thai. As they do not have Thai ID cards, they are asked 
to pay an amount of money as a bribe in exchange for not being arrested. As a result, they 
avoid contacting the Thai authorities, such as police and other officials, because they are 
afraid of being treated unfairly, arrested and deported. 
It is very hard for me to just travel on the main road of Mae Sot town. It is a 
town where I have lived my whole life. One day I rode my motorbike on 
Intarakhiri Road just like normal. I was stopped by the police, who asked me 
to show my Thai ID card. I gave him my ID. After seeing my ID, he said I 
was not Thai and he would arrest me. I was afraid of being arrested, and he 
knew it, so he asked me to pay THB200 [US$5.94], then he would release me. 
After I paid, I rode my motorbike as far as possible. Since then, I promise 
myself not to use this main road. We know this practice among my friends 
too (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
Although some stateless people are born in Thailand, speak Thai as their native language 
and are educated in the Thai education system, they are not yet considered as Thais; when 
they are unable to show their Thai national ID card to the state authorities, or their ID 
card indicates their non-Thai status, they have to pay bribes or they will be put in jail. 
6.5.1. Fake ID to Protect and to Jeopardize Their Lives 
Public schools in Thailand are under the government’s Ministry of Education. In this 
sense public schools not only provide learning opportunities, but also protect their 
members. Studying in public schools, stateless youth are provided with a student ID card 
that can be used for freedom of movement for an educational purpose, such as academic 
training and internship outside their district. As one informant said, 
… now I am in grade 9 [in the Thai education system]. I have only a student 
card. Although it means nothing, I can use this student card to travel around 
my district freely, but not outside the district (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang 
Mai province, 14 November 2014). 
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Moreover, the school ID card is important as it is used to protect stateless youth from 
being arrested by Thai authorities. A stateless student in Chiang Mai province said that 
she felt more confident, if the police ask to check her ID card as long as she has the school 
ID card with her. The student ID card indicates the student ID number which does not 
identify the class of citizenship to which she belongs. Therefore, the school ID card 
protects her from being arrested, because she is studying in the government educational 
institution (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 14 November 2014). 
As mentioned above, anyone in Thailand without an ID card is seen as an illegal migrant 
who can be arrested and deported by the Thai authorities. This regulation forces 
individuals to acquire an ID card, even an illegal one. To access the right to be protected, 
illegal migrants, including stateless people, sometimes decide to use fake ID cards or 
purchase Thai ID cards. Information from the focus group discussion participants has 
shown that although using a fake ID or buying a Thai ID card to obtain Thai citizenship 
is illegal, this is the real practice for those who can afford the price. I confirm here that 
none of the participants in this study practises these illegal activities.  
I know someone in the [refugee] camp who has a Thai ID card because they 
buy it. I can find a broker here if you want, but I will not do it. It is illegal and 
very expensive. I do not think I can find THB50,000–60,000 [US$1,485–
1,783] just to pay for the card (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 
12 September 2014).  
The ID card, for those who do not have it, can be priceless. Laungaramsri (2014) argues 
that for stateless people and migrants from Myanmar, the identity card has become an 
asset of great value related to the legal status the card provides the holder. Having 
different types of ID card can improve their livelihood, because different cards are issued 
for different purposes. It is possible for one individual to obtain many different cards and 
this has become a concerted strategy to ensure that one of the cards could possibly support 
their legal status in the near future (Laungaramsri 2014, p.160). 
The Thai ID card is free for Thai citizens. However, similar to other countries, buying a 
fake Thai ID card is made possible because of Thailand’s widespread and multi-level 
corruption, as a result of a poor bureaucratic system and bad governance (NGO 
representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 10 September 2014; Sinpeng 
2014). The lack of effective census data collection and birth registration system allows 
individuals to obtain their ID card illegally. Fake citizenship papers and ID cards are 
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widely used by stateless people to fake citizenship, although it is illegal, because those 
who hold such documents are protected from police harassment. 
The process for obtaining the fake ID card, issued by the Local Administration 
Department, Ministry of Interior, involves illegal activities and various kinds of scams. 
For example, Mae Sot is well-known for its black market, where illegal activities are 
possible. Rumours have spread in the refugee camps for a decade that there are some 
brokers who can help refugees to get Thai ID cards. However, the price of different 
categories of the card varies. The price of the Thai national ID card is the highest. The 
costs range from THB50,000–80,000 (approximately US$1,485–2,377) (stateless youth, 
FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). Some refugees in the camp can 
manage to purchase the ID card with the help of personal networks and a local broker. 
The personal connection is very important in the process. When an individual 
intends to buy an ID card, he will go to consult with those who already have 
one. There are not many options, but one of them is to purchase. The 
consultant will refer the individual to a broker who can find any ID card or 
who can bribe the officer to issue one in exchange for a large amount of 
money. The price is determined by the difficulty of the process (stateless 
youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
This multi-level corruption involving large amounts of money is performed secretly by 
local politicians and local government officials. A deal between an individual, or a group 
of non-Thai migrants, brokers, local politicians and local government officials is made. 
The broker works as a connection, or a middle-man, who is matching demand for the ID 
card with supply of available ID cards. The money for the cards can come from 
individuals or local politicians who own local businesses and reap great benefit from 
cheap labour. The local government officials are able to access and edit the local 
household registration in the government online database system. In some cases the 
government officials can check if any name is available for identity theft,54 or illegal 
personal subrogation/substitution55 (or Karn suam sithi).  
                                                             
54 Identity theft is a type of fraud that involves using someone else’s identity to steal or gain a 
personal benefit or advantage in the other person’s name. In this case, a non-citizen assumes the 
identity of a citizen to gain access to citizenship rights. 
55 Paying for illegal subrogation of a ‘10-years ID card,’ costs about THB20,000 (about 
US$595) for the whole process. It is considerably cheaper than registering as an illegal migrant 
worker to get a pink card which requires a complicated bureaucratic system involving the 
employer’s approval, annual renewal and fee. The pink card does not allow its holder to travel 
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In other cases, the names of dead Thai citizens are used by individuals. 
Occasionally, a registered new born baby’s name, which was not reported 
dead after birth, is available for illegal subrogation. Some local villagers have 
found 30 years later that their baby’s details in the household registration have 
changed and were illegally used by unknown individuals (NGO representative, 
in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 17 November 2014).  
The process of identity theft or illegal personal substitution is extremely risky. For 
instance, in 2013 approximately 20,000 names were illegally added in the household 
registration in Wiang Haeng district, located in the northern part of Chiang Mai province, 
and connected to the Shan State of Myanmar. The police investigated the case56 and found 
that four senior officials of Wiang Haeng district who were on duty at the time were guilty 
(Thai PBS News 2013). 
On 17 June 2017, the Thai military government released a new executive decree on 
foreign labour in order ‘to raise the standards of recruitment and management of labour, 
protect Thai economic security and avoid accusations of abuse or human 
trafficking’(Bangkok Post 2017, p.1). Under this new law, Thai authorities arrested illegal 
migrants immediately. Heavy punishment was imposed on thousands of illegal migrants 
and their employers, 57  whilst registration fees increased. 58  Hence, more than 60,000 
migrant workers, who came from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, and worked in Chiang 
Rai, Chiang Mai and Tak provinces, rapidly returned home (ABC News 2017; Tha 2017). 
Thai businessmen and politicians criticised the government that labour shortage in the 
private sector and small business threatens the Thai economy. Eventually, Prime Minister 
Prayuth Chan-ocha asked the Ministry of Labour to reconsider the decree which has been 
suspended for six months (Bangkok Post 2017; Ekachai 2017). 
                                                             
outside his province of registration for more than seven days without the employer’s 
permission. The holders cannot return to their country of origin as well (Aung 2016). 
56 This case is reported as it is relevant to drug trafficking with state officials’ support, because 
all the individuals’ support documents are suspicious. About 6,000 names are unidentified, 
whilst about 10,000 names cannot prove their Thai identity, and 1,500 names have incomplete 
documents (Thai PBS News 2013). 
57 Illegal migrants would be either arrested, imprisoned for up to five years, or fined between 
THB2,000–100,000 (about US$60-2,970). Their employers would be fined up to THB800,000 
(about US$23,767) if an undocumented migrant worker is hired (Chaimol 2017; Ekachai 2017). 
58 An employer has to pay THB20,000 (US$594) for a licence. A migrant worker must pay 
THB20,000 baht for a work permit, and THB20,000 for annual renewal (Ekachai 2017). This 
encourages corruption, as some police and officials try to seek bribes from panic stricken 
migrants and employers (Lefevre 2017). 
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Using fake illegal ID cards is dangerous. The price of the ID is high and unaffordable for 
ordinary, low income, stateless people. Buyers normally make a deal with local 
politicians and government officials by paying an expensive bribe to add their name in 
the household registration. Once the registration is successful, the issue of Thai ID cards 
follows. It is, however, an obligation between illegal subrogated persons and the business 
owner that they have to work to repay the business owner, whilst the Thai ID cards belong 
to the businessman. Finally, illegal persons are prone to be exploited as they have to work 
in either low paid or unpaid jobs to repay the businessman (NGO representative, in-depth 
interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 10 September 2014).  
6.6. Negotiating Freedom of Movement 
According to Thailand’s migration law, refugees do not have the right of residence in 
Thailand. They are allowed to stay only temporarily in the shelter areas and have to obtain 
travel approval documents from the Thai authorities, if they wish to leave the camp. So 
they fear being evicted or deported by authorities, if they are found outside the camp.  
Most refugee camps in Thailand are located in remote mountainous areas, which makes 
it difficult to travel on foot. They are under the co-administration of the Thai government 
and the National Security Council (NSC), whose refugee policy is implemented by the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI). National security policy is stringently implemented at all 
camps as the flow of people and goods at the main entry and exits are checked by the 
provincial and district authorities of the Ministry of Interior which appoints camp 
commanders to monitor refugee and camp committees (The Border Consortium (TBC) 
2014). Camp residents are restricted in applying for travel approval if they wish to leave 
the camp. Outsiders are also limited in travelling into the camp by the Ministry of Interior.  
Mae La refugee camp, for example, is located 57 kilometres from Mae Sot town. 
Transportation, such as a bus line connecting the camps and towns enables some camp 
residents to travel to the nearest border town of Tha Song Yan and Mae Sot Districts. 
However, several Thai Army checkpoints along the road check everyone’s ID card and 
arrest illegal migrants and refugees who travel without the required travel approval 
document. Refugees who leave the camp without travel approval are considered illegal 
migrants who are at risk of being arrested on the route outside the camps. Although some 
refugees can manage to leave the camp without the travel approval document, they may 
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find it difficult to come back to the camp by themselves. They are often arrested and sent 
back to the camp by the Thai police. 
Figure 6.4: Road to Mae La refugee camp   
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 10 September 2014  
It takes nearly one hour from Mae La to the nearest northern town, Mae Sot. 
I have to wait near the main highway to catch a yellow line bus. The bus leaves 
from Tha Song Yang district and drives along the highway from the forested 
hill on either side down to the farms. Passengers increase as it reaches the 
town. The Thai Army checkpoint is there when I pass. The bus is stopped by 
the Thai Army officer who asks everyone to show their ID. He aims to catch 
illegal migrants and refugees who move without a travel approval paper. 
There are many checkpoints along the main highway. Thai citizens, (who are 
rare) show their ID cards, a refugee shows travel approval papers. This time, 
I am granted a seven-day travel approval by the camp commander. I cannot 
stay longer, otherwise the Thai Army can arrest me (stateless youth, FGD, 
Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014). 
In the refugee camp, stateless children who are born in the camp cannot obtain a passport. 
Although some have proof of birth, they are unable to have their passport issued. Firstly, 
stateless youth of Myanmar refugee parents are unable to go to Myanmar without proof 
of citizenship. Secondly, the Thai government issues a passport only to registered 
stateless people in the civil registration list. As a result, stateless youth of Myanmar 
refugee parents have to live as permanent refugees and are unable to securely settle in any 
country (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 10 September 
2014).  
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Figure 6.5: Inside Mae La refugee camp 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 12 September 2014  
The same condition applies to stateless people who live outside the refugee camps in 
Thailand. Although stateless youth are living outside the camp, their travel is restricted. 
Being registered as ‘a person without legal status’, these people are allowed to live and 
travel only within the district in which they are registered. All young people in this 
research found that mobility is the most difficult aspect. While waiting for the Thai 
government’s decision on their legal status, or deportation, they need to obtain permission 
to travel from the district officer and the provincial governor, if they want to travel out of 
their district and province. According to the official letter of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
No. 0310.1/wor3408 B.E. 2543 (2000), police can arrest and convict any stateless people 
who fail to obtain travel approval and are found outside their district or province, as they 
are guilty of a crime  (UNESCO 2008, p.124).  
My family member and I could not go anywhere. We have been waiting for 
many years to confirm our Thai citizen status. Our status has not yet been 
confirmed so I am always stopped by police when I leave my village. I have 
nothing to prove that I am Thai (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 
12 September 2014). 
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During the 15 years of free education in Thailand, stateless youth attending Thai public 
schools can get travel approval for educational purposes. For example, two stateless 
young adults explained that their first chance to travel outside Mae Sot district to Bangkok 
is because of their education. A four-month internship in hotels located in Bangkok was 
offered to them with the help of their educational institution. However, the situation is 
different for long-term mobility. After graduation, they had to refuse a job offer at Samui 
Island, located in the Gulf of Thailand, due to restrictions on their mobility  (stateless 
youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
The restriction on movement makes living conditions difficult. Educated stateless young 
adults aim to further their higher education by going to a university outside their district, 
in Bangkok or abroad. One of the stateless youth participants had a great educational 
opportunity outside her district, however, she was not allowed to go.  She said: 
I want to study abroad. A teacher asked me if I wanted a scholarship to study 
abroad, but I could not accept it. This upset me every much because I could 
not take up the opportunity which was in front of me. I can only see it 
(stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014). 
The problem of mobility affects stateless young adults’ ability to pursue any occupation 
which requires their movement. After graduation, many stateless youth hope to get a good 
job offer; however, the restriction on movement does not allow them to work outside their 
district. 
My parents have lived in Thailand since they were teenagers. I was born in 
Thailand in 1994. Now I hold a10-year ID card… I want to know when the 
law will change for us. It is very difficult to go elsewhere. I feel like I don’t 
have freedom. I have a school certificate…I can have a driving licence, but I 
cannot go and work outside my district (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai 
province, 10 November 2014).  
On the other hand, the jobs available for them within their district of residency are limited. 
The limitation on movement impacts on their career choices.  
I have studied and graduated from hotel management. I want to work in a 
good hotel. I had a job offer in Phuket in the last semester of my study.  But I 
cannot go because the district officer said I cannot have approval to stay 
outside my district for that long. Now I have to decline the offer, and start to 
look for a job again in Mae Sot. The job is not relevant to what I have studied 
(stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). 
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6.6.1. Using Foreign ID to Live in Thailand  
To enjoy freedom of mobility, some stateless people use a foreign ID card to live in 
Thailand. It is not only to end their statelessness, but also so that they can access the 
citizenship rights in the country which had issued their ID card. However, this practice is 
very complicated, difficult and limited, because it applies only to those whose parents can 
prove their original identity and are able to return to their country of origin to get their 
children registered and have a passport issued. One of the stateless youth participants 
explained that it is comparatively easy in her case to go to Myanmar and obtain Myanmar 
citizenship, as her parents are originally from Myanmar. 
Although I was born in Thailand, it is very easy for me to go to my parents’ 
village to get my Myanmar citizenship. When I was born, I did not have my 
birth certificate. My mom asked a Myanmar monk to write my name on a 
piece of wood as birth evidence. If I want to get Myanmar citizenship, I can 
show that wood to the district officer. Then, I am eligible to be a Myanmar 
citizen (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 12 September 2014).  
Undocumented migrants and stateless people can use the restriction of movement and 
deportation to their advantage. In some cases, stateless youth may be able to go to their 
parents’ country of origin. They can pay money to a broker to help smuggle them to 
Myanmar (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). However, 
if they are poor and unable to contact the embassy of Myanmar in Thailand, they may 
walk to a Thai police station to get arrested as illegal migrants. This situation works as 
the police put them in jail whilst awaiting deportation. Later, their parents are asked to be 
present in the country of origin to prove their offspring’s identity. Then they can apply 
for a passport and return to Thailand with a tourist visa (stateless parents, in-depth 
interview, Chiang Mai province, 5 November 2014). 
Deportation has happened regularly since the Thai coup in May 2014. The Thai military 
government assigned over 100 armed officers to patrol the Thailand–Myanmar border in 
Mae Sot District. In June 2014, the government planned to solve the problem of illegal 
migrants because they are considered a threat to national security (Office of the National 
Security Council 2015). Armed soldiers guarding the border have noticed that hundreds 
of illegal migrants cross the natural border every day. They are very difficult to control 
or arrest, especially regular migrants who come and go on an everyday basis (Army 
officer, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). 
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Figure 6.6: The point of entry: Mae Sot border post 
 
Source: Photo by Ladawan Khaikham, 29 September 2014 
It is important to note here that deportation costs the government a great deal. Thai border 
police realise that many illegal migrant workers use this method to obtain free 
transportation. In reality, there ‘is no point in arresting and deporting these illegal 
migrants to Myanmar since they will eventually return to Thailand again’ (Army officer, 
in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). 
After a foreign passport is issued, these people are not considered stateless anymore. The 
Thai government considers them as aliens who have to comply with the immigration law. 
Before returning to Thailand, they have to apply for a Thai visiting visa in accordance 
with the purpose of entering the country. Using a foreign ID such as a passport helps them 
receive their education certificate and gain freedom of movement in Thailand. It allows 
them to work in a specific district. However, they feel as if they are foreigners in their 
own country (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014).  
Stateless youth participants consider using a foreign passport as the last option, because 
there is a number of limitations connected with a foreign passport. Moreover, the 
opportunity to apply for a Myanmar passport for stateless children of Myanmar migrant 
parents is not available to everyone.  Stateless youth have to make sure that they are able 
to go to their parents’ country of origin to apply for a passport. One of the stateless youth 
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participants was advised to obtain a Myanmar passport, because it is easier than applying 
for Thai citizenship. Nevertheless, she could not go to Myanmar, because she could not 
prove that she was from Myanmar. To begin with, her parents lost their Myanmar identity 
documents long ago, when they fled the conflict zone. It was impossible for her to track 
her family history to prove that she was from Myanmar. Secondly, she was from an ethnic 
minority family, so she could not speak Myanmar language at all. Therefore, it was 
impossible for her to apply for Myanmar citizenship (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 12 September 2014). 
6.7. Applying for Thai Citizenship 
6.7.1. ‘I want to be Thai’ 
When stateless youth decide to use other ID cards to live in Thailand, they give up their 
chance to obtain Thai citizenship. Some stateless youth are able to prove their identity is 
Myanmar, but they are not interested in applying for Myanmar citizenship (stateless youth, 
FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). A stateless youth participant said,  
I was born in Thailand. I studied in the Thai school. I speak Thai. So I want 
to be a full Thai citizen. If I get Myanmar citizenship, I cannot become a Thai 
citizen anymore (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 
2014). 
Stateless youth who were born in Thailand to a Karen or Shan family realise that they are 
of a different ethnicity from the Thai. The local dialect is used as the main language of 
communication, and Karen culture is preserved in their family and community (stateless 
youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014). Nevertheless, while all 
stateless youth participants prefer Thai citizenship to Myanmar citizenship, their reasons 
are various. Stateless youth of refugee parents prefer to have Thai citizenship due to their 
parents’ unhappy memories of Myanmar. Two stateless youth in Mae Sot, Tak province 
and Chiang Mai province said that: 
No I do not want Myanmar citizenship. My parents have told me they have to 
run out of the conflict zones in Myanmar. It is very dangerous to live there. 
Our house was burned, so my parents moved to live in Thailand (stateless 
youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 September 2014).  
…I hope that I can become a full Thai citizen. I know that I am not ethnic 
Thai and I have never forgotten my Shan identity, but I love Thai people and 
Thailand… (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 20 November 2014).  
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Moreover, for stateless youth to go to Myanmar to obtain Myanmar citizenship makes 
their life uncertain. For them, their lives in Myanmar are unimaginable. Their future is 
unforeseen. Some parents, who have left Myanmar a long time ago, are unable to find 
their villages. The first group of 68 Myanmar refugees was voluntarily repatriated to 
Myanmar in October 2016 (Lefevre 2016). Although most of them travelled back to their 
hometown, some 17 refugees had nowhere to live. As a result, they ended up in Yangon 
waiting for the government to relocate them somewhere 59  (Mon 2016). Going to 
Myanmar for Myanmar citizenship is like re-starting their life from zero. Therefore, they 
prefer to stay in Thailand to live out their lives (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak 
province, 20 September 2014). 
On the other hand, stateless youth participants who were born and have lived outside the 
refugee camps in Thailand for a long time feel more attached to Thai society than those 
who were born and have lived in the refugee camps.60 In terms of the decision to go to 
Myanmar to obtain Myanmar citizenship, these stateless youth are more concerned about 
their family settlement and friendship circle in Thailand, rather than an uncertain life in 
Myanmar. It is understandable because their family has settled and their social networks 
are established within Thai society, as they have more opportunity to socialise with Thai 
friends through school. They consider themselves more Thai than otherwise. 
We have a house and our plantation. We have everything here. I do not think 
I will go to Myanmar. I do not want Myanmar citizenship. We cannot go there. 
My family has nothing there. I will stay in Thailand, waiting for my Thai 
citizenship to be confirmed (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot, Tak province, 20 
September 2014). 
They prefer to stay in Thailand, although they have difficult lives, and are trying to apply 
for Thai citizenship. 
6.7.2. Application for Thai Citizenship 
Receiving Thai citizenship is the best way to end their statelessness. However, Thailand’s 
citizenship policy is based on the government’s expectation that non-Thai migrants, with 
their stateless children, will simply return home. In reality, the stateless children have 
                                                             
59 It is possible that the Myanmar government would assign them to stay in low-cost housing at 
Shwe Linn Ban industrial zone. They also have to pay about K9.8 million (US$7,540) for the 
accommodation at an unspecified future time (Mon 2016). 
60 Italics by the researcher. 
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been born in Thailand and lived there their whole life. It is difficult for them to go to a 
place where they have never been and live there. Therefore, to have fulfilling lives, they 
are trying to apply for Thai citizenship (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 10 
November 2014). 
In 2000, the Ministry of Interior changed its regulation by giving the authority to grant 
Thai citizenship to district officials. This change was expected to make the process faster 
as hundreds of thousands of hill tribe people were eligible for Thai citizenship. However, 
there are officials who slow down the process in order to bargain for bribes. Corruption 
is still under cover, but becoming normal practice, especially in the government offices 
along the border provinces. Many applications are ‘accidentally’ lost, delayed or disposed 
of due to the outright prejudice of the officials (NGO representative, in-depth interview, 
Mae Sot, Tak province, 10 September 2014; Bangkok Post 2016). Moreover, in 2002 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra intended to grant Thai citizenship to approximately 
200,000 hill tribe people and different groups of stateless people including children and 
young adults who had continuously lived in the country for more than 10 years (The 
Nation 2006) . The National Security Council estimated that almost 1,300,000 stateless 
people would have been granted Thai citizenship, if the policy had been continued 
(Kaosa-ard and Rutherford 2007). Unfortunately, this policy was never implemented. 
This policy failed not only due to the fact that the Prime Minister was overthrown, but 
also, in the state’s eyes, the policy was not an urgent issue. 
During 2008–2017, a series of new laws was passed that bring more benefits to stateless 
people in the country. In 2008, a new law allowed stateless people who were born before 
26 February 1992 to be granted Thai citizenship. Unfortunately, the younger generations 
remain stateless. In 2012, the amended Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965) granted 
citizenship to around 17,000 displaced Thai people who used to live outside the country.61 
In 2015, the military government granted legal status to stateless students who are in the 
registration database of Thai public schools (Jedsadachaiyut and Al-jasem 2016). 
However, among 69,600 stateless students in Thai public schools, only 19,800 were 
determined to be eligible for Thai citizenship (Srisinsuphya 2016). Furthermore, 
Notification of the Ministry of Interior in January 2017 allows about 80,000 stateless 
                                                             
61 Displaced Thai people are those who used to live in Myanmar. They decided to move to Thai 
territory in the 1980s. 
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people to apply for Thai citizenship. Nevertheless, eligible applicants need to demonstrate 
that they are born in Thailand to parents from ethnic minority groups; they have lived in 
Thailand for more than 15 years; and they have graduated from university (Rakkanam 
2017; Notification of the Ministry of Interior on granting Thai citizenship to persons born 
in the Kingdom of Thailand to alien father and mother in general and specific cases 2017, 
pp.10–14). 
Besides these strict criteria, there are also too many difficulties concerning the application 
of laws and regulations. According to the Nationality Act, B.E. 2508 (1965) (as amended 
in 2012), granting Thai citizenship is based on each individual case under the Minister’s 
consideration ‘in conformity with the rules prescribed by the Cabinet’ (Nationality Act 
B.E. 2508 1965, p. 5). Not many stateless people are able to end their statelessness by 
applying for Thai citizenship, as most stateless adults and youth are ineligible to apply 
for Thai citizenship and continue to be categorised as illegal migrants. Moreover, many 
stateless people are local villagers who lack legal knowledge about the civil and 
household registration and Thai citizenship. For instance, if they do not have to travel 
outside their district, they do not have to get involved with the district office and the 
government at all.  
My mother and father have been working in our field in our district in Tak 
province. They do not have to travel outside so they do not need travel 
approval. Also they want to avoid contacting the district officer or the 
government because they are illegal Karen people who have lived in Tak 
province. They are afraid of getting arrested. But I need to go outside our 
district for study, so I have just realised that I cannot go because I am not a 
Thai citizen (stateless youth, FGD, Mae Sot District, Tak province, 12 
September 2014). 
The new generation of stateless young adults is educated and knowledgeable.  After 18–
30 years staying in Thailand, studying in the Thai educational system and speaking Thai, 
they now consider themselves as Thai and want to apply for Thai citizenship. 
6.7.3. The Case of Pu Too’s Application for Thai Citizenship 
The policy failure affected Pu Too who is one of the stateless young adults. Pu Too was 
studying in the Thai public education system with the help of NGOs and a private 
scholarship. Her parents migrated from Shan State in Myanmar to Thailand long ago. She 
was born in Chiang Mai province in Thailand in 1992. 
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My family moved to Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai Thailand, because we 
wanted to reunite with my grandma who had already lived there for 20 years 
and my parents wanted to find a job. I was born in our village and have lived 
there my whole life (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 14 
November 2014).  
When they first arrived in Chiang Mai, Pu Too’s parents could not speak Thai at all. 
Without any identity document, they became stateless persons. Pu Too’s parents work in 
jobs that change regularly. Since 2001, her parents have been registered as alien migrant 
workers and obtained work permits. Thus, they were able to be registered in the household 
registration system. Nonetheless, Pu Too cannot obtain legal status and has become a 
stateless person.  
Although stateless young adults are educated and knowledgeable, they are not eligible to 
apply for Thai citizenship, until they are 20 years old. NGOs have played an important 
role to solve the problem of stateless children and young adults in Thailand (Saisoonthorn 
2003, p.7). Assistance and aid are available through the private sector and NGOs to help 
them access their rights and apply for Thai citizenship. Firstly, stateless young adults have 
received support from their primary school and teachers who allowed them to study in a 
local school. In Pu Too’s case, Rak Dek Foundation helped her to be able to register her 
name in Fang district, Chiang Mai province, as a person without legal status. She was 
able to go to secondary and high school with financial support from a private foundation. 
It was easy for her to study in the district where she is registered (stateless youth, FGD, 
Chiang Mai province, 14 November 2014).  
Pu Too’s life has changed again. Once she graduated from school, her choices were very 
limited. Although she obtained scholarship offers from universities outside her district, 
she could not accept them. Short term travel for educational purpose is approved easily, 
but studying or working outside the district for a long time is impossible. Pu Too believed 
that if she could end her statelessness by obtaining Thai citizenship, she could have 
freedom of movement and be able to accept scholarship offers to study overseas. 
She said: 
I have applied for Thai citizenship a long time ago, but the result has not been 
released yet… I just want the Prime Minster to give me approval that allows 
me to go anywhere just like other people (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai 
province, 14 November 2014). 
 162 
Besides the lack of legal knowledge that deprives locals and villagers of the capacity to 
apply for Thai citizenship, the process of the application itself is very complicated and 
could take a long time. Mr Yuthachai, a representative of the Mirror Foundation, who 
works with stateless youth in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, explained the reality 
of the process as a difficult, complex and unfinished project (NGO representative, in-
depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 8 November 2014). Although the process of 
application is explained in the Handbook of Registration and Citizenship provided by the 
Office of Registration, Local Administration Department, which is accessible online, it is 
hard for local stateless people without the internet to access it. Besides, official standard 
Thai language is difficult to understand for those who are not native Thai. Importantly, 
the process in the handbook is only part of the whole process. The non-government 
organisations (NGOs), based in Chiang Mai, Mae Sot and Mae Hong Son provinces, have 
been working to provide knowledge of the Thai citizenship application process to 
stateless locals and villagers. For some special cases, these organisations have stepped in 
to help stateless people submit their applications for Thai citizenship.  
To apply to be a Thai citizen, we have to apply to be entered into the 
household registration system by providing strong evidence to the district 
officer. Firstly, we have to know the status of the stateless person’s parents, 
if their name is already in the household registration, if they are ethnic 
minority, or migrants from foreign countries who have stayed in Thailand for 
a long time. We have to be able to prove that the stateless person is a 
descendant from their parents (NGO representative, in-depth interview, 
Chiang Mai province, 8 November 2014). 
Pu Too has applied from her current residence to the district office where the district 
officer can refer to her personal records. According to the in-depth interview with an 
NGO representative in Chiang Mai province (17 September 2014), in order to prove that 
their offspring should be entered into the household registration, the applicants have to 
provide one or two pieces of evidence. The first piece of evidence is villagers who can 
verify Pu Too’s relationship with her parents. The second piece of evidence is a DNA test 
result which confirms her parental relationship62 (Senate Thailand 2013). Problems occur 
                                                             
62 It is worth nothing here that DNA test does not identify or guarantee Thai citizenship. The test 
result is merely one piece of evidence to prove the parental relationship with the claimed parents 
whose names pre-exist in the Thai household registration (Schearf 2011; Senate Thailand 2013). 
 163 
in this process when the local authorities are not satisfied with the confirmation of the 
witnesses in the village, and the DNA test result is required. 
We were conducting a referendum among villagers as witnesses in order to 
confirm Pu Too’s status as a child of her parents who live in that village. The 
result was very obvious when all villagers confirmed their parental 
relationship because they have lived there their whole lives. However, the 
district officer is not happy with the result. I do not know what he really wants. 
He insists that he needs DNA check which is very expensive for us (NGO 
representative, in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 10 November 2014).  
As the authority to grant citizenship depends on the district officers who can use their 
own judgement to reject the applications, the system allows corruption and prejudice 
which are common difficulties (Schearf 2011; NGO representative, in-depth interview, 
Mae Sot, Tak province, 2014; Bangkok Post 2016). Moreover, the DNA examination 
costs THB2,050 per person (about US$61), which is relatively expensive for local people. 
Also NGOs do not have enough financial support for all applicants to pay for the DNA 
test. In many cases, applications are unable to be submitted because of the lack of the 
DNA test result (NGO representative, in-depth interview, Mae Sot, Tak province, 17 
September 2014).  
The complicated process for the Thai citizenship application can take up to a decade, and 
the result is not always promising. Some cases are granted Thai citizenship, some are 
added to the household registration and are provided merely with 10-year ID cards, which 
allows them to re-apply for Thai citizenship 10 years later. Some are not granted any 
status and continue stateless. Pu Too’s application was launched in 2004 when she was 
in grade 6, yet she has not heard anything about it. Jane, who has taken care of Pu Too’s 
Thai citizenship application for almost 10 years, states that  
… It takes a very long time to get a result from the Ministry of Interior. We 
submitted the application in 2004. Now it is 2014. We have been waiting for 
ten years, and the result may not make us happy… (NGO, representative, in-
depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 17 November 2014). 
Pu Too said: 
I want to know if I will get Thai citizenship. I have submitted my application 
since I was in grade 6 in 2004. I have paid a lot of money and been waiting 
for a long time until today (stateless youth, FGD, Chiang Mai province, 14 
November 2014). 
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Figure 6.7: The process of Thai citizenship application for stateless youth 
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Although the application process can take a decade, and its result may not be favourable, 
these stateless youth prefer to stay in Thailand and to apply for, and obtain, Thai 
citizenship.  
6.8. Conclusion 
Stateless youth in Thailand have been struggling to access their basic rights by employing 
both legal and illegal activities. They can access education by participating in community-
based schools. Since 2005, all stateless youth have been allowed to attend Thai public 
schools. Local private medical practitioners and clinics provide them with a health care 
service. Illegal activities which involve scamming, identity theft or illegal personal 
substitution and fake ID cards are real practices for those who can afford them. Finally, 
these stateless youth prefer to stay in Thailand and to apply for Thai citizenship because 
they consider themselves as Thai. Chapter 7 will discuss Thai respondents’ opinions 
about whether stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship. 
 167 
Chapter 7: The Opinions of Thai Respondents 
towards the Stateless Youth in Thailand  
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents results from 315 completed paper questionnaire surveys conducted 
between November 2014 and April 2015. This chapter shows that the opinions of Thai 
respondents are significantly different from the government perspective. The government 
considers the refugees along the borders and individuals without legal status, or stateless 
people, as threats to national security. However, the data suggest that the Thai respondents 
see the refugees along the borders and stateless people differently. The respondents 
believe that the temporary shelter areas and the refugees cause some problems such as 
threats to national security and personal safety. Hence, the respondents need the Thai 
government to take care of border security, as a part of national security. 
On the other hand, the respondents consider the stateless status as a social matter rather 
than a security concern. They believe this is a social issue that can be solved by the Thai 
government’s agencies in cooperation with INGOs/NGOs. Consequently, the data show 
the majority of overall respondents, about 64 per cent, prefer stateless youth to gain Thai 
citizenship and remain in Thailand. The Thai male respondents who have engaged with 
non-Thai migrants previously are more likely to support the stateless youth than the 
female respondents. The reasons for supporting them are various such as humanity and 
morality reasons, the jus soli principle, basic human rights and human security reason. 
Also, personal safety reasons, economic reasons and child protection by law are 
mentioned. 
This chapter consists of three parts. Firstly, the overview of research participants 
identifies the research target group by using snowball sampling as the data collection 
strategy. The second part presents the results and a discussion relating to the Thai 
respondents’ engagement with non-Thai migrants and the Thai respondents’ opinion of 
refugees and temporary shelter areas, border security and stateless youth. Moreover, the 
reasons why the respondents support or do not support the stateless youth in gaining Thai 
citizenship are presented. Finally, the research findings and conclusion are discussed.  
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7.2. Overview of Research Participants 
In this chapter, data have been collected from 315 paper questionnaire surveys, completed 
by Thai citizens nationwide. This research engages the general population of various areas 
in Thailand in demonstrating the opinions of Thai respondents as important factors in 
helping promote awareness of refugees and stateless people in Thailand. Moreover, Thai 
citizens’ opinions may ‘have the power to change the government’s policy’ (Sunpuwan 
and Niyomsilpa 2012, p.11), because Thai citizens aged 18 years and over in principle 
are able to vote in local and national elections, and participate in political campaigns and 
social movements.  
Figure 7.1: The distribution of the survey’s participants in the BMR 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015; map adapted 
from Carto GIS 2016b, CAP, Australian National University 
Later, the research participants referred the researcher to a broader participant group. 
About 61.90 per cent of these reside outside the BMR.  
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Figure 7.2: The distribution of the survey’s participants nationwide 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015; map adapted 
from Carto GIS 2015, CAP, Australian National University. The red dots show the 
number of respondents in each area. 
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Subsequently, the research result shows that the paper survey was completed by 
participants coming from multiple areas including provinces where refugee camps are 
located, and homes for stateless youth, such as in Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son, Tak, 
Ratchaburi, and Kanchanaburi. Moreover, participants living in border provinces between 
Thailand–Laos and Thailand–Cambodia, such as Ubon-Ratchathani, Nong Khai and 
Nakhon Phanom are also included. 
The survey covers Thai respondents aged between 21 to 70 years old from various socio-
economic backgrounds. Some 58.41 per cent were female and 41.59 per cent were male. 
The average age of the survey respondents is 43.16 years old. Figure 7.3 shows overall 
respondents’ age groups. About 36 per cent of respondents are in the age group 31–40 
years old. Some 22 per cent are in the age groups 51–60 years old. Respondents aged 41–
50 years old and those 21–30 years old represent 21 per cent and 13 per cent respectively. 
The smallest group comprises respondents aged 61–70 years old (8 per cent). 
Figure 7.3: Overall respondents’ age groups 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
In terms of education, Figure 7.4 shows that more than half of the total respondents had 
a bachelor degree (56 per cent) whilst 31 per cent had a master’s degree. The third group 
of respondents (7 per cent) had finished a doctoral degree. About 4 per cent have finished 
their vocational education. The smallest group is the 2 per cent who completed their 
education at high school level. 
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Figure 7.4: Respondents’ educational level 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
In terms of careers, Figure 7.5 shows that the overall majority of respondents are 
employees of a private company (56 per cent). The second largest group is students (17 
per cent). Moreover, small numbers are government officials, business owners, or have 
other types of employment; these constitute 9 per cent, 8 per cent, and 8 per cent 
respectively. The smallest group (about 2 per cent) is salesmen.  
Figure 7.5: Respondents’ careers 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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In terms of salary, Figure 7.6 shows that 75 per cent of respondents receive more than 
THB200,000 per year. The majority, about 40 per cent, receives more than THB500,000 
per year. The second largest group is the respondents who receive THB200,000–300,000 
baht per year (15 per cent). About 10 per cent receives THB300,000–400,000 per year. 
About 10 per cent receives THB400,000–500,000 per year. The rest, about 25 per cent of 
respondents, receives less than THB200,000; about 13 per cent receives no more than 
THB100,000 per year, and about 12 per cent receives THB100,000–THB200,000 per 
year. 
Figure 7.6: Overall respondents’ salary per year 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
In terms of family, more than half of the overall respondents do not have children (60.32 
per cent). The rest, 39.68 per cent, have at least one child (Questionnaire survey between 
November 2014 and April 2015). 
7.3. The Thai Respondents’ Engagement with Non-Thai 
Migrants 
This section was designed to ask the respondent about her/his engagement with non-Thai 
migrants. Questions include whether they have worked with and/or employed non-Thai 
migrants, by asking the question, ‘Have you ever employed or worked with non-Thai 
migrants?’ Responses to the questionnaire aim to elucidate how familiar the respondents 
are with the non-Thai migrants.  
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Firstly, this research identifies two groups of respondents as shown in Figure 7.7. About 
49 per cent have engaged with non-Thai migrants. The second group, 51 per cent, i.e. 
more than half, have never engaged with non-Thai migrants.  
Figure 7.7: Respondents who have or have not engaged with non-Thai migrants  
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
In terms of gender comparison, Figure 7.8 shows some differences. The data show that 
more than half of male respondents (51.15 per cent) and female respondents (54.89 per 
cent) have never engaged with non-Thai migrants. On the other hand, comparatively, 
more male respondents (48.85 per cent) have engaged with non-Thai migrants than have 
female respondents (45.11 per cent). 
Figure 7.8: Respondents who have or have not engaged with non-Thai migrants by 
gender 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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Table 7.1 shows the correlation between the respondents’ careers and their engagement 
with non-Thai migrants. Among the different careers, more than 50 per cent of business 
owners, students, salesmen and those with other careers have engaged with non-Thai 
migrants. It shows that people with these careers have more chance to employ non-Thai 
employees, study with non-Thai students and contact non-Thai customers than do those 
with other careers, such as government officials and employees of private companies, 
who do not have a chance to interact with non-Thai migrants. 
Table 7.1: The correlation between the respondents’ careers and their engagement 
with non-Thai migrants 
Career 
Have engaged 
with non-Thai 
migrants (%) 
Have never 
engaged with non-
Thai migrants (%) 
1. Business owners 62.50 37.50 
2. Government officials 44.83 89.66 
3. Students 56.36 43.64 
4. Employees 38.86 61.14 
5. Salesmen 57.14 42.86 
6. Others 64.00 36.00 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Later, the respondents were asked to identify which non-Thai migrants they have 
employed or worked with previously. This question was designed to see with which non-
Thai identity the respondents were most familiar.  
Figure 7.9 shows that among respondents who have employed or worked with non-Thai 
migrants, those from Myanmar such as the Burman, Karen, including Karen ethnic 
minority of the Thai Yai, Lahu and Pga K’nyauare, who are actually Thai citizens, are the 
most mentioned (about 53 per cent). The second and third most mentioned groups of non-
Thai migrants come from Laos and Cambodia, respectively. Those from Vietnam and 
Japan are rarely mentioned. Others who come from Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines, 
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China, Russia, The Netherlands, Belgium, India, Switzerland, Indonesia, the U.S., France, 
Germany, Australia and the U.K. are also less frequently mentioned.  
Figure 7.9: The countries of origin by percentage of non-Thai migrants mentioned  
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Table 7.2 shows the respondents’ overall profile. It also shows in percentage terms the 
differences between the two groups of respondents. The first group is the respondents 
who have engaged with non-Thai migrants previously. The second group is the 
respondents who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants. 
Table 7.2: Respondents’ overall profile 
Respondents’ 
Socio-economic background 
Overall 
(%) 
Have engaged with 
non- Thai migrants 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Gender    
 Male 41.59 48.85 51.15 
 Female 58.41 45.11 54.89 
Age group    
 21–30 years old 13.02 56.10 43.90 
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Respondents’ 
Socio-economic background 
Overall 
(%) 
Have engaged with 
non- Thai migrants 
Yes (%) No (%) 
 31–40 years old 36.19 50.00 50.00 
 41–50 years old 20.32 45.31 54.69 
 51–60 years old 22.22 37.14 62.86 
 61–70 years old 8.25 46.15 53.85 
Residential areas    
 in the BMR 38.10 56.67 43.33 
 outside the BMR 61.90 40.51 59.49 
Length of residence in survey areas    
 0–3 years  12.70 60.00 40.00 
 3–6 years  8.57 29.63 70.37 
 6–9 years  7.62 41.67 58.33 
 9–12 years  6.03 52.63 47.37 
 12–15 years  4.13 23.08 76.92 
 more than 15 years  60.95 47.92 52.08 
Education level    
 High School 1.90 66.67 33.33 
 Vocational School 4.13 46.15 53.85 
 Bachelor Degree 55.56 44.57 55.43 
 Master Degree 32.06 47.52 52.48 
 Doctoral Degree  6.35 55.00 45.00 
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Respondents’ 
Socio-economic background 
Overall 
(%) 
Have engaged with 
non- Thai migrants 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Careers    
 Business owners 7.62 62.50 37.50 
 Government officials 9.21 44.83 89.66 
 Students 17.46 56.36 43.64 
 Employees 55.56 38.86 61.14 
 Salesmen 2.22 57.14 42.86 
 Others 7.94 64.00 36.00 
Salary per year    
 THB0–100,000 11.75 29.73 70.27 
 THB100,001–200,000 13.02 56.10 43.90 
 THB200,001–300,000 15.24 45.83 54.17 
 THB300,001–400,000 9.21 55.17 44.83 
 THB400,001–500,000 10.48 48.48 51.52 
 more than THB500,001 40.32 46.46 53.54 
Family context    
 Has children 39.68 38.40 61.60 
 Does not have children 60.32 52.11 47.89 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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7.4. The Thai Respondents’ Knowledge Concerning Refugees  
7.4.1. Knowledge of Temporary Shelter Areas and Refugees 
When the government consolidated the refugee camps 63  in 1995–1997, they were 
expected to become inaccessible to Thai people. However, this has proved to be 
impossible, because some refugees can find their way to work outside the camps. This 
section of the questionnaire aims to explore the respondents’ knowledge of temporary 
shelter areas and refugees living along the Thailand–Myanmar border.  
The modified Likert scale has been used to measure and evaluate the Thai respondents’ 
knowledge through two sets of statements concerning temporary shelter areas and 
refugees. The first set of statements concerns awareness of the existence of temporary 
shelter areas and refugees among Thai respondents. Table 7.3 shows that the knowledge 
of Thai respondents concerning refugees is very limited, as less than half of overall 
respondents (about 49 per cent) agree that they ‘know of the existence of the temporary 
shelter areas along the border’. Secondly, about 48 per cent knows that ‘people living in 
the temporary shelter are refugees’. Moreover, about 36 per cent agrees that they ‘know 
the refugees are from Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar’. However, more respondents 
are unsure about the statement while the rest do not agree with it. The majority (40 per 
cent) disagrees with the fourth statement, ‘the temporary shelter areas are closed areas’. 
Only 33 per cent agrees with this statement. The rest are not sure about the statement.  
Table 7.3: Overall results of the Thai respondents’ knowledge of temporary shelter 
areas and refugees  
 
Statements 
Overall (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
1. I know of the existence of the temporary 
shelter areas along the border. 48.89 27.94 23.17 
                                                             
63 In the beginning, the refugee communities were allowed to be established together with Thai 
border communities. However, later in 1995 the villagers’ failure to protect themselves from the 
Burmese army’s attack attracted the Thai Government’s sanction. All communities were 
consolidated into nine ‘temporary shelters’ as today. The Thai government imposed more direct 
control over the communities for security reasons, and displaced people were in principle 
completely cut off from the local Thai communities and Thai villages. 
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Statements 
Overall (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
2. I know people living in the temporary 
shelter areas are refugees. 47.62 26.67 25.71 
3. I know the refugees are from 
Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar. 35.87 34.92 29.21 
4. I know the temporary shelter areas are 
closed areas. 32.38 27.62 40.00 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Comparing the two groups of respondents who have or have not engaged with non-Thai 
migrants, Figure 7.10 shows that the majority of both groups (about 53 per cent of the 
first group and about 45 per cent of the second group) acknowledge that they know of 
‘the existence of the temporary shelter areas along the border’. Slightly more respondents 
of the first group know of the existence of the temporary shelter areas along the border 
than the second group.  
Figure 7.10: The percentage of respondents who know of the existence of the 
temporary shelter areas along the border 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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Furthermore, in Figure 7.11 the majority of both groups agrees that they know that 
‘people living in the temporary shelter are refugees.’ However, slightly more respondents 
of the first group know about this than the second group; these are 53.74 per cent and 
42.26 per cent, respectively. More respondents of the second group are unsure and 
disagree with the statement, compared to the first group. 
Figure 7.11: The percentage of respondents who know people living in the 
temporary shelter areas are refugees 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
These findings demonstrate that more than half of the respondents know that the 
temporary shelter areas exist and that there are refugees living inside the areas. However, 
a large percentage of respondents, who has never engaged with non-Thai migrants, is 
either unsure or disagrees with these statements. 
Figure 7.12 shows that 41.50 per cent of the first group agrees that they know ‘refugees 
are from Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar’. About 30.61 per cent of this group is unsure, 
whilst about 27.89 per cent disagrees with the statement. On the other hand, about 38.69 
per cent of the second group is unsure about the statement. Only one third of this group 
(30.95 per cent) knows that the ‘refugees are from Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar’. 
The rest, about 30.36 per cent, disagrees that they know ‘refugees are from Karen/Shan 
States inside Myanmar’. 
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Figure 7.12: The percentage of respondents who know the refugees are from 
Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Figure 7.13 shows that 40.82 per cent of the first group and 39.29 per cent of the second 
group disagree with the statement that ‘the temporary shelter areas are closed areas.’ 
However, more respondents of the first group (37.41 per cent), compared to those of the 
second group (27.98 per cent), agree with this statement.  
Figure 7.13: The percentage of respondents who know that the temporary shelter 
areas are closed areas 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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7.4.2. Discussion 
According to the results, this section shows that knowledge of temporary shelter areas 
and refugees among Thai respondents is limited as slightly less than half of overall 
respondents agree that they ‘know of the existence of the temporary shelter areas along 
the border’ and  ‘know people living in the temporary shelter are refugees.’  Moreover, 
about 36 per cent agrees that they ‘know the refugees are from Karen/Shan States inside 
Myanmar’. However, the majority (about 40 per cent) does not know that ‘the temporary 
shelter areas are closed areas’. 
In terms of comparison between the two groups who have or have not engaged with non-
Thai migrants, more respondents of the first group have obtained knowledge about 
temporary shelter areas and refugees, compared to the second group. Furthermore, more 
than half of the first group know of ‘the existence of the temporary shelter areas along the 
border’ (53.06 per cent) and that ‘people living in the temporary shelter areas are refugees’ 
(53.74 per cent). Less than half of the second group know about these issues. Likewise, 
the majority of the first group also knows that the refugees are from Karen/Shan States 
inside Myanmar, whilst only one third of the second group knows this information. 
7.4.3. The Thai Respondents’ Interaction with Refugees 
This section of the questionnaire involves the everyday life of Thai respondents 
interacting with non-Thai refugees and stateless people. The questions aimed to examine 
the Thai respondents’ awareness about contacting refugees and stateless people on a daily 
basis. The set of statements and overall results are in Table 7.4 below.  
Table 7.4 shows that there is a considerable difference between respondents who disagree 
and those who agree with the first statement that ‘I know refugees in the temporary shelter 
areas are not allowed to go out’. About 38 per cent of overall respondents disagrees that 
refugees are not allowed to go out of the temporary shelter whilst 32.70 per cent agrees 
with it.  
On the other hand, the majority (about 50.48 per cent) disagrees that they ‘know some 
refugees can go out of the temporary shelters’. Also, about 77.46 per cent disagrees that 
they have met and known refugees from the temporary shelters. One third of respondents 
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is unsure if they know ‘refugees in the temporary shelter are not allowed to go out’ and 
‘some refugees can go out of the temporary shelters’.  
However, the respondents know very clearly when they are asked whether they have ever 
met and known, or worked with refugees from the temporary shelter areas. When asked 
if they have met and known refugees inside the temporary shelters previously, the 
majority of respondents (77.46 per cent) disagrees. On the other hand, 7.94 per cent has 
met and known refugees from the temporary shelters. Finally, only 6.03 per cent agrees 
that they have ‘worked with refugees who lived in the temporary shelters’ whilst the 
majority (about 80 per cent) disagrees with this statement.  
Table 7.4: Overall results of Thai respondents’ interaction with the refugees  
Statements 
Overall (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
1. I know refugees in the temporary shelter 
areas are not allowed to go out. 32.70 29.21 38.10 
2. I know some refugees can go out of the 
temporary shelter areas. 18.73 30.79 50.48 
3. I have met and known refugees from the 
temporary shelter areas. 7.94 14.60 77.46 
4. I have worked with refugees who lived in the 
temporary shelter areas. 6.03 13.97 80.00 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
In terms of comparison, there are no significant differences between the two groups of 
respondents.  Figure 7.14 shows the comparison result of the respondents who know that 
refugees in the temporary shelter areas are not allowed to go out. There is no significant 
difference between the respondents of the first group who agree (37.41 per cent) and those 
who disagree (36.73 per cent) with the statement ‘I know refugees in the temporary shelter 
areas are not allowed to go out’. On the other hand, 39.29 per cent of the second group, 
who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants, disagrees that they ‘know that refugees 
in the temporary shelter areas are not allowed to go out’. 
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Figure 7.14: The comparison result of the respondents who know that refugees in 
the temporary shelter areas are not allowed to go out 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Figure 7.15 also shows no significant difference between the two groups who know that 
some refugees can go out of the temporary shelters. The majority of both groups (48.30 
per cent of the first group, and 52.38 per cent of the second group) does not agree that 
they know ‘some refugees can go out of the temporary shelters’. However, more 
respondents of the first group, 19.73 per cent, agree with this statement than do 
respondents of the second group, 17.86 per cent.  
Figure 7.15: The comparison result of the respondents who know that some 
refugees can go out of the temporary shelter areas 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
37.41
25.85
36.73
28.57
32.14
39.29
0
10
20
30
40
50
Agree Unsure Disagree
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
I know that refugees in the temporary shelter areas are not allowed to go out.
Have engaged with non-Thai migrants Have never engaged with non-Thai migrants
19.73
31.97
48.30
17.86
29.76
52.38
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
Agree Unsure Disagree
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
I know some refugees can go out of the temporary shelters.
Have engaged with non-Thai migrants Have never engaged with non-Thai migrants
 185 
Table 7.5 below focuses on the first group of respondents who have engaged with non-
Thai migrants previously. The majority, about 76.19 per cent, disagrees that they have 
met any refugees from the temporary shelter areas. On the other hand, about 10.88 per 
cent believes that they have met refugees from the temporary shelter areas. Moreover, the 
majority, about 76.19 per cent, has never worked with refugees who live in the temporary 
shelter areas. Only 8.16 per cent has worked with refugees who live in the temporary 
shelter areas.  
Table 7.5: Respondents who have engaged with non-Thai migrants 
 
Statements 
 
Respondents who have 
engaged with non-Thai 
migrants (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
1. I have met and known refugees from the 
temporary shelter areas. 10.88 12.93 76.19 
2. I have worked with refugees who lived in the 
temporary shelter areas. 8.16 15.65 76.19 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.4.4. Discussion  
This section shows the results of Thai respondents’ interactions with refugees. The overall 
results show that about 38 per cent of respondents does not know that refugees are not 
allowed to go out of the temporary shelter, whilst about 32 per cent does know about this. 
On the other hand, the majority does not know that some refugees can go out of the 
temporary shelter areas. It is very clear that the majority does not know about the living 
conditions of refugees in the temporary shelter areas. Finally, about 77 per cent has never 
met or known refugees from the temporary shelter areas.  
Comparing the two groups of respondents who have and have not engaged with non-Thai 
migrants, it is clear that there are no significant differences between the two groups of 
respondents in terms of their knowledge about refugees in the temporary shelter areas. 
However, a slightly greater percentage of respondents of the first group has interacted 
with refugees than the second group.  
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Focusing on the first group who have engaged with non-Thai migrants previously, the 
data show that the majority, about 76.19 per cent, has never met or known refugees from 
the temporary shelters. Only 8.16 per cent has worked with refugees who lived in the 
temporary shelter areas previously. This is because few Myanmar refugees from the 
temporary shelter areas are able to work outside the camps, due to many difficulties such 
as transportation, lack of travel approval document and financial problems, which limit 
interaction. 
Due to interaction with non-Thai migrants, the respondents of the first group have 
obtained more knowledge about the temporary shelter areas and the refugees. The results 
show that more respondents of the first group know about the living conditions of the 
refugees than do respondents of the second group. However, the majority of both groups 
has never met, known or worked with the refugees. Although the first group has engaged 
with non-Thai migrants, their engagement does not reflect their familiarity with the 
refugees from the temporary shelter areas, as the majority has never met, known or 
worked with the refugees. It is also interesting to see that about 8.16 per cent of the first 
group of respondents has worked with refugees, although in principle the refugees are not 
allowed to travel or work outside the refugee camps.  
7.5. The Thai Respondents’ Opinions on Border Security  
In the third section, the questionnaire explores respondents’ opinions on Thailand’s 
border security as a part of Thailand’s national security concerns. It covers the 
respondents’ opinions on four different aspects. These are 1) the temporary shelter areas; 
2) the refugees; 3) effects on Thailand; and 4) border problems. The questionnaire results 
are presented below. 
7.5.1. The Temporary Shelter Areas  
When the questionnaire asks ‘what do you think about the temporary shelter areas along 
the border’, overall respondents do not reject the existence of the temporary shelter areas 
along the Thailand–Myanmar border. Figure 7.16 shows that the majority (70 per cent) 
does not mind having the temporary shelter areas along the border. In contrast, about 27 
per cent does not like having the temporary shelter areas. Finally, about 3 per cent does 
not know about the temporary shelter areas. Their opinions are different; for instance they 
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suggest that the areas must be under international law, and the government should 
prioritise national security.  
Figure 7.16: Respondents’ opinions about the temporary shelter areas along the 
border 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.5.2. The Refugees 
Figure 7.17 shows that slightly more than half of the respondents (55 per cent) does not 
welcome the refugees residing along the Thailand–Myanmar border. In contrast, about 
33 per cent welcomes refugees staying in Thailand. A very small percentage (about 8 per 
cent) does not mind having them stay temporarily in Thailand. The remainder, about 4 
per cent, does not have an opinion about this. 
Figure 7.17: Respondents’ opinions on the refugees 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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In terms of comparison, Figure 7.18 shows the differences between the two groups of 
respondents who have and have not engaged with non-Thai migrants. More respondents 
of the first group welcome refugees staying in Thailand. Within the first group of 
respondents, however, it is interesting to see an equal percentage between respondents 
who welcome the refugees and those who do not welcome the refugees (47.62 per cent 
each). This is because respondents may have different experiences with non-Thai 
migrants. Therefore, their answers are diverse.  
In contrast, the majority (61.90 per cent) of the second group, who has never engaged 
with non-Thai migrants previously, does not welcome refugees staying in Thailand. This 
also reflects Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa’s research that Thai media, such as television, 
newspapers and social media, plays an important role in reporting negative perceptions 
toward refugees and non-Thai migrants (Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2014, p.43). Only 
20.24 per cent of those who do not have any direct experience with non-Thai citizens 
welcomes the refugees. 
Figure 7.18: The comparison of the respondents’ opinions on welcoming the 
refugees 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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7.5.3. Benefits to Thailand 
This section asks the respondents about their opinion concerning the temporary shelter 
areas and whether refugees bring benefits to Thailand. Figure 7.19 below shows that about 
41 per cent thinks that refugees in the temporary shelter areas bring many benefits to 
Thailand. Moreover, about 27 per cent thinks that some benefits come from the temporary 
shelter areas and refugees. In contrast, 32 per cent thinks that the temporary shelter areas 
and refugees do not bring any benefits to Thai society. 
Figure 7.19: The respondents’ opinions on whether the temporary shelter areas 
and refugees benefit Thailand 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Focusing on the benefits to Thailand, Figure 7.20 shows that about 34 per cent of overall 
respondents believes refugees help increase the Thai national economy. About 29 per cent 
thinks that Thailand has benefited from the cheap labour contributed by the refugees. 
About 20 per cent thinks more Thai products can be sold and 17 per cent believes that 
refugees help replace labour in 3D jobs.64 
                                                             
64 3D jobs are dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs that have been ignored by Thai citizens in 
general. These jobs, including seafood processing, manufacturing, service industries and 
domestic employment, usually require hard work, but generate low income. Therefore, these 
jobs always attract non-Thai migrant workers (Huguet, Chamratrithirong and Claudia 2012; 
Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2012). 
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Figure 7.20: The respondents’ opinions about benefits to Thailand from the 
temporary shelter areas and refugees 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.5.4. Border Problems 
This section asks the respondents about their opinions concerning whether the temporary 
shelter areas cause any problems to Thailand. Figure 7.21 shows that the majority of 
overall respondents, 90 per cent, believes that the temporary shelter areas and refugees 
cause problems to Thailand. Almost half of the respondents, about 45 per cent, thinks 
they cause some problems. About 31 per cent thinks that they cause only a few problems. 
About 14 per cent believes that the temporary shelter areas and refugees cause many 
problems. In contrast, only 10 per cent thinks temporary shelter areas and refugees do not 
cause any problems.  
Figure 7.21: The respondents’ opinions on temporary shelter areas and refugees 
causing problems to Thailand 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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To identify the problems caused by the temporary shelter areas and refugees along the 
border, Figure 7.22 shows that 25 per cent believes that the temporary shelter areas and 
refugees are threats to national security. About 24 per cent believes that refugees commit 
serious crimes in Thai society, whilst another 24 per cent thinks that refugees pose threats 
to personal safety. Environmental problems concern 18 per cent. Finally, about 9 per cent 
is concerned about other problems such as financial support and international relations 
with Myanmar.  
Figure 7.22: The respondents’ opinions on problems caused by the temporary 
shelter areas and refugees along the border  
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
The respondents were asked to identify who should be responsible for the border 
problems. Figure 7.23 shows that 27 per cent thinks that the border problems should be 
solved by Thailand’s border police. About 22 per cent wants local Thai citizens to help 
solve the border problems. About 21 per cent believes that the Thai government should 
deal with the border problems. About 18 per cent believes that the Myanmar government 
should take some responsibility to solve the border problems. About 11 per cent prefers 
to have the Thai military take action. Lastly, only 1 per cent thinks of other options. 
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Figure 7.23: The respondents’ opinions on who should solve the border problems  
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.5.5. Discussion 
In terms of border security, the majority of overall respondents, about 54 per cent, does 
not mind having the temporary shelter areas along the border, because about 68 per cent 
believes that the temporary shelter areas and refugees bring benefits to Thai society. 
These benefits include increasing the national economy (34 per cent), refugees adding 
more cheap labourers to the Thai labour market (29 per cent), replacing labourers in 3D 
jobs (17 per cent), and selling more products to them (20 per cent). 
On the other hand, about 55 per cent, do not welcome refugees staying in Thailand. They 
believe that the temporary shelter areas and refugees do not bring any benefit to Thailand. 
Particularly about 61.90 per cent of respondents, who have never engaged with non-Thai 
migrants, do not welcome refugees. This may be because Thai media portray negative 
perceptions about refugees and non-Thai migrants.  
Concerning border problems, the majority, about 90 per cent, believes that the temporary 
shelter areas and refugees cause at least one problem to Thailand. Therefore, the Thai 
government agencies are mentioned as being responsible for the border problems, 
especially Thailand’s border police. 
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7.6. The Thai Respondents’ Knowledge of Stateless Youth in 
Thailand 
7.6.1. Knowledge of the Stateless Situation in Thailand 
Section four of the questionnaire asks the respondents about their knowledge of the 
situation of stateless youth in Thailand. Table 7.6 below shows that more than half of 
overall respondents, about 55 per cent, know that ‘there are youth who were born to non-
Thai migrants in the temporary shelter areas’. However, about 38 per cent knows that ‘the 
youth do not have Myanmar citizenship’, and about 40 per cent knows that the youth also 
do not have Thai citizenship. 
In terms of accessing public facilities, about 44 per cent knows that these youth are unable 
to attend Thailand’s public schools. About 40 per cent knows that stateless youth are 
unable to use public health care services in Thailand, and do not have health care 
insurance, so they have to pay for their own health maintenance.  
Moreover, regarding the ability to move and to stay, about 42 per cent of respondents 
does not know that without citizenship, these stateless youth cannot move to Myanmar. 
In contrast, about 40 per cent knows that the youth are restricted from travelling freely in 
Thailand. Finally, one third knows that the youth cannot go out of Thailand legally. 
Table 7.6: Overall results of the respondents’ knowledge about stateless youth in 
Thailand  
 
Statements 
Overall (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
1. I know there are youth who were born to non-
Thai migrants in the temporary shelter areas. 55.56 21.59 21.90 
2. I know the youth do not have Myanmar 
citizenship. 37.78 27.30 33.65 
3. I know the youth do not have Thai citizenship. 40.63 26.03 32.70 
4. I know the youth are unable to attend 
Thailand’s public schools. 44.76 26.67 26.98 
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Statements 
Overall (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree 
5. I know the youth are unable to use public 
health care services in Thailand. 40.00 26.03 32.38 
6. I know the youth do not have health care 
insurance so they have to pay for their own 
health maintenance. 39.37 28.25 31.11 
7. I know the youth are unable to move to 
Myanmar without citizenship papers. 27.30 29.84 41.59 
8. I know the youth are unable to move around 
Thailand freely. 40.00 29.84 28.25 
9. I know the youth cannot go out of Thailand 
legally. 34.60 27.62 35.87 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Table 7.7 shows the comparison between the two groups of respondents who have or have 
never engaged with non-Thai migrants. More than half of both groups, about 59 per cent 
of the first group and 52 per cent of the second group, know about ‘youth who were born 
to non-Thai migrants in the temporary shelter areas’. However, concerning citizenship, 
more of the first group, about 45 per cent, know that the youth do not have Myanmar or 
Thai citizenship. In contrast, about one third of the second group know this.  
In terms of accessing public facilities, the results from both groups are similar. About 44 
per cent of each group knows that the stateless youth are unable to attend Thailand’s 
public schools. About 40 per cent of the first group and 28 per cent of the second group 
know that the youth are unable use public health care services and are not covered by 
health insurance, so the stateless youth have to pay for their own health maintenance. 
For the ability to move or to stay, more than one third of both groups, about 39 per cent 
of the first group and about 44 per cent of the second group, do not know the youth are 
unable to move to Myanmar without citizenship papers. However, more than one third of 
both groups know about the restrictions on the stateless youth travelling freely in and out 
of Thailand. 
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Table 7.7: Comparison of the results of respondents’ knowledge about stateless youth in Thailand 
Statements 
Have engaged with non- 
Thai citizens (%) 
Have never engaged with 
non- Thai citizens (%) 
Agree Unsure Disagree Agree Unsure Disagree 
1. I know there are youth who are born to non-Thai migrants in the 
temporary shelter areas. 59.18 21.09 19.73 52.38 22.02 23.81 
2. I know the youth do not have Myanmar citizenship. 44.22 27.89 27.89 32.14 26.79 38.69 
3. I know the youth do not have Thai citizenship. 45.58 24.49 30.61 36.31 27.38 34.52 
4. I know the youth are unable to attend Thailand’s public schools. 44.90 27.89 27.21 44.64 25.60 26.79 
5. I know the youth are unable to use public health care services in 
Thailand. 41.50 27.89 30.61 38.69 24.40 33.93 
6. I know the youth do not have social insurance so they have to pay 
for their own health maintenance. 41.50 27.21 31.29 37.50 29.17 30.95 
7. I know the youth are unable to move to Myanmar without any 
citizenship papers. 28.57 32.65 38.78 26.19 27.38 44.05 
8. I know the youth are unable to move around Thailand freely. 40.82 34.01 25.17 39.29 26.19 30.95 
9. I know the youth cannot go out of Thailand legally. 36.73 32.65 31.97 32.74 23.21 39.29 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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7.6.2. Effects on Thai Society  
On the issue of stateless youth having effects on Thai society, Figure 7.24 shows that 
about 48 per cent of overall respondents is unsure if stateless youth bring some benefits 
to Thai society. About 35 per cent agrees that the stateless youth bring some benefits to 
Thai society. In contrast, only about 17 per cent disagrees that stateless youth bring 
benefits to Thai society 
Figure 7.24: Respondents’ opinions on stateless youth bringing benefits to Thai 
society 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
On the other hand, Figure 7.25 shows that 46 per cent of overall respondents are unsure 
about whether the stateless youth cause problems in Thai society. About 31 per cent 
disagrees, whilst 23 per cent agrees that stateless youth cause some problems to Thai 
society. 
Figure 7.25: Respondents’ opinions on whether stateless youth cause problems in 
Thai society 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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According to Figure 7.26 below, the respondents’ opinions reveal that 20 per cent 
associate the stateless youth with the problem of human trafficking. About 19 per cent is 
concerned about child labour exploitation, and another 19 per cent is concerned about 
illegal migration. Problems of child sexual harassment and drug trafficking concern 16 
per cent and 15 per cent of respondents, respectively. Lastly 11 per cent is concerned 
about terrorism. 
Figure 7.26: The overall percentage of problems the respondents think stateless 
youth bring to Thai society 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Furthermore, Figure 7.27 shows that about 67 per cent believes that solving the problems 
of stateless youth is the responsibility of the Thai government agencies, especially the 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (25 per cent), the Ministry of 
Interior (17 per cent), the Ministry of International Affairs (16 per cent), and the Ministry 
of Education (9 per cent). About 18 per cent thinks that INGOs such as UNICEF and 
UNHCR should take care of the stateless youth. Finally, the remainder think that the 
stateless youth should be taken care of by all Thai citizens (8 per cent) and the private 
sector (7 per cent), respectively. 
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Figure 7.27: Respondents’ opinions regarding who is responsible for stateless 
youth 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.6.3. Discussion 
The section on the Thai respondents’ knowledge of stateless youth in Thailand reveals 
that more than half of overall respondents know that there are youth who have been born 
to non-Thai migrants in the temporary shelter areas, but only one third knows that the 
youth do not have Myanmar citizenship, and about 40 per cent knows that the youth also 
do not have Thai citizenship. In terms of comparison, slightly more respondents of the 
first group know about these issues than those in the second group. 
In terms of accessing public facilities, less than half, about 40 per cent, knows that these 
youth are unable to attend Thailand’s public schools, use public health care services in 
Thailand, and do not have health care insurance, so that they have to pay for their own 
health maintenance. In contrast, roughly about one third does not know about these issues. 
The rest is unsure. There are no differences between the two groups of respondents on 
this aspect. 
Concerning the ability to move and to stay, about 42 per cent of the respondents does not 
know that these youth cannot move to Myanmar because they are stateless. In contrast, 
about 40 per cent knows that the youth are restricted from traveling freely in Thailand. 
Finally, one third knows that the youth cannot legally go out of Thailand. In terms of 
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comparison, there are no differences between the two groups of respondents. More than 
one third of both groups does not know that without any citizenship the youth are unable 
to return to Myanmar, but another one third of both groups knows that these stateless 
youth are restricted from traveling in and out of the country.  
Furthermore, about 48 per cent of the respondents is unsure what benefit the stateless 
youth bring to Thai society. About 35 per cent agrees that the stateless youth bring some 
benefits to Thai society. In terms of causing problems, about 46 per cent of the 
respondents is unsure whether the stateless youth bring problems to Thai society, but 23 
per cent agrees that they do. The problems caused by the stateless youth involve human 
trafficking, child labour exploitation, illegal migration, child sexual harassment and drugs 
trafficking. 
In addition, about 57 per cent of the Thai respondents believes that solving the problem 
of stateless youth is the responsibility of Thailand’s government agencies, especially the 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (24 per cent), and the Ministry of 
Interior (17 per cent) should be involved in dealing with the Myanmar government to 
discuss how to solve this problem.  
7.7. Granting Thai Citizenship to Stateless Youth in Thailand 
This final section focuses on granting Thai citizenship to the stateless youth in Thailand. 
The first question asks the respondents’ view on ‘granting Thai citizenship to stateless 
youth to help them have better lives’. In Figure 7.28, around 46 per cent of overall 
respondents considers that granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth would help them 
to have better lives. About 30 per cent is unsure about the situation. On the other hand, 
about 24 per cent does not agree that having Thai citizenship will help stateless youth to 
have better lives. 
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  Figure 7.28: Respondents’ opinions whether Thai citizenship will help stateless 
youth have better lives 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
The overall survey result shown in Figure 7.29 reveals that the majority, about 64 per cent 
supports the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship. In contrast, about 29 per cent 
does not support stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship. About 7 per cent does not 
have any opinion about this proposal. 
Figure 7.29: Support for stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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In terms of gender, Figure 7.30 shows that there are similarities and differences between 
male and female respondents in terms of whether they support stateless youth being 
granted Thai citizenship. A greater percentage of male respondents (66.67 per cent) 
supports stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship than do female respondents 
(62.37). In contrast, more female respondents (31.18 per cent) do not support stateless 
youth than male respondents (25.58 per cent). Lastly, about 7 per cent of male and female 
respondents do not have an opinion about this aspect. These results correlate well with 
those presented in Figure 7.8. 
Figure 7.30: Support for stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship by gender 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
When asked about how the stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship, the survey 
result shown in Figure 7.31 reveals that the respondents believe that Thai citizienship 
should be granted mainly by choice, depending on whether stateless youth choose to stay 
in Thailand, or return to Myammar. The overall result shows that about 38 per cent of 
respondents thinks that the stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship, if they wish 
to stay in Thailand. About 27 per cent believes that they should not be granted Thai 
citizenship, because they were born to non-Thai migrants. About 20 per cent believes that 
stateless youth who decide to move to Myanamar with their parents should not be granted 
Thai citizenship. Finally, about 15 per cent support the stateless youth being granted Thai 
citizenship, because of the jus soli principle, as they were born in the territory of Thailand. 
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Figure 7.31: How stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
7.7.1. The Reasons for Supporting or Not Supporting Stateless Youth 
Being Granted Thai Citizenship 
This section of the survey was designed for respondents to write a short answer to respond 
to the question ‘Why do you support or not support the Thai state giving stateless youth 
born in Thailand the legal status of Thai citizenship?’ The answers can be categorised 
into two groups. The first group is comprised of respondents who support the stateless 
youth being granted Thai citizenship since they were born and have stayed in Thailand 
for more than 5 years, 7 years or 10 years. The second group is comprised of respondents 
who do not support the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship. 
20%
27%38%
15%
No, if they have to move
to Myanmar
No, because they were
born to non-Thai citizens
Yes, if they decide to stay
in Thailand
Yes, because they were
born in Thailand
 203 
Table 7.8: Thai respondents’ opinions about granting Thai citizenship to stateless 
youth 
Proposal Percentage 
1. Reasons to support 64.10 
1) Morality reason  9.55 
2) The jus soli principle  9.24 
3) Basic human rights 9.24 
4) Human security reason  8.92 
5) Individual safety reason  8.60 
6) Economic reason 4.14 
7) Child protection by law  2.55 
2. Reasons not to support 28.85 
1) The jus sanguinis principle  8.92 
2) The lack of national resources 6.37 
3) National security reason 4.78 
4) Overpopulation in Thailand 1.91 
5) Immigration problem  1.59 
3. Do not have an opinion 7.05 
Total 100 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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7.7.2. Reasons Given by Those Who Support 
According to Figure 7.29, the majority of overall respondents, about 64 per cent, supports 
the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship. Moreover, Figure 7.32 shows the Thai 
respondents’ opinions among those who support the stateless youth being granted 
citizenship. About 44 per cent thinks that the stateless youth should be granted Thai 
citizenship after staying in Thailand more than 10 years.  The second group, 29 per cent, 
believes that the stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship since birth. About 16 
per cent thinks the stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship after they have 
stayed in Thailand for 7 years. A small number, about 11 per cent, supports the statement 
when the stateless youth have stayed in Thailand more than 5 years. 
Figure 7.32: The respondents’ opinions on when the stateless youth should be 
granted Thai citizenship 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Reasons behind the respondents’ decisions are shown in Figure 7.33. There are seven 
different reasons, which are 1) morality reason (about 18 per cent); 2) the jus soli principle 
(about 18 per cent); 3) basic human rights (about 18 per cent); 4) human security (about 
17 per cent); 5) individual safety reason (about 16 per cent); 6) economic reason (about 8 
per cent); and 7) child protection by law (about 5 per cent). 
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Figure 7.33: Reasons to support the stateless youth 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
Figure 7.34 shows that morality and national security reasons were given the most support 
among those who agree to grant Thai citizenship to stateless youth after they have stayed 
in Thailand more than 10 years or since their birth. On the other hand, the basic human 
rights and human security reason were most often mentioned among those who support 
stateless youth who have spent more than 10 years in Thailand. The jus soli principle was 
the most frequent reason given among those who want to give Thai citizenship to stateless 
youth from the time after they have stayed in Thailand for 10 years and because they were 
born in Thailand.  
Figure 7.34: Reasons to support the stateless youth by separate groups 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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(1) The Morality Reason 
The morality reason is the most frequently mentioned by about 18 per cent of overall 
respondents who support the stateless youth gaining Thai citizenship. However, when the 
group of supporters is separately identified, it can be seen that 39 per cent of respondents 
who support stateless youth staying in Thailand after more than 10 years gave this reason 
the most often.  
Many respondents mentioned the word ‘feeling pity for’ as the reason to support the 
stateless youth. Moreover, the word ‘humanity’ is often articulated. Some respondents 
state that ‘everybody, no matter where they are born, they are all human’ (survey 213, 
2015) and ‘in terms of humanity, I understand and feel pity for them’ (survey 163, 2014) 
(2) The Jus Soli Principle Reason 
The second reason is the jus soli principle which was mentioned by about 18 per cent of 
the supporters. This reason is mentioned by the majority of respondents who support 
stateless youth receiving Thai citizenship at birth (69 per cent). The respondents believe 
that ‘the stateless youth should become any countries’ citizens, no matter where they are 
born’ (paper survey 035, 2014) and ‘everyone who was born in Thailand, should be a 
Thai citizen’ (paper survey 061, 2014). 
Respondents in this group ignore the ethnic differences. One opinion wrote that ‘everyone, 
no matter their ethnicity, if they are born in the territory of Thailand, they should have 
Thai citizenship and citizenship rights, the same as other Thai citizens’.  Moreover, the 
respondents believe that being stateless is not the youth’s fault, ‘because they cannot 
choose where to be born’ (paper survey 29, 2014). Therefore, ‘they should be Thai 
citizens because they are born here’ (paper survey 301, 2015). 
(3) The Basic Human Rights Reason 
The basic human rights reason is mentioned by about 18 per cent of respondents who 
support the stateless youth, especially 30 per cent of those who support stateless youth 
staying in Thailand after more than 10 years. Also about 28 per cent of respondents who 
support stateless youth since birth gave this as a reason why the stateless youth should 
have Thai citizenship.  
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Many responses mention ‘human rights’ as the reason to support the stateless youth. 
Moreover, the words ‘rights,’ ‘basic rights,’ and ‘human rights’ are often mentioned. 
Some responses state that ‘I support them having Thai citizenship because it is a basic 
right that the government should give to this group of youth’ (paper survey 037, 2014) 
and ‘according to human rights, everyone should be treated equally’ (paper survey 028, 
2014) and … 
When we were born, we have citizenship, as it is a basic human right. Without 
citizenship, a person cannot access the rights they should have, and that brings 
a lot of problems (paper survey 014, 2014). 
(4) The Human Security Reason 
Human security is the fourth type mentioned by about 17 per cent of supporting 
respondents. The human security reason involves public services provided by the 
government, such as education, health care service and the right of movement, including 
the ability to access them. This reason accounts for 48 per cent of respondents who 
support stateless youth staying in Thailand after more than 10 years. In addition, this 
reason is given by about 24 per cent of respondents who support stateless youth since 
birth. 
Many responses refer to ‘their opportunity to access’ ‘public services’ and ‘improving 
their quality of life’. Moreover, respondents believe that holding Thai citizenship will 
help the stateless youth be able to access public facilities and services, especially basic 
education. One respondent states that he supports the stateless youth after they have 
stayed for more than 7 years ‘because the youth can access basic education’65 (paper 
survey 065, 2014).  Moreover, many respondents believe that ‘accessing public services 
and social welfare provided by the government can help them improve their lives’ in order 
for them to ‘help develop our country in the future’(paper survey 116, 2014). 
(5) Individual Safety Reason 
About 16 per cent of overall supporters mentioned safety reasons involving national 
security and individual safety. This reason was given by 75 per cent of respondents who 
support stateless youth staying in Thailand more than 10 years. Moreover, about 14 per 
                                                             
65 The first year primary school in Thailand’s 15 years of free basic education starts when a 
child is aged 7 years old. 
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cent of respondents, who support stateless youth after staying in Thailand more than 5 
years, mentioned this reason. 
The words ‘register’, ‘identify’ and ‘punishment’ appear in this response. The 
respondents believe that giving Thai citizenship to stateless youth will help the 
government be able to identify individuals. One respondent wrote that ‘it will be easy for 
the government to track them, if they have Thai citizenship and commit crimes. Holding 
Thai citizenship, they will be treated and punished as a Thai citizen’ (paper survey 041, 
2014). 
Moreover, ‘assimilation into Thai society’ and ‘being good citizens’ are mentioned by 
the respondents. These factors are believed to contribute to personal safety and social 
security especially by respondents who support stateless youth staying in Thailand after 
more than 10 years. They wrote ‘if [stateless youth] stay in Thailand more than 10 years  
and voluntarily want to become Thai citizens, then we should give them Thai 
citizenship’(paper survey 066, 2014)  and ‘a 10-year period for staying in Thailand would 
possibly make them loyal to Thailand and respect Thai law, tradition and culture, if they 
are taught to understand Thai culture’ (paper survey 073, 2014), and ‘know how to live 
in Thai society’ (paper survey 126, 2014), then they should be granted Thai citizenship. 
Also, respondents think that... 
Children and youth are the future of the country… Give them Thai citizenship, 
so they can be a driving force in the country. I think it doesn’t matter where 
they come from. We just have to teach them to be responsible and ‘good’ 
citizens (paper survey 302, 2015). 
(6) Economic Reason  
About 8 per cent of supporters mentioned economic reasons for granting Thai citizenship. 
This reason includes the potential development of stateless youth to be good citizens, such 
as good tax payers, consumers and labourers. About 54 per cent of respondents who 
support stateless youth who have stayed in Thailand more than 10 years give this reason. 
One opinion believes that ‘the youth are already born. In terms of economy, we should 
support them to grow up in the right way. This will benefit Thailand in the future’ (paper 
survey 086, 2014). 
Furthermore, one respondent believes that the stateless youth actually contribute to Thai 
society. She wrote, ‘especially [stateless youth] add more labourers to the Thai labour 
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market and contribute to economic growth. Moreover, they also pay taxes to the 
government’ (paper survey 077, 2014). 
(7) The Child Protection by Law Reason 
Child protection by law is mentioned by about 5 per cent of overall respondents. It was 
mentioned by 62 per cent of respondents who support stateless youth being granted Thai 
citizenship since they were born in Thailand.  
The respondents believe that ‘all human beings should be protected by the state’ (paper 
survey 054, 2014). Moreover, one respondent wrote ‘I support because the children and 
youth should be protected. All the children must be treated equally’ (paper survey 200, 
2015). 
7.7.3. Reasons Given by Those Who Do Not Support 
As shown in Figure 7.31 above, about 29 per cent of respondents do not support stateless 
youth being granted Thai citizenship. Figure 7.35 shows five main reasons mentioned by 
those respondents, which are 1) the jus sanguinis principle (38 per cent); 2) the lack of 
national resources (27 per cent); 3) security reason (20 per cent); 4) overpopulation in 
Thailand (8 per cent); and 5) immigration problem (7 per cent).  
Figure 7.35: Reasons for not supporting  
 
Source: Questionnaire survey between November 2014 and April 2015 
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(1) The Jus Sanguinis Principle  
Among non-supporters, about 38 per cent of respondents do not agree with granting Thai 
citizenship to stateless youth because of the jus sanguinis principle. The respondents 
believe that the stateless youth were not born to Thai citizens, so they are ineligible to 
gain Thai citizenship.  
For example, many opinions mentioned that ‘they are not born to the Thai blood’, ‘their 
parents are not Thai citizens’ and ‘Thai citizenship is for Thai people only’ (paper survey 
031, 064, 2014). Furthermore, many respondents referred to the parents of the stateless 
youth by saying that ‘the stateless youth should be granted citizenship according to their 
parents’ citizenship’, (paper survey 055, 2014) and ‘their parents are from Myanmar, so 
the Myanmar government must solve this problem’ (paper survey 023, 2014).   
(2) The Lack of National Resources Reason 
The second reason mentioned concerns the lack of national resources. About 27 per cent 
of respondents believe that granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth would consume 
Thai national resources in the future, especially the government’s budget for education, 
health care services and land ownership. Respondents are aware that Thailand has limited 
national resources including financial support. Therefore granting Thai citizenship to 
these stateless youth would worsen the situation of the government’s inefficient resource 
distribution. 
For example, one opinion states that ‘We [Thailand] have our own (serious) problems to 
solve. We are not a wealthy country and what we have done for them is good enough,’ 
and ‘we will have to use more national resources such as spending more of the 
government’s budget to take care of them and develop their potential’ (paper survey 029, 
2014). 
Moreover, respondents are reluctant to allow the government to spend more money on 
non-Thai migrants, as they stated that ‘all the government’s services are not equally 
provided by the government even to Thai people’ (paper survey 090, 2014), ‘if we want 
to help other people, we have to make sure that we do not hurt ourselves’ (paper survey 
081, 2014) and ‘we have to prioritise the national interest over other individual interest’ 
(paper survey 102, 2014) 
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(3) National Security Reason 
About 20 per cent of non-supporters are concerned about security problems. The security 
problems include national security and individual safety. Most respondents believe the 
security reason is connected with the jus sanguinis principle. Due to the fact that their 
parents are not Thai citizens, the stateless youth may cause some problems for national 
security. One response states that he feels insecure and ‘do[es] not support because they 
cause human trafficking and jeopardise national security’ (paper survey 074, 2014). 
Due to their parents’ origin in Myanmar, some respondents are sceptical about their 
loyalty to Thailand, which may be harmful to Thailand’s national security and individual 
safety. One respondent wrote that ‘they do not truly love Thailand because they always 
rob and kill Thai people’ as the Thai media always display (paper survey 034, 2014). One 
respondent wrote that ‘we have to be careful in terms of refugees because they do not 
have genuine links to Thailand and they are likely to commit crimes in Thailand’ (paper 
survey 315, 2014). 
Although some respondents do not support stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship, 
they offer solutions. One respondent wrote: 
I do not support, although I know that the stateless situation in Thailand is 
important. If we plan it wrong, it will affect our national security. I have a 
condition that, we may not have to grant Thai citizenship, but we can provide 
education and health care services to them. For example, we provide schools 
for the stateless youth, and allow them to access some hospitals. We do not 
have to give them Thai citizenship, but we should keep job opportunities open 
for them. However, they can be granted Thai citizenship if they stay in 
Thailand longer than 30 years (paper survey 051, 2014). 
(4) Overpopulation in Thailand Reason 
Around 8 per cent of non-supporters are concerned about overpopulation in Thailand. 
They mentioned that the Thai population is already high. Granting Thai citizenship would 
increase the Thai population. One opinion thinks that ‘Thailand’s birth rate is still fine. 
We do not need to bring in more diversity’ (paper survey 005, 2014). 
The issue of overpopulation is connected with national welfare and the lack of national 
resources. Respondents believe that ‘Thailand has enough Thai citizens’ (paper survey 
004, 2014) and ‘the recent quality of life of Thai people is very low. We do not want to 
have more burden’ (paper survey 110, 2014).  
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(5) Immigration Problems Reason 
Finally, a few respondents (about 7 per cent) are afraid that granting Thai citizenship to 
stateless youth in Thailand would become one of the pull factors for immigration. The 
respondents believe that easily granting Thai citizenship is a signpost to welcome more 
migrants. They decided not to support the stateless youth in order to deter other non-Thai 
migrants who may use this means to ‘give birth in Thailand for their children to benefit 
from Thailand’s welfare,’ such as free education (paper survey 304, 2015). 
7.7.4. Discussion 
The results from this section on respondents’ decisions to support or not support the 
stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship reveal that less than half, about 46 per cent, 
of respondents, consider granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth would help them 
have better lives, whilst about 30 per cent are unsure about the situation. In contrast, about 
24 per cent disagree that having Thai citizenship would help stateless youth have better 
lives.  
However, respondents believe that granting Thai citizenship should depend on whether 
stateless youth choose to stay in Thailand or move to Myanmar. About 53 per cent think 
that the stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship, if they decide to stay in 
Thailand (about 38 per cent) and they are born in Thailand (about 15 per cent). On the 
other hand, about 47 per cent believe that they should not be granted Thai citizenship 
because they are born to non-Thai migrants (27 per cent) and they may decide to move to 
Myanmar with their parents (20 per cent). 
When asked whether the respondents support the stateless youth being granted Thai 
citizenship, the majority, about 64 per cent, of overall respondents, supports the stateless 
youth being granted Thai citizenship. Among them 44 per cent think that the stateless 
youth should be granted Thai citizenship after they have lived in Thailand longer than 10 
years. About 29 per cent believes that the stateless youth should be granted Thai 
citizenship at birth. About 16 per cent supports the stateless youth after they have stayed 
in Thailand for 7 years. Finally, about 11 per cent supports the stateless youth after they 
have stayed in Thailand more than 5 years. 
 213 
Importantly, there are seven different reasons behind the decision for supporting them. 
The most mentioned is the morality reason. The respondents feel pity for the stateless 
youth. Particularly, the words ‘humanity’ and ‘morality’ are often mentioned. The jus soli 
principle is mentioned, as the stateless youth are born in the territory of Thailand. Basic 
human rights, human security reason, security concerns are also mentioned. The 
respondents believe that granting citizenship is one of the basic human rights that all 
human beings should have.  
Moreover, human security reasons involve ability to access public facilities provided by 
the government, such as education, health care service, the freedom of movement and 
capacity to find a job. This can help improve stateless youth’s quality of life, so that they 
can ‘help develop our country in the future’ (paper survey 116, 2014). Furthermore, 
economic reasons are mentioned as stateless youth have the potential to become good tax 
payers, consumers and labourers. Finally, child protection by law is mentioned because 
they think all children and youth in Thailand should be treated equally and protected.  
In contrast, 29 per cent does not support and about 7 per cent does not have any opinion 
about this proposal. Five main reasons are mentioned by non-supporters. They do not 
agree with granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth because of the jus sanguinis 
principle. The second reason is that granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth would 
consume more Thai national resources in the future. The third reason is that the stateless 
youth are believed to cause some problems in terms of national security and individual 
safety. The fourth reason is that granting Thai citizenship would increase the Thai 
population. As a result, Thailand will face the problem of overpopulation. Finally, a few 
respondents believe that granting Thai citizenship would become one of the pull factors 
for more non-Thai individuals to migrate into Thailand.  
7.8. Research Results and Discussion 
The paper questionnaire survey on the Thai respondents’ opinions concerning refugees 
and stateless youth covered the following major aspects:  temporary shelter areas and 
refugees; border security; the situation of stateless youth in Thailand; and granting Thai 
citizenship to stateless youth.  
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Major research findings and discussion are as follows: 
1) The majority of Thai respondents lacks knowledge of the existence of the 
temporary shelter areas along the border and refugees. For instance, more than 
half of overall respondents disagree that they know about these issues. Moreover, 
only one third of the respondents knows the refugees are from Karen/Shan States 
inside Myanmar and the temporary shelters are closed areas. 
2) Thai respondents who have engaged with non-Thai migrants previously are more 
likely to have knowledge about temporary shelter areas and refugees than those 
who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants. Moreover, Thai citizens who 
have engaged with non-Thai migrants previously are more welcoming to the 
refugees than the others. 
3) The majority of respondents does not mind having the temporary shelter areas 
along the border, but they do not welcome the refugees staying in Thailand.  
4) For the temporary shelter areas along the border and the refugees, the respondents 
focus on security concerns. The majority thinks that the temporary shelter areas 
and the refugees do not bring much benefit to Thailand, although overall 
respondents believe refugees help increase the Thai national economy as labour 
is contributed by the refugees who help replace Thai labourers in dirty, dangerous 
and difficult jobs (3D jobs). Also, more Thai products can be sold to the refugees. 
5) In contrast, the majority thinks that the temporary shelter areas and the refugees 
cause some problems such as threats to national security and personal safety. The 
respondents believe that the Thai government must take care of border security, 
as a part of national security. 
6) In terms of stateless youth, more than half of the respondents have knowledge of 
stateless youth in Thailand. Nevertheless, less than half (about 40 per cent) know 
the stateless youth cannot access public facilities such as Thailand’s public 
schools, public health care services and the right of movement. 
7) For stateless youth, the respondents consider them a social issue rather than a 
security concern. Although about less than half of respondents are unsure whether 
stateless youth bring some benefits or cause problems to Thai society, they focus 
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on social issues such as human trafficking, child labour exploitation and illegal 
migration. The respondents expect Thailand’s Ministry of Social Development 
and Human Security and INGOs to take care of the stateless youth. This shows 
that the respondents believe that the situation of stateless youth in Thailand is a 
social issue that can be solved by the Thai government’s agencies in cooperation 
with INGOs/NGOs. 
8) The majority of overall respondents (see Figure 7.24), about 64 per cent, supports 
the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship. The Thai respondents, 
especially the male respondents, who have previously engaged with non-Thai 
migrants are more likely to support the stateless youth than female. The reasons 
for supporting them are various such as humanity and morality reasons, the jus 
soli principle, basic human rights and human security reason. Also, individual 
safety reasons, economic reasons and child protection by law are mentioned as 
bases for their decisions. 
9) About 29 per cent of overall respondents does not support the stateless youth being 
granted Thai citizenship. More female respondents than males do not support the 
stateless youth. The respondents do not support it because of the jus sanguinis 
principle and the lack of national resources. Also, national security, 
overpopulation in Thailand and immigration problems are mentioned. Finally, the 
rest, about 7 per cent, do not have an opinion about this proposal.  
 7.9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, among Thai citizens knowledge of the existence of the temporary shelter 
areas along the border and refugees is limited. Although Thai citizens who have engaged 
with non-Thai migrants previously are more likely to know about the situation than those 
who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants, they still lack knowledge about 
refugees from Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar and that the temporary shelters are 
closed areas. 
The respondents are more concerned with the security issue in relation to the refugees 
and the temporary shelter areas along the border than the situation of stateless youth in 
Thailand. We can see this by investigating the respondents’ opinion about who should 
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take care of the issue. In the case of the refugees and the temporary shelter areas, the 
respondents expect the Thai government to take care of border security, as it is a part of 
national security. On the other hand, the situation of stateless youth should be handled by 
Thailand’s Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and INGOs, because it 
is seen as one of the social issues. 
Moreover, when asking about problems caused by the temporary shelter areas and 
refugees, threats to national security and personal safety are most frequently mentioned. 
On the other hand, stateless youth are not seen as security risks, but they are seen as 
potential causes of human trafficking, child labour exploitation and illegal migration.  
Finally, the majority of respondents, about 69 per cent, supports the stateless youth being 
granted Thai citizenship, because of humanity and morality reasons, the jus soli principle, 
basic human rights and human security. Also, about 29 per cent are non-supporters and 7 
per cent do not have an opinion about this proposal. They are more concerned with the 
jus sanguinis principle and the lack of national resources than the national security reason. 
Based on these results, policy recommendations and conclusion are presented in Chapter 
8.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion, Policy Recommendations 
and Future Research 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has sought to explore the idea and practice of citizenship and their impact on 
stateless young adults along the Thailand-Myanmar border in the context of the Thai 
state’s national security policy. The study pursued four sub-objectives. Firstly, the 
research identifies the causes of statelessness in Thailand. Secondly, the study 
investigates the dynamic of Thailand’s national security policies regarding stateless 
children and young adults. Thirdly, the research has discussed the impact of statelessness 
on the livelihoods of the young adults living along the Thailand–Myanmar border. 
Fourthly, the statistical evidence of the study explores the opinions of Thai respondents 
regarding support for the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship and the reasons 
underlying their views.  
The present chapter aims to propose policy recommendations for balancing national 
security, human rights and human security to benefit Thai citizens and young adults along 
the Thailand–Myanmar border, thus addressing the fourth research question. 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section provides the main findings of the 
research drawing on the idea and practice of citizenship related to national security 
policies in Thailand. This is followed by policy recommendations with respect to the Thai 
government balancing its national security, human rights and human security policies for 
stateless young adults. The third section presents the thesis’s contribution to existing 
knowledge. The final two sections discuss the limitations of the study and offer some 
suggestions for further research. 
8.2. Research Findings and Conclusions 
8.2.1. Becoming Stateless in Thailand  
Chapter 4 has addressed the first research question on the causes of statelessness in 
Thailand. This chapter presents three important origins of statelessness in Thailand. Due 
to the development of Western-style political mapping techniques and the emergence of 
a modern state, the borderlines were fixed between British Burma and Siam in the 
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nineteenth century. At the time of the 1909 treaty between the United Kingdom and the 
Kingdom of Siam, many ethnic groups now in Thailand were living in Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan. They were left unrecognised as citizens of any modern state 
when the borders were formally drawn. People who lived in-between the borders and 
belonged to communities who crossed back and forth were disadvantaged by the new 
borders (Winichakul 1994; Keyes 2002; Gainsborough 2009). 
Later on, the nationality law, as a product of modern nation-state building and Thai 
national security policies, was regulated by different Thai governments at different times. 
It has changed regularly and significantly. The changes in the law contributed to creating 
the stateless population in the country. As a result, large numbers of ethnic minorities 
living far from the central government and authorities have been left unrecognised and 
unregistered by the Thai government, although they have never been anywhere else. The 
second cause arises from the problem of law enforcement, the failure of the government’s 
civil registration survey in 1956, the government’s policy changes from 2001 and the Thai 
bureaucratic system including officials who lack understanding of the nationality laws. 
In addition, children of migrant and refugee families have failed to obtain their birth 
certificates due to Thai government policy on birth certificates being issued in the refugee 
areas and many difficulties accessing the registration at the time of birth.  
As a result, many stateless youth who were born in Thailand and have never left the 
country at all have no citizenship. Their stateless status is a consequence of the progress 
of modern state building and the operation of the nationality law. Without citizenship, 
they are considered as migrants who have entered and resided in Thailand without 
permission. Accordingly, stateless young adults are not only deprived of their basic rights, 
but also are subject to being arrested and forced to leave the country at any time. 
8.2.2. National Security Policies towards Stateless People in Thailand 
Chapter 5 answers the second research question by investigating the dynamic of 
Thailand’s national security policies regarding stateless children and youth. It presents 
the concept of national security policies in the Thai context which are controversial and 
changeable. The misuse of the national security concept not only diversifies the security 
discourse and justifies the state distancing itself from its international legal obligations, 
but also prioritises the importance of protecting the existing state over that of individuals 
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(Nasu 2011). As a result, national security has become an excuse for the Thai government 
to issue policies targeting non-Thai migrants (Office of the National Security Council 
2015). Consequently, it is the way national security is framed that poses threats to 
individuals and violates their human rights and human security (Suhrke 1999; 
Chongkittavorn 2012; Karunan 1997). 
Thai government philosophy is formed around the notion that the country faces several 
major security threats from neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Malaysia. Various Thai governments have conceptualised threats from Myanmar focused 
on ethnic insurgencies resulting in forcibly displaced people and illegal immigrants. This 
has especially been the case since the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001–2006). 
More than two million migrants from Myanmar are considered as threats to Thai local 
society, although they have made a huge contribution to Thailand’s rapid economic 
growth. Moreover, the current Thai government considers stateless people along the 
border as a problem involving drug trafficking and illegal migrant workers that needs to 
be resolved. Consequently, a number of domestic laws and policies concerning non-Thai 
migrants has been promulgated. These series of regulations include stateless youth who 
were actually born and live in Thailand as they are seen as non-Thai migrants. Therefore, 
they are inevitably constituted as threats to the nation.  
Chapter 5 also analyses the strategy of the Thai government in employing several 
mechanisms in its national security policies to ensure that every individual in Thailand 
has at least one form of identification document. Legalising an ‘individual without legal 
status’ through the system of different categories of documentation is employed by the 
Thai state. However, the categorisation process lacks a consistent rationale, resulting in 
confusion. Although the colour ID cards or 13-digit ID Code which classify people of 
different ethnic origins, are not referred to in the frameworks of Thai citizenship, the card 
holders are constructed as subjects of the state under the Thai domestic laws. The 13-digit 
ID Code symbolises discrimination and marginalisation as it limits the holders’ 
movements, access to public services and rights to access citizenship, according to the 
different categories.  
Consequently, the confusing process for legalisation of non-Thai migrants does not 
actually aim to solve the problem of stateless people in Thailand. It only allows the 
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individual to have a form of identification document. At the same time, it marginalises 
and suppresses stateless people through its limitation on access to basic rights, and makes 
their lives subject to Thai domestic law.  
8.2.3. Negotiating Basic Rights among Stateless Youth in Thailand 
Chapter 6 responds to the first research question about the impact of being stateless young 
adults living along the Thailand-Myanmar border. The study shows that stateless people 
are required to register in order to not be arrested or deported. Being registered, stateless 
people are recognised as ‘a person without legal status’ by the Thai government; however, 
this semi-legal status is not considered as Thai citizenship. The semi-legal status has great 
impacts on stateless people’s lives. The study shows that the research participants 
describe their lives as ‘a life in waiting’ due to their several years of waiting for the official 
confirmation of their legal status. However, their wait is for an outcome which is not 
guaranteed and the result may not be what they want. 
During the several years of waiting, negotiations for basic rights between stateless youth 
and the Thai government have focused on four aspects. Firstly, education is a central 
concern of the stateless youth, because it is an important key to improve their livelihood. 
Being students in a Thai public school allows stateless youth to have freedom of 
movement, and some stateless youth can further their education at university level. 
Although the Education for All policy in 2005 allows all individuals in Thailand to 
receive 15-years free public basic education, stateless youth find difficulties in accessing 
public schools, as some public schools ‘refuse to admit migrant children’ (Nawarat 2014b, 
p.4).  Moreover, the language barrier and discrimination are significant problems for 
children of different backgrounds. Also, the government’s student loan is provided 
exclusively to Thai citizens. This encourages children of illegal migrants and stateless 
youth to attend community-based Migrant Learning Centres (MLCs), although the 
centres are not acknowledged by the Thai and Myanmar governments. Refugee children 
receive non-government education. Mae La refugee camp is well known as a centre of 
education for refugee children and youth to access informal education provided by 
refugee communities and INGOs with limited support.  
Secondly, public health care services and health insurance are provided only to registered 
stateless people who are considered as ethnic minorities. Stateless people whose 13-digit 
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ID Code begins with ‘0’ are left to buy their own health insurance, but their low paid jobs 
do not allow them to do so. Refugees generally find it difficult to access public hospitals 
outside the camp. To be able to access a health care service, stateless individuals rely on 
helpful hospital staff to access some public hospitals which are available to poor Thais 
and non-citizen Shan migrants in Chiang Mai (Seo 2015). Most stateless individuals in 
Tak province go to a private pharmacy and local clinics for basic health treatment. The 
community-based migrant clinic and NGOs are key agencies to provide health care 
facilities and activities for the displaced and stateless people. 
Thirdly, legal protection in Thailand, especially under the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) and the Child Protection Act B.E. 2546 (2003), applies only 
to Thai citizens. As a result, migrants, refugees, stateless children and youth in Thailand 
are left without legal protection. To access the right to be legally protected, the study 
shows that the use of fake ID cards, the purchase of Thai ID cards and identity theft are 
real practices for those who can afford the price. Moreover, obtaining many different 
cards by one individual is a strategy to ensure that one of the cards will support the 
owner’s legal status in the near future (Laungaramsri 2014). 
Fourthly, freedom of movement is limited for stateless people. They are required to have 
permission to travel out of their registered areas. Any stateless person who fails to obtain 
travel approval and is found outside his/her district or province may be arrested by police, 
as he/she is guilty of a crime. Likewise, some stateless youth use a foreign ID, such as a 
foreign passport, to live in Thailand, if they are able to get it issued from their parents’ 
country of origin. However, this practice is very rare, because most are unable to prove 
their origin. Also, they prefer not to use a foreign passport to live in Thailand, because 
they need a visiting visa, and must comply with the immigration law. Using a foreign 
passport to live in Thailand gives the non-Thai people the feeling of being aliens living 
in their own country. 
As described by an NGO representative (in-depth interview, Tak province and Chiang 
Mai province, September–November 2014), the application for Thai citizenship is a 
difficult, complex and seemingly endless project. The application requires complicated 
supporting documentation and proof on a case by case basis. At this point, the individual 
has to rely on his/her own personal connections to access basic public services and 
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allocation processes. Moreover, the application system allows common corruption and 
prejudice, as the authority for granting Thai citizenship resides solely with a district 
governor. At the same time, stateless youth’s political capital is very weak, as they can 
only rely on NGOs who work on their application for Thai citizenship, which is resolved 
on a case by case basis. For some cases, a DNA examination costing more than THB2,050 
per person (about $64) is required. In many cases, applications are unable to be submitted 
because of the lack of supporting documents and proof. 
8.2.4. Public Opinion 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the questionnaire survey regarding the third research 
question on Thai respondents’ opinions about the issue of stateless children and young 
adults. It showed that public knowledge among Thai respondents concerning the 
temporary shelter areas and refugees along the Western border of Thailand is limited. 
Although some Thai respondents who have worked with and/or employed non-Thai 
migrants are more likely to know more about the situation of the temporary shelter areas 
and refugees than those who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants, the majority 
still lacks knowledge about refugees from Karen/Shan States inside Myanmar and that 
the temporary shelters are confined areas.66 
The majority of the respondents regards the temporary shelter areas and refugees in terms 
of national security and personal safety. On the other hand, the majority of the 
respondents considers stateless youth as a social issue rather than a security problem. 
Although less than half of the respondents are unsure that stateless youth bring some 
benefits or cause some problems to Thai society, they focus on social issues such as 
human trafficking, child labour exploitation and illegal migration. 
In terms of the temporary shelter areas and the refugees, the respondents believe that the 
Thai government is responsible for border security, as a part of national security. In 
contrast, the respondents expect Thai government agencies such as the Ministry of Social 
                                                             
66 At the beginning of the refugee influx, the refugee communities were established along with 
the Thai border communities. However, the government consolidated the refugee communities 
into nine ‘temporary shelter’ areas in 1995–1997 due to the security reasons. The Thai 
government has more direct control over the communities and displaced people are completely 
cut off as the entrance and exit are under the control of Thai authorities. They have become 
inaccessible to Thai people. 
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Development and Human Security and INGOs to take care of the stateless youth, as major 
social issues. 
Finally, the majority (64 per cent) supports the stateless youth, especially the Thai 
respondents who have engaged with non-Thai migrants. They are more likely to support 
the stateless youth than the other groups who have not previously had contact with non-
Thai migrants. The reasons for supporting them are various including morality reasons, 
the jus soli principle, basic human rights, human security reason, safety reasons, 
economic reasons and child protection under the law. On the other hand, only about 29 
per cent does not support the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship due to the jus 
sanguinis principle and the lack of national resources rather than the national security 
reason. The rest, 7 per cent, does not have an opinion about this proposal. 
8.3. Policy Recommendations 
8.3.1. The Legal Perspective 
Citizenship may be simply seen as nationality which indicates that individuals either are, 
or are not, citizens of a specific country (McCargo 2011, p. 833). This status is based on 
legal institutions. Chapter 4 shows that the de jure stateless situation in Thailand is a result 
of historical geo-political development from the Siamese court to the modern Thai state 
by fixing the borderlines and the regulation of the 1909 Civil Registration Law and the 
1913 Nationality Law. This study argues that the evolution of the Nationality Law has 
shown that the jus sanguinis and the jus soli principles were implemented in the original 
Thai Nationality Law in 1913. From 1965, national security policy has played an 
important role in Thai Nationality Law resulting in the limitation of Thai citizenship being 
granted to those who were born to Thai parents. To maintain national security, the 
Nationality Law changed to emphasise the jus sanguinis principle. Eventually, the jus soli 
principle disappeared from the promulgation of Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965). 
This thesis encourages the government to resume granting Thai citizenship to those who 
were born and have lived in Thailand their whole life, especially the next generation of 
ethnic minorities including diverse groups of Karen, Hmong, Shan, Lao and Khmer. This 
could be based on the jus soli principle as in the original Civil Registration Law of 1909 
which did not aim to distinguish between Thai and non-Thai migrants. The policy of 
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including the majority of immigrants of Chinese, Indian, or Vietnamese background 
through the Nationality Act B.E. 2456 (1913) was announced. The government could no 
longer ignore their existence, influence, or contributions to the nation. By this method, 
the Thai government recognised the enormous contribution to national economic growth 
of the Chinese migrants.  
The data from the study suggest that since the conflict in neighbouring countries has 
ended, national security policy, which aims to prioritise Thai citizenship, should be 
reviewed. Amendment of the nationality law to grant Thai citizenship based on the jus 
soli principle would do no harm to the nation. On the other hand, loyalty to the nation 
will be strengthened. Firstly, granting Thai citizenship since a child’s birth not only 
demonstrates that the Thai government accepts the international obligation under Article 
7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which allows every child to 
register ‘immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to 
acquire a nationality’ (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, p.3), but also the right 
to be registered as a citizen at birth. This will help the country prevent the phenomenon 
of statelessness. 
Secondly, granting Thai citizenship to stateless people who were born and have been 
living in Thailand their whole life shows that the Thai government and Thai citizens 
welcome individuals to Thai society (as per the result shown in Chapter 7) regardless of 
the origin of their parents. At the same time, the government can use this policy as an 
opportunity to offer an apology and compensation to ethnic minority people who were 
left unrecognised and unregistered at the household survey in 1956, which forced them 
and their next generation to be stateless. However, the government must ensure that all 
individual applications are equally treated and fairly judged. The corruption and prejudice 
of local officials must be dealt with. 
Thirdly, the shortage of labourers in Thailand’s labour market is a longstanding problem 
that has obstructed the nation’s economic growth since the 1997 economic crisis. 
Furthermore, labour shortage in the private sector occurred in June 2017 due to the 
implementation of a new executive decree on foreign labour. This decree was criticised 
and suspended, because Thailand’s economy could not afford the price of losing more 
than 60,000 migrant workers from neighbouring countries. Granting Thai citizenship 
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based on the jus soli principle will increase the numbers of participants in the labour 
market, as stateless youth are mostly under 30 years old. The study has shown that their 
ability to work has been prepared and advanced through Thailand’s formal and informal 
education systems. Therefore, it is logical that granting Thai citizenship to those who were 
born in the country will help national economic growth, because these youth can be 
employed by the formal business sector and become tax payers (paper survey 077, 2014). 
8.3.2. The National Security Perspective 
Chapter 5 of this study shows that national security in Thailand reflects a traditional 
understanding of security which is a diverse and contested concept. Moreover, national 
security in the Thai context is controversial and changeable, resulting in a series of 
inconsistent regulations that have marginalised stateless people through a confusing 
categorisation process. The study shows that since the 2014 coup, the military 
government has granted Thai citizenship to more of the stateless population, compared to 
the previously elected government. Since 2016, the number of stateless people who has 
been granted Thai citizenship has been increasing. According to the official report in 2016, 
18,773 stateless people were granted Thai citizenship during 2013-2016 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2016). In addition, 1,465 stateless applicants in Mae Hong Son, Chiang 
Rai, Chiang Mai and Tak provinces holding an 13-digit ID Code beginning with number 
‘6’ or ‘7’67  were granted Thai citizenship between July and October 2016 (Ministry of 
Interior 2017). It is understood that these applications were lodged long ago,68 and the 
government considers them ethnic minority people who have lived and assimilated to 
Thai society for a long time. It is possible to see the military government taking a serious 
step to address the stateless situation as the government understands that the request for 
Thai citizenship is important.  
On the other hand, it is noticeable that all successful applications exclude the stateless 
population holding 13-digit ID Code beginning with number ‘0’. Also, the law indicates 
                                                             
67 ID beginning with number ‘6’ and ‘7’ indicates that the holders are ethnic minority and 
children of ethnic minority parents respectively. The Thai government believes that registered 
stateless people are ethnic minority and their family has assimilated to Thai society, and has 
contributed to Thai society because they have lived in Thailand for a long time (Napaumporn 
2014, p.147). 
68 Two applicants in Chiang Mai province were not granted Thai nationality because they died 
in 2015 and 2016 (Ministry of Interior 2017). 
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clearly that granting Thai citizenship is considered on a case by case basis and depends 
largely on local authorities  (Nationality Act B.E. 2508 1965; Schearf 2011). This thesis 
suggests that the government needs to systematise and standardise its record keeping to 
ensure that stateless people are categorised in the right group. This will reduce confusion 
in the categorisation process, and simplify the complexity of a series of domestic laws 
that have been recently applied to stateless people in different categories. In the first stage, 
it will allow stateless people to access some public services.  
In 2017, Notification of the Ministry of Interior allowed about 80,000 stateless people, 
including children of migrants and displaced people to be eligible to apply for Thai 
citizenship (Rakkanam 2017). However, strong criteria have been placed on eligible 
applicants. The first group is those who were born in Thailand to ethnic minority parents, 
registered by the Ministry of Interior, and has lived in Thailand for no less than 15 years 
(Notification of the Ministry of Interior on granting Thai citizenship to persons born in 
the Kingdom of Thailand to alien father and mother in general and specific cases 2017, 
p.11). This Notification of the Ministry of Interior conflicts with the naturalisation process. 
As stated in Section 10 of the Nationality Act B.E. 2508 (1965): 
An alien  may  apply  for  naturalisation as a Thai [if they have] a domicile in 
the Thai Kingdom for a consecutive period of not less than five years69 till the 
day of filing the application for naturalization (Nationality Act B.E. 2508 as 
amended by Acts B.E. 2535 No. 2 and 3 (1992), p. 3).  
Correspondingly, ‘a person who has acquired Thai nationality by naturalisation must hold 
the Thai nationality for not less than five years 70 [to have the right to vote at an election]’, 
according to Section 95 of Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) 
As we can see, an alien can become a Thai citizen by naturalisation within 5 years of 
staying consecutively in Thailand. Later on, he/she can have some political rights71, 
within 10 years for domicile in Thailand. In contrast, stateless people must stay in 
Thailand for 15 years, 5 years longer, in order to be eligible to apply for Thai citizenship. 
Also the process of application will take longer. Therefore, this Notification of the 
                                                             
69 Italics added by the researcher. 
70 Italics added by the researcher. 
71 He/she will have the right to vote at an election, but no right to be elected as a member of the 
House of Representatives or the Senate, or to be appointed as a minister or a justice of the 
Constitutional Court (Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017)). 
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Ministry of Interior enforces very strict criteria on stateless people with regard to applying 
for Thai citizenship, in contrast to the naturalisation law.  
The second group of eligible applicants refers to stateless youth who were born in 
Thailand to alien parents, including children of migrants and displaced people, and have 
graduated from university. The process excludes a large number of children of migrants 
and displaced people due to educational background. As shown in Chapter 6, children of 
migrants and displaced people have only a small chance to attend a Thai public school. 
According to the Thai National News Bureau and Public Relations (2016), more than 
69,600 stateless students are in Thai public schools, but only 19,800 were determined to 
be eligible for Thai citizenship (Srisinsuphya 2016). Also, very few stateless youth have 
graduated from university. Therefore, ending statelessness in the country is likely to take 
a long time, because the process for a number of offspring of migrants and displaced 
people to be granted Thai citizenship is still lengthy.  
Importantly, the study suggests that Thai authorities should acknowledge the concept of 
citizenship in the broader context, and consider the statelessness situation in the country 
a social problem rather than a security issue. By changing this perspective, the 
government will conceptualise these stateless people as individuals who have been left 
out of the official records. This study suggests that the government revise the Thai 
nationality law to acknowledge every individuals’ contribution to the country. In brief, 
citizenship should be offered to the stateless children and youth born in the country, and 
persons who have resided in Thailand, connect with and benefit Thai society for some 
period of time, such as 5 years as per the naturalisation process in the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017), or 10 years as suggested in Chapter 7.  
8.3.3. The Human Security Perspective 
By focusing on human security, the rights and security of individuals are prioritised over 
those of the state. The idea of human security was initiated by the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report (HDR) (Gasper 2014). Amartya Sen explains that human security 
focuses on individual human lives, and concentrates ‘on the downside [of] risks [to] 
human lives, rather than on the overall expansion of effective freedom in general’ (Sen 
2014, p.18). 
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Stateless people are at risk in regard to health, lack of food, shelter and freedom of 
education and movement. Their security requires responses from a broader spectrum of 
policy and competencies, with the collaboration of many actors such as governments, 
NGOs and other civil society movements. Therefore, society and the government 
play important roles in ensuring that the security of individuals is prioritised. Taking 
human security seriously, the Thai government must acknowledge that the individual has 
the basic right to remain in Thailand. Unlike the case of the refugees from Myanmar, the 
repatriation or resettlement programme is not the choice of stateless youth born in 
Thailand. They consider Thailand their home, and they have the right to remain in 
Thailand as they were born and have lived in Thailand their whole lives.  
In addition, Chapter 7 shows that the Thai respondents, who support the stateless youth 
being granted Thai citizenship, are concerned about their human security. Thai 
respondents believe that being granted Thai citizenship can ensure that stateless youth 
can access the basic public facilities provided by the government, such as education, 
health care service, freedom of movement and capacity to find a job. These can help 
improve their quality of life. For example, the 2005 Education for All policy reflects how 
the government sees the importance of education. Initially, this policy was expected to 
improve the nation’s literacy, while the stateless children and youth can also benefit from 
it. The study in Chapter 6 shows that the 15-years free public education policy works in 
multiple ways. Education can temporarily support their security as public schools provide 
learning opportunities and protection. Studying in public schools, stateless youth are 
protected by the educational institution. When in contact with Thai authorities, stateless 
youth are more confident in showing their student card72 instead of the ID card which 
indicates their stateless status. The police eventually ignore them. Moreover, for 
educational purposes, stateless students are allowed to travel domestically without travel 
approval. Once they have graduated, their movements become restricted. This regulation 
reflects the inconsistency in Thai domestic law. This thesis sees the government’s 
reduction on the limitation of travel in 2016 as a positive step. Implemented on 5 August 
2016, the regulation allows stateless people, including displaced people from Myanmar, 
                                                             
72 The student card does not contain an ID number. Showing only the student ID number, the 
student card is sufficiently robust to inhibit the police harassing them. 
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to travel freely in their registered province73 (Ministry of Interior 2016, pp. 21-24). This 
is in preparation for freedom of movement nationwide. 
In addition, education encourages assimilation between Thai and non-Thai migrants. 
Public schools follow the Thai curriculum and Thai is the main language which is difficult 
for children from a Myanmar family, resulting in a high rate of school dropouts. However, 
stateless participants who have attended Thai schools since they were very young can 
communicate perfectly in Thai. This is the first step in preparing children of non-Thai 
background to assimilate to Thai society, but the government must allow more than 
19,800 stateless students in Thai public schools to be eligible for Thai citizenship. 
Spending their whole life in Thai society contributes to self-identification. As shown in 
Chapter 6, stateless participants feel reluctant to go to Myanmar to obtain a Myanmar ID 
and passport, even though they may be able to do so. Stateless youth participants whose 
family has settled have been socialised with Thai citizens through schools and short-term 
employment on an everyday basis. They self-identify as more Thai than otherwise, 
although there are ethnic differences. Therefore, they prefer to stay in Thailand and apply 
for Thai citizenship, as shown by the case of Pu Too’s application for Thai citizenship in 
chapter 6 (in-depth interview, Chiang Mai province, 15 November 2014). 
The limitation on movement correlates with the limitation on access to higher education 
and employment. Stateless youth’s registration with the government allows them to 
obtain some form of working qualification or at least a school certificate, but the 
government’s limitation of movement permitted them to work only in their registered 
areas. Stateless youth have great concerns after graduating from high school. The lack of 
an ID card and school certificate results in their inability to study further and apply for 
work. Advanced education at university level and vocational training are open to all 
students, but stateless youth are ineligible for student loans. Moreover, finding 
employment outside the district is possible, but it is restricted by the travel approval which 
needs annual renewal (Post Today 2016). 
                                                             
73 The previous law allowed the stateless people to travel freely only around their registered 
district. Travel approval was needed if they planned to travel outside their registered district, 
and province. 
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Although they are acquainted with the refugees, stateless youth prefer being granted Thai 
citizenship. Through education and socialisation within Thai society, these stateless youth 
were born, grew up, spent their whole lives living in Thailand and interact with Thai 
people by using Thai language perfectly. These life experiences also encourage them to 
realise that Thailand is truly their home country. This thesis suggests that the government 
allow educated stateless youth to work according to their education certificate with no 
restriction on movement or employment. In June 2016, The Legal Status Network 
Foundation, as one of the NGOs working with stateless people, proposed to the Ministry 
of Labour suspending the limitation on alien work to ensure that approximately 79,000 
stateless youth, who are already in the education system in six border provinces, have the 
ability to work after graduation (Post Today 2016). The reason is because the regulation 
is out of date, and they are afraid that this regulation impedes opportunities for diligent 
stateless adolescents to work. It ‘may further prevent the future generation of stateless 
population from entering into the educational system, which may lead them into earning 
their livelihood illegally’ (Post Today 2016, p. 1). 
The thesis suggests that this will provide the opportunity for stateless youth to lead 
meaningful lives. It will encourage them to study hard and lead productive lives. Also the 
nation will benefit from additions to the labour market. As a first step, the notification in 
2017 allows stateless youth who were born in Thailand to members of minority groups 
and who have graduated from university, to apply for Thai citizenship (Rakkanam 2017). 
Moreover, the Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour, has promised to help the 
ethnic minority population to have the right to work according to their qualifications 
including as teachers, engineers, nurses and lawyers (Office of Foreign Workers 
Administration 2014). Hopefully, this policy will expand to include other stateless groups 
as well. 
This thesis recommends that the Thai government reconsider the citizenship law to take 
human security into account. As shown in Chapter 6, the legal exclusion of the stateless 
population also obstructs stateless youth making good livelihoods. Initially, the law on 
child protection must be amended to ensure the right to be protected for all children in 
Thailand regardless of their legal status and nationality. According to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1989), the government must take all responsibility to ensure that 
children’s rights and human rights ‘are respected, protected, and fulfilled’ (World Health 
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Organization 2014, p. 22). Furthermore, all people in Thailand regardless of their origin 
and nationality must be protected under the country’s constitution. This thesis also 
encourages the government to synthesise domestic laws and practices concerning 
employment, occupational and health safety, and environmental and legal protection of 
foreign migrant workers living in Thailand, to be the same as those of Thai citizens 
(Muntarbhorn and Mantaphon 2005; Jaisat et al. 2014). 
Since 2005, the stateless youth have had the opportunity to participate in basic education, 
but limitations on their movement and the lack of protection inhibit them from fulfilling 
their potential. The thesis recommends that the Thai government permit stateless youth 
to be able to use their qualifications in gaining employment. Thai respondents in Chapter 
7 also believed that the nation can benefit from the stateless youth in the future. Granting 
Thai citizenship to stateless youth can ensure some level of human security.  
8.3.4. Thai Respondents’ Perspective  
The final question of the research aims to reveal the opinions of Thai citizens about 
whether they support or do not support these stateless youth in gaining Thai citizenship. 
In Thailand, Thai citizens aged 18 years and over are able to participate in political 
campaigns and movements, including voting in local and national elections. Therefore, 
public opinion is an important factor in changing government policy.  
As Chapter 6 shows, education in public schools encourages assimilation between Thai 
and non-Thai migrants. The government should allow refugees and non-Thai youth to 
attend public schools outside the camps. Likewise, the study in Chapter 7 also indicates 
that Thai respondents who have engaged with non-Thai migrants are more likely to have 
knowledge about temporary shelter areas and refugees and are more welcoming to the 
refugees than those who have never engaged with non-Thai migrants. Furthermore, this 
group of Thai respondents is more likely to support the stateless youth than the others. 
The understanding between Thai and non-Thai migrants through the educational system 
and employment on an everyday basis helps Thai citizens to become more aware of the 
existence of temporary shelter areas, refugees and non-Thai migrants. Thai citizens may 
become more open-minded as they have more opportunities to socialise with non-Thai 
migrants within Thai society. This may bring positive impacts in the reduction of 
discrimination and marginalisation in Thai society toward non-Thai migrants.   
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Allowing stateless youth to access Thai citizenship may create a more inclusive and 
tolerant Thai society. Historically and culturally, Thai society has been rather exclusive 
as a result of the nationalistic idea during nation-state building in King Vajiravudh’s reign 
(1910–1925) which strongly reflects government immigration policies and regulations 
(Traitongyoo 2008; Sattayanurak 2008). Nevertheless the result in Chapter 7 does not 
show a strong discourse of Thainess among the majority of Thai respondents. About 64 
per cent of Thai respondents supports the stateless youth being granted Thai citizenship 
regardless of the origin of their identity, although some 29 per cent does not support them, 
because they are born to non-Thai migrants. The government could consider granting 
Thai citizenship to stateless youth by taking all Thai respondents’ perspectives into 
account. Importantly, granting Thai citizenship can occur depending on whether stateless 
youth choose to stay in Thailand or move to Myanmar. The stateless youth could be 
granted Thai citizenship at different times. In the beginning, the government should 
consider granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth who were born and have lived in 
Thailand longer than 10 years, as a process of normal naturalisation. This would avoid an 
influx of migrants from neighbouring countries who aim to use this means to give birth 
to their child in Thailand. Later, the government could consider granting Thai citizenship 
to stateless children born in Thailand to stateless parents, by resuming the implementation 
of granting Thai citizenship to next and following generations based on both the jus 
sanguinis principle and the jus soli principle. 
8.4. Contribution to Contemporary Discussion 
This study has made four main contributions. Firstly, the study has reviewed the existing 
literature on the topic and discusses what remains to be explored. The thesis has found 
that most studies on stateless children require international and regional law, international 
and regional relief agencies and NGOs to play central roles to help solve the statelessness 
problem. A few studies mention that the Thai government domestic law needs to comply 
with international law to help ensure that all migrants, refugees and their children have 
the opportunity for safe return to Myanmar voluntarily. However, some research focuses 
on the perspective of stateless children and young adults in Thailand. Likewise, 
Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa (2012; 2014) research Thai public opinion toward Myanmar 
refugees and migrant workers, but not the stateless situation. They emphasise local 
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integration and encourage the Thai government to promote a multiculturalism policy to 
create a ‘more inclusive society’ (Sunpuwan and Niyomsilpa 2014, p. 41). No research 
mentions the amendment of the nationality law that has direct impact on stateless people, 
or requests the Thai government to take serious action on birth registration, categorisation 
and granting citizenship to resolve the problem of the stateless population in the country.  
Secondly, the study investigates the situation of stateless youth along the Thailand-
Myanmar border. The classic work by T.H. Marshall explains citizenship as a principle 
of equality which is linked to the capacity to enjoy a set of rights, such as civil, political 
and social rights (Marshall 1950). However, the idea of citizenship is practised within the 
nation-state. Citizenship is also a relationship between the state and individuals. 
Therefore, it is impossible to study citizenship in Asia without the state (Turner 2001, p. 
203; McCargo 2011, p. 836). McCargo (2011) argues that citizenship in Thailand 
operates on multiple levels as a tension between ambiguity and complexity. Therefore, 
Thai citizenship is seen as a result of the negotiation between the state and the individual. 
This research shows the negotiation between stateless youth and the Thai government, 
although the Thai government does not recognise stateless people. The negotiation is 
possible, as this study shows that stateless youth can successfully access some basic 
public services provided by the government, especially education. The most important 
negotiation is the application for Thai citizenship, because they know that it does not 
matter how much they have negotiated with the state or assimilated to Thai society, 
stateless people without a Thai Nationality ID Card have great difficulty in becoming full 
Thai citizens. 
Thirdly, the research is designed to study both stateless youth and the opinions of Thai 
citizens. The study does not consider granting citizenship to the stateless youth as merely 
giving them an entrance ticket to the political/social community, but it also aims to hear 
from the community whether it welcomes the stateless youth. Qualitative data in Chapter 
6 show that stateless youth in Thailand have already entered Thai society for a long time 
mainly through schooling and socialisation with Thai people. Moreover, quantitative data 
analysis in Chapter 7 shows that the majority of Thai respondents supports the stateless 
youth being granted Thai citizenship. Only the legal status that guarantees their basic 
rights and political rights is lacking. The quantitative approach used in the questionnaire 
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survey reveals that the majority of Thai respondents supports these stateless youth being 
granted Thai citizenship for various reasons. The results from this questionnaire survey 
help sharpen the study’s conclusion and policy recommendations concerning the situation 
of stateless youth in the country. 
Finally, this research investigates the recent situation of stateless youth, who have 
experienced difficulties in being stateless, particularly under the military government 
after the coup in May 2014. However, this research does not focus on the comparative 
situation pre- and post-coup May 2014, although the situation has changed significantly 
since the military takeover. The military government has instituted the repatriation 
programme since 2014, but voluntary repatriation began only in 2016 when the first group 
of Myanmar refugees was issued with certificates as identification as Myanmar citizens 
and voluntarily returned to Myanmar. This approach was endorsed by both the Thai and 
Myanmar governments which encouraged the Thai government to close the camps sooner 
(Lefevre 2016).  
Repatriation is not a choice of stateless youth in Thailand, but being granted citizenship 
is the basic  human right for everyone, according to Article 7 in the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1989, p.3) that ‘the child … shall have the right to acquire a 
nationality’. The study observes that the number of stateless people being granted Thai 
citizenship has been increasing in 2016 under the military government. Moreover, 
Notification of the Ministry of Interior on granting Thai citizenship to persons born in the 
Kingdom of Thailand to alien father and mother in general and specific cases in 2017 
will increase the number of stateless people living in Thailand who are eligible for Thai 
citizenship. The research provides the Thai government with policy recommendations 
relating to the opinions of Thai respondents on the current situation of stateless youth 
along the border from four perspectives. Encouraging the Thai government to grant Thai 
citizenship to stateless youth, the legal perspective focuses on the government’s resuming 
granting Thai citizenship to the next generation of ethnic minorities based on both the jus 
sanguinis principle and the jus soli principle. The national security perspective suggests 
that the government reconsider citizenship in a broader context, seeing stateless youth as 
a social issue rather than as threats to national security, and acknowledging the 
contribution of non-Thai migrants. The human security perspective suggests that the Thai 
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state plays an important role in ensuring the security of individuals over the security of 
the state, and allows public services to be accessible by all.  
Finally, as discussed above, this notification in 2017 conflicts with the naturalisation 
process. Results in Chapter 7 show that the Thai respondents agree that Thai citizenship 
should be granted to stateless youth who were born and have lived in Thailand for more 
than 10 years. This is a suitable period for stateless youth to become familiar with Thai 
society. This approach provides a suitable means of balancing national security, human 
security and Thai perspectives. Full rights of citizenship will enable these stateless youth 
to be less vulnerable.  
8.5. Limitations of the Study  
The study employs mixed methods. This approach enables the researcher to access and 
obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the ‘problem’ of statelessness. 
Importantly, this study prioritizes the qualitative method involving ethnographic 
participant observation, in-depth interview and focus group discussions, whilst the 
quantitative method of paper questionnaire survey was used to support and complement 
the qualitative examination.  
Unexpectedly, the qualitative data collection was limited by two main fieldwork 
difficulties. The research undertook fieldwork for six months in Thailand from August 
2014 to January 2015. During the six-month fieldwork, the researcher experienced 
difficulty in obtaining access to the fieldwork sites. The temporary shelter areas, or so-
called ‘refugee camps’ along the Thailand–Myanmar border became physically restricted, 
because the military government strengthened its national security policies in the border 
areas after Thailand’s coup in May 2014. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) no longer grants 
refugee camp access to anyone, including academics who used to frequently work in the 
camp, since the political situation is under the control of the military regime.  
In order to overcome this limitation, the data collection was conducted outside the camp, 
since permission to access the camp could not be obtained. Also, targeted participants are 
various, ranging from refugee youth living in the camp to youth living along the 
borderline, who were born and live in the camp, but find their way out of the camps often 
on a daily base. 
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Some key informants, however, were not available for in-depth interviews during the six-
month fieldwork period. Some interviews were declined because the key informants were 
too busy working in remote areas outside the researcher’s expected area of fieldwork. The 
researcher attempted to arrange a time for the participants’ availability. However, some 
key informants’ workplaces were difficult to access. In order to overcome this limitation, 
telephone and email became essential for communication. However, the researcher 
prefers face-to-face semi structured interviews to telephone or email communication, 
because body language and facial expression are important to observe.  
Furthermore, the quantitative data collection was limited for the paper survey. The paper 
questionnaires were distributed to 500 Thai participants who were selected by snowball 
sampling technique in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) and around the border 
areas. In total, 315 Thai citizens completed the paper questionnaire survey. Although a 
63 per cent overall response rate was obtained, the response rate from Thai citizens living 
around the border areas was comparatively low. Due to the sensitivity of the situation 
along the borderline, people along the Western border were suspicious of the 
consequences, if they participated in the survey. Some were, therefore, reluctant to 
complete the paper questionnaire survey. 
8.6. Suggestions for Further Research 
The thesis suggests that potential future research should focus on other aspects of stateless 
people’s lives such as careers and finances, marriage and family and social security for a 
comprehensive study of their livelihoods. Likewise, further research should gather 
quantitative data from a large representative sample in order to represent better the public 
opinion of Thai citizens and compare results from different socio-economic backgrounds. 
Finally, the study recommends that future research focus on the comparison of the 
relationship between Thai citizens and non-Thai migrants in different areas, such as along 
the border provinces and the capital city areas of Bangkok, in order to understand more 
thoroughly the stateless situation nationwide. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet 
(to be translated in Thai and read out to participants) 
THAI CITIZENSHIP AND STATELESS YOUTH 
ALONG THE THAILAND–MYANMAR BORDER 
What is the project about? 
This research project attempts to identify the problems of lack of citizenship and its 
impact on stateless youth in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border 
in relation to the concepts of Thai national security, human rights and human security. 
This research focuses on youth aged more than 18 years old who were actually born and 
have lived in Chiang Mai province, and in Tak province. The research aims to raise policy 
implications of balancing national security, human rights and human security to benefit 
the stateless youth in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border. This 
requires reconsideration of the moral and theoretical justification for granting citizenship 
to stateless youth in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border, so that 
the stateless youth can enjoy full rights of citizenship which will enable them to access 
public services provided by the state such as the health care system and education. 
Who is conducting this research? 
My name is Ladawan Khaikham, PhD Candidate, Asian Studies, Department of 
Anthropology, School of Culture, History and Language, College of Asia Pacific, The 
Australian National University (ANU). 
Who will be involved? 
The fieldwork will be divided into two phases of data collection. In the first phase, 
qualitative method of three focus group discussions consisting of eight to ten stateless 
youth will be conducted. In total, there will be 19 youth participants in the FGDs. Later, 
in-depth interviews will be conducted among 15-20 various key informants in temporary 
shelter areas in each of the three research sites. These key informants participating in each 
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in-depth interview including camp/community leaders, government Officials, 
representatives of INGOs/NGOs, school teachers, and selected parents of stateless Youth 
What are my rights? 
Participation is entirely voluntary. Participants may withdraw or cease participation in the 
study at any time, without consequence. 
Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews will be conducted in safe places of each 
camp administrative office. The researcher will ensure everything that will happen in 
focus group discussions and in-depth interviews will be kept confidential. If child 
participants are unable to make their own consent, the researcher will seek consent from 
youth’s parents or guardians. 
How to maintain my confidentiality, anonymity, privacy? 
Confidentiality, anonymity, privacy will be maintained throughout the research process 
in order to avoid potential harm to the participants because of the disclosure of 
information or their expression during the research process. The personal information will 
be kept confidential and used solely for the research purpose. During the collection phase 
and in the publication of results, the participants in focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews will be identified with specific confidential numbers instead of their real names 
for security purposes. The personal information of participants will be stored and secured 
by digital numbers. This can be re-identified by the researcher for academic proposes 
only. In the publication of results, where appropriate, pseudonyms for individual names 
will be used, unless participants specifically request that their own names be used. 
If you have been distressed by the procedures, you may contact: 
UNHCR Field Office at Mae Sot 
34/5 Mae Sot - Mae Tao Road,  
Mae Sot Drictrict, Tak, Thailand 
Telephone: +665 553 4636 
Email: thabm@unhcr.org 
The Thailand Burma Border Consortium. 
12/5 Convent Road, Bangrak,  
Bangkok 10500, Thailand 
Tel: +66 (0) 2238 5027 
Fax: +66 (0) 2266 5376 
Email: tbc@theborderconsortium.org 
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What are incentives? 
Youth participants in this research project will receive a meal after participation for their 
contribution in the focus group discussions.  
Each adult respondent will be given a small gift as a token of the appreciation for his/her 
contribution to the research. These incentives will be provided directly to respondents 
after each session.  
Who will have access to the information? 
The research data will be kept securely and only used for the research purpose. The 
fieldwork notes from the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews will only be 
digitalised and kept in the researchers password protected laptop with no authority 
granted for external access. Hard copies of fieldwork notes will be destroyed immediately 
after being digitalised. The digital data will be kept securely in the researcher’s online 
storage with secure password protection and exclusively used only by the researcher for 
academic purposes and the researcher’s thesis report. They also will be safely stored and 
password-protected in the researcher’s laptop. Some fieldwork notes and completed 
questionnaire sheets will be stored in the locked cabinet of the researcher’s office only 
for reference when needed. These data collection will be backed up into computer files 
and stored for five years, which can be solely accessed by the researcher.   
How will the information be published? 
The research is part of the researchers work for her PhD thesis at the ANU. The summary 
of research results will be provided upon the request of individuals, academic and 
research institutions and government agencies of interest.  
At the completion and publication of this research, all stateless youth who have 
participated in focus group discussions, their parents and their guardians will be invited 
to a debrief section in a public presentation involving the researcher and participants. 
During this debrief section, participants are more than welcome to offer any comments. 
In addition, it is the researcher’s intention that the research results will be presented at 
relevant conferences and will be published in academic journals. 
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What are the risks of this research? 
The risk of this research is a vulnerability of the youth. All youth are vulnerable and this 
vulnerability is heightened in some youth, especially stateless youth who are already 
singled out in many ways because they are different than other youth in Thai society. The 
researcher has acknowledged is fact very well. Therefore, word usage in a set of focus 
group questionnaire for the youth have been selected and developed carefully. The 
research also encourage the youth to express their thought through drawing and simple 
story-telling, if they prefer, instead of giving a direct answer the in order to minimized 
the risk that may do a possibly harm to youth’s mind.  
What are the benefits of this research? 
The outcomes of this research will primarily benefit the stateless youth who were born 
and live in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border. On the one hand, 
stateless youth along the border will be able to express their thoughts because the research 
is able to describe difficulties that directly affect stateless youth and their way of lives 
through the individual experiences. Moreover, the public opinion of local people will be 
heard because the local Thai people are able to express their thoughts and concerns 
relating to stateless youth throughout the research. Therefore the benefit will flow directly 
to stateless youth and local Thai people who are living around temporary shelter areas 
along the Thailand-Myanmar border. 
Where do I get further information? 
If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact any of the following 
Ladawan Khaikham, PhD Candidate 
PhD Candidate, Asian Studies, Department of Anthropology, School of Culture, 
History and Language, College of Asia Pacific,  
The Australian National University (ANU). 
Room 5219, HC Coombs Building, Fellows Road, ACT 0200, AUSTRALIA 
Tel: +61 2 6125 2306 
Mob: +61 0406 244425(AUS), +668 795 1715 (TH) 
Email: Ladawan.Khaikham@anu.edu.au 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Supervisor contact: 
Professor (Honorary) Helen James 
Department of Anthropology, School of Culture, History and Language, College 
of Asia Pacific, The Australian National University (ANU). 
Room 5206, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, ACT, 2600 
Tel: 6125-2125 
Mob: 0419-414552 
Fax: 6125-4917 
Email: helen.james@anu.edu.au or waldenent@hotmail.com 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
If you have any concerns about how this research has been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 (0) 2 6125 3427 
 276 
 277 
Appendix 2: List of Indicative Questions for the Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) 
(used exclusively by the researcher) 
THAI CITIZENSHIP AND STATELESS YOUTH 
ALONG THE THAILAND–MYANMAR BORDER 
Group ____________ consists on ___________participants 
Conducted on _____/______/2014 
Ice Breaking 
1. Self-introduction, age, and school 
2. How many close friends do you have? 
3. What do you normally do with your friends? 
Birth, Home, Family and the Sense of Belonging  
1. Home:  
1.1 Do you know where were you born, and how important this place is to you? 
1.2 Where do you live now and how many people do you live with?  
1.3 Can you describe where you live now?  
2. Education:  
2.1 Do you go to school?  
2.2 Do you have many friends in school? 
2.3 What does your school look like? 
2.4 How do you feel about going to school every weekdays? 
3. Health care:  
3.1 What do you do when you or your family members are sick?  
3.2 Is the hospital far from your house?  
3.3 Who takes care of you if your parents are sick? 
3.4 If your family member sick, what will you do? 
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Decision to Stay or Leave 
1. How much do you know Myanmar, how do you know about this country?  
2. What do you think about Myanmar? What about Thailand? 
3. Do you know anyone in Myanmar? 
4. How do you feel if one day you have to go to Myanmar? 
Ending Session 
1. Which country do you prefer to live (between Thailand, Myanmar, or other 
countries)? Why? 
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Appendix 3: List of Indicative Questions for the In-depth 
Interview 
(used exclusively by the researcher) 
THAI CITIZENSHIP AND STATELESS YOUTH 
ALONG THE THAILAND–MYANMAR BORDER 
Group ____________ consists on ___________participants 
Conducted on _____/______/2014 
Introduction  
1. Self-introduction including age 
2. Current career and position 
2.1 Community/camp leaders  
2.2 Parents of stateless youth 
2.3 School teachers 
2.4 Representatives of INGOs/NGOs 
2.5 Government officials 
Direct and Indirect Contact with Stateless Youth  
1. How long have you known stateless youth in your areas? 
2. Do you have regular contact with the youth? How often?  
3. What do you think about the livelihood of the stateless youth in your areas in 
terms of  
3.1 Housing 
3.2  Education 
3.3 Health care services? 
National Security Policies, Human Rights, and Human Security 
1. What is your opinion about Thailand national security policy toward the 
stateless youth? 
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2. According to your everyday life contacting with the stateless youth, do you find 
any difficulty for them to live under current national security policy of the Thai 
state in terms of housing, education, and health care services?  
3. Do you think the Thai government uses an appropriate way to deal with the 
stateless youth on the border? How? 
4.  In your opinion, what should the Thai and Myanmar governments do for the 
stateless youth on the border?  
5. In terms of human rights and human security, what should the Thai and 
Myanmar governments provide to meet the stateless youth’s needs?  
Ending Session 
1. In your opinion, do you think the stateless youth prefer to stay in Thailand or go 
back to Myanmar with their parents? 
2. If the stateless youth the Thailand – Myanmar border prefer to remain in 
Thailand, will you support them to gain Thai citizenship? Why, or why not? 
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Appendix 4: Sample of the Paper Questionnaire Survey 
No. (Runs From 1 to 315) 
Sample of the Paper Questionnaire Survey 
(to be translated in Thai) 
THAI CITIZENSHIP AND STATELESS YOUTH 
ALONG THE THAILAND–MYANMAR BORDER 
General Outline of the Project: 
This research project attempts to identify the problems of citizenship and statelessness 
for stateless youth in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand and Myanmar border. 
Many of them remain stateless because they have not been granted any legal status in 
either Thailand or Myanmar. Moreover, this research will investigate the concepts of 
national security, human rights and human security for stateless youth. Importantly, the 
research will explore the various reasons for the Thai state’s national security policy. 
Finally, the research will make suggestions on a suitable way of balancing national 
security, human rights and human security to encourage the Thai state to amend its 
national security policy to grant citizenship to the stateless youth, so that the stateless 
youth can enjoy full rights of citizenship which will make them less vulnerable.  
This paper questionnaire is in the second phase of data collection. 500 Thai citizens who 
will be selected by snowball sampling technique in BMR (250 people) and around the 
border areas (250 people) will be asked to complete a set of paper questionnaire 
concerning stateless youth.  
Who is conducting this research? 
My name is Ladawan Khaikham, PhD Candidate, Asian Studies, Department of 
Anthropology, School of Culture, History and Language, College of Asia Pacific, The 
Australian National University (ANU). 
What are my rights? 
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Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw from the study at any 
time, without consequence. In order to minimise foreseeable risks to participants, the 
paper questionnaire will be completed in places where participants can feel a sense of 
safety and belonging.  
If you have been distressed by the procedures, you may contact: 
UNHCR Field Office at Mae Sot 
34/5 Mae Sot - Mae Tao Road,  
Mae Sot Drictrict, Tak, Thailand 
Telephone: +665 553 4636 
Email: thabm@unhcr.org 
The Thailand Burma Border Consortium. 
12/5 Convent Road, Bangrak,  
Bangkok 10500, Thailand 
Tel: +66 (0) 2238 5027 
Fax: +66 (0) 2266 5376 
Email: tbc@theborderconsortium.org 
What is incentive? 
Each respondent will be given a small gift as a token of appreciation for his/her 
contribution to the research. These incentives will be provided directly to respondents 
after finish the questionnaire.  
Who will have access to the information? 
The research data will be kept securely and only used for the research purpose. The 
fieldwork notes from the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews will only be 
digitalised and kept in the researchers password protected laptop with no authority 
granted for external access. Hard copies of fieldwork notes will be destroyed immediately 
after being digitalised. The digital data will be kept securely in the researcher’s online 
storage with secure password protection and exclusively used only by the researcher for 
academic purposes and the researcher’s thesis report. They also will be safely stored and 
password-protected in the researcher’s laptop. Some fieldwork notes and completed 
questionnaire sheets will be stored in the locked cabinet of the researcher’s office only 
for reference when needed. These data collection will be backed up into computer files 
and stored for five years, which can be solely accessed by the researcher. 
How will the information be published? 
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The research is part of the researchers work for her PhD thesis at the ANU. Participants 
will be notified on publication. The summary of research results will be provided upon 
the request of individuals, academic and research institutions and government agencies 
of interest. It is the researcher’s intention that the research results will be presented at 
relevant conferences or will be published in academic journals.  
What are the benefits of this research? 
The outcomes of this research will primarily benefit the stateless youth who were born 
and live in temporary shelter areas along the Thailand and Myanmar border. On the one 
hand, stateless youth along the border will be able to express their thoughts, and the public 
opinion of local people will be heard because the research is able to describe difficulties 
that affect stateless youth and their way of life through the individual experiences. 
Moreover, the research will contribute to the knowledge of the real situation of stateless 
youth along the Thailand-Myanmar border at present and in the future, the discussion of 
statelessness, citizenship, and national security policy of the Thai state. Through the 
expression from the participant’s direct experiences, Thai society will gain a better 
understanding of the difficulties that these vulnerable people who have been living in 
these politically sensitive areas have to encounter. Importantly, the research will broaden 
the perspective of decision-making and national policy regarding national security, as 
well as increase public awareness of stateless youth in national political institutions and 
many public organisations who deal with the stateless youth. Finally, the research will 
produce a normative explanation of how the Thai-state might amend its national security 
policy based on the case study in this research 
Where do I get further information? 
If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact any of the following 
Ladawan Khaikham, PhD Candidate 
PhD Candidate, Asian Studies, Department of Anthropology, School of Culture, 
History and Language, College of Asia Pacific,  
The Australian National University (ANU). 
Room 5219, HC Coombs Building, Fellows Road, ACT 0200, AUSTRALIA 
Tel: +61 2 6125 2306 
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Mob: +61 0406 244425(AUS), +668 795 1715 (TH) 
Email: Ladawan.Khaikham@anu.edu.au 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Supervisor contact: 
Professor (Honorary) Helen James 
Department of Anthropology, School of Culture, History and Language, College 
of Asia Pacific, The Australian National University (ANU). 
Room 5206, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, ACT, 2600 
Tel: 6125-2125 
Mob: 0419-414552 
Fax: 6125-4917 
Email: helen.james@anu.edu.au or waldenent@hotmail.com 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
If you have any concerns about how this research has been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 (0) 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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The Paper Questionnaire Survey 
(to be translated in Thai) 
THAI CITIZENSHIP AND STATELESS YOUTH 
ALONG THE THAILAND–MYANMAR BORDER 
Part I: A few brief questions about you 
 
Remember, all responses are kept confidential and the 
results will be used for research only. 
 
Please indicate X which of the following applies to you. 
1) What is your gender? 
[   ] Male [   ] Female  
2) How old are you? 
[   ] 21–30 years old   [   ] 31–40 years old  [   ] 41–50 years old  
[   ] 51–60 years old  [   ] 61–70 years old 
3) Do you hold Thai citizenship? 
[   ] Yes [   ] No  
4) Do you have youth?  
[   ] Yes [   ] No  
5) If yes, do your youth have citizenship of any country? 
[   ] Yes [   ] No  
6) Where do you currently live? 
_______________________________________ 
 
7) How long have you lived in the areas?  
[   ] 1–3 years 
[   ] 3–6 years 
[   ] 6–9 years 
[   ] 9–12 years 
[   ] 12–15 years 
[   ] More than 15 years 
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8) What is your career?  
[   ] Farmers and fishermen 
[   ] Business owners 
[   ] Government officials 
[   ] Teachers and lecturers 
[   ] Student 
[   ] Private Officers 
[   ] Salesmen 
[   ] Retirement 
[   ] Unemployed 
[   ] Other 
9) Which of these categories best describe the annual income of your household 
[   ] THB0–100,000 
[   ] THB100,001–200,000 
[   ] THB200,001–300,000 
[   ] THB300,001–400,000 
[   ] THB400,001–500,000 
[   ] more than THB500,001 
  
 
Part II: The awareness of the existence of temporary shelter areas, and 
everyday life involving Myanmar/Karen/Shan workers, refugees and 
stateless youth 
Please circle O around the degree of your agreement relating to the following 
statement: 
1 = disagree, 2 = partly disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = partly agree, 5 = most agree 
Statements Degree of agreement 
1) I know of the existence of the temporary shelter areas 
along the border. 
1    2    3    4    5 
2) I know people living in the temporary shelter areas are 
refugees. 
1    2    3    4    5 
3) I know the refugees are from Karen/Shan States inside 
Myanmar. 
1    2    3    4    5 
4) I know the temporary shelter areas are closed areas. 1    2    3    4    5 
5) I know refugees in the temporary shelter are not 
allowed to go out. 
1    2    3    4    5 
6) I have contacted refugees inside  the temporary 
shelters. 
1    2    3    4    5 
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Statements Degree of agreement 
7) I know some refugees can go out of the temporary 
shelters. 
1    2    3    4    5 
8) I have met and known refugees from the temporary 
shelters. 
1    2    3    4    5 
9) I have worked with refugees who live in the 
temporary shelters. 
1    2    3    4    5 
  
 
Part III: The justification of the temporary shelter areas and national 
security concerning border issues  
Please indicate [X] which of the following applied to you. 
1) What do you think about the temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar 
Border? 
[   ] I do not mind having the shelter areas 
[   ] I do not like the shelter areas  
[   ] I like to have the shelter areas 
[   ] We should have the shelter areas    
[   ] I don’t know 
 
2) What do you think about refugees along the Thailand-Myanmar Border? 
[   ] I welcome refugees staying in Thailand  
[   ] I do not mind having them stay temporarily in Thailand   
[   ] They are not welcome to stay in Thailand  
[   ] I have no opinion 
 
3) How much do you think temporary shelter areas bring benefit to Thailand? 
[   ] bring many benefits to Thailand  
[   ] bring some benefits to Thailand  
[   ] do not bring benefit to Thailand (go to question 5) 
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4) How Thailand benefit from temporary shelters and refugees along the border?  
[   ] Thailand have more cheap labourers 
[   ] Add labourers to help increase the national economy 
[   ] Replace Thai labour in 3D Jobs 
[   ] Thailand can sell more produce to these people 
[   ] Do not bring any benefit to Thailand  
 
5) how much do you think temporary shelter areas cause problems to Thailand 
[   ] They do not cause any problem to Thailand 
[   ] They cause few problems to Thailand 
[   ] They cause some problems to Thailand 
[   ] They cause many problems to Thailand 
 
6) Do you think having the temporary shelter areas along the Thailand-Myanmar 
Border cause which problem the most?   
[   ] They do not cause any problem 
[   ] They cause social problems such as robbery 
[   ] They are dangerous to national security 
[   ] They are dangerous to personal security  
[   ] They cause environmental destruction 
[   ] other problem 
 
7) In your opinion, the border problems should be solved by… 
[   ] Thailand’s Border Patrol Police 
[   ] The Thai military 
[   ] The Thai local police 
[   ] The Myanmar government 
[   ] The Thailand government  
[   ] Thai citizens 
[   ] People border areas 
[   ] Others 
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Part IX: Your opinion regarding stateless youth 
1) Please circle O around the degree of your agreement relating to the following 
statement:  
1 = disagree, 2 = partly disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = partly agree, 5 = most agree 
Statements Degree of agreement 
1) I know there are youth who born to non-Thai 
migrants in the temporary shelter areas. 
1    2    3    4    5 
2) I know the youth do not have Myanmar 
citizenship. 
1    2    3    4    5 
3) I know the youth do not have Thai citizenship. 1    2    3    4    5 
4) I know the youth are unable to attend Thailand’s 
public schools. 
1    2    3    4    5 
5) I know the youth are unable to use public health 
care services in Thailand. 
1    2    3    4    5 
6) I know the youth do not have social insurance so 
they have to pay for health maintenance. 
1    2    3    4    5 
7) I know the youth are unable to return to Myanmar 
without any citizenship. 
1    2    3    4    5 
8) I know the youth are unable to move around 
Thailand freely. 
1    2    3    4    5 
9) I know the youth cannot go out of Thailand legally. 1    2    3    4    5 
10) I think the youth bring benefits to Thailand.  1    2    3    4    5 
11) I think the youth cause problems in Thailand. 1    2    3    4    5 
12) I think granting Thai citizenship to stateless youth 
help them have better lives. 
1    2    3    4    5 
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Please indicate [X] which of the following applied to you.  
2) What are the problems stateless youth bring to Thai society? (check all that 
apply) 
[   ] Child Sexual Harassment 
[   ] Exploitation of child labour 
[   ] Terrorism 
[   ] Illegal migration 
[   ] Illegal Drugs 
[   ] Human trafficking 
 
3) Who do you think are responsible for stateless youth? (check all that apply) 
[   ] Thailand’s Ministry of Interior 
[   ] Thailand’s Ministry of Social Development and Human Society 
[   ] Thailand’s Ministry of Education 
[   ] Thailand’s Ministry of International Affairs 
[   ] Every Thai citizen 
[   ] The private sector 
[   ] INGOs such as UNHCR 
 
4) Do you think youth born to refugees should gain Thai citizenship or not? (Check 
only one) 
[   ] Yes, because they were born in Thailand. 
[   ] Yes, if they decide to stay in Thailand 
[   ] No, because they were born to non-Thai citizens 
[   ] No, if they have to return to Myanmar 
 
5) Do you support stateless youth to gain Thai citizenship? 
[   ] Yes, I support.  
[   ] No, I do not support (go to Part V) 
 
6) when do you think stateless youth should be granted Thai citizenship 
[   ] Since they were born 
[   ] When they have stayed in Thailand more than 5 years 
[   ] When they have stayed in Thailand more than 7 years 
[   ] When they have stayed in Thailand more than 10 years 
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Part V: Short answer questions regarding stateless youth 
Please write a short answer related to the topics asked 
1) Why do you or not support the Thai state to give youth born in Thailand the legal 
status of Thai citizenship? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
------------------ End of the questionnaire -------------- 
Thank you for your participation 
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Appendix 5: Ten Provinces Which Have Most Stateless People 
 
Provinces people74 
1. Chiang Rai province  53,000 
2. Chiang Mai province 35,000 
3. Tak province 31,000 
4. Kanchanaburi province 25,000 
5. Mae Hong Son province 10,000 
6. Ranong province 10,000 
7. Ratchaburi province 8,000 
8. Prachuap Khiri Khan province 5,200 
9. Trat province 5,000 
10. Chumphon province 1,600 
Total 183,800 
Source: Achavanitkul (2011) and Thairath Online (2015) 
 
                                                             
74 This number is approximate and not included unregistered stateless people 
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Appendix 6: A Sample of a Birth Certificate for a Child of 
Thai Citizens 
สูติบตัร (ท.ร. 1 ท.ร. 2 และ ท.ร. 3) 
 
Source: Office of Civil Registration (2009) 
 295 
Translation of a Birth Certificate for a Child of Thai Citizens 
 
CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH 
Registration Office:             Form Thor.Ror.19 
Identification Number:  
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
The 
New Born 
 
1.1 Name-Surname:          1.2 Sex :  1.3 Nationality: 
 
1.4 Date of Birth: 
 ……../……../………. 
At : 
                
hrs. 
Corresponding to : 
[ ]  Waxing moon            
[ ]  Waning moon 
Month: Year: 
1.5 Place of birth: 
  
1.6 Child Order: 
 
1.7 Midwife 
 
1.8 Weight …….Gram 
1.9 Add a Name in Household 
Registration No: 
1.10 Identification Number of the Host: 
 
 
 
2. 
Mother 
2.1 Name-surname : 
       
2.2 Identification 
Number: 
2.3 Age : 
                
      Years 
2.4 Nationality: 2.5 Place of Birth                                  Country 
2.6 Residence 
 
 
 
3. 
Father 
3.1 Name-surname : 
       
3.2 Identification 
Number: 
3.3 Age : 
                
                  Years 
3.4 Nationality: 
 
3.5 Place of Birth:                                  Country: 
3.6 Residence: 
 
 
4.  
Person 
Notifying 
Birth 
4.1 Name- Surname: 4.2 Identification 
Number: 
4.3 Age: 
                
               Years                   
4.4 Residence: 
 
4.5 Relationship:  4.5 Birth Certificate: 4.6 Birth Notification: 
 
 
………………………… 
Person Notifying Birth 
 
………………………… 
Signature of Officials 
………………………… 
Signature of Registrar 
Date ....../………/…….. 
Source: Translated by Ladawan Khaikham (2017) 
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Appendix 7: A Sample of a Birth Certificate for a Child of 
Aliens 
สูติบตัรบุตรคนต่างดา้วท่ีไดรั้บอนุญาตใหอ้ยู่ในราชอาณาจกัรเป็นกรณีพิเศษ (ท.ร. 03) 
 
Source: Office of Civil Registration (2009) 
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Translation of a Birth Certificate for a Child of Aliens  
Form Thor.Ror.03 
 
CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH OF A CHILD OF ALIENS WHO 
ARE ALLOWED TO STAY TEMPORARILY IN THE KINGDOM 
No:      Date: 
Registration Office:   
 
 
 
1. 
The 
New Born 
 
1.1 Name-surname: 
           
1.2 Identification Number: 
 
1.3 Date of Birth:   
 ……../……../………. 
At:               
              hrs. 
Corresponding to: 
[ ]  Waxing moon            
[ ]  Waning moon 
1.4 Sex: 
1.5 Place of Birth:  
  
1.6 Add Name to Civil Registration Number: 
 
 
 
2. 
Mother 
2.1 Name-Surname: 
       
2.2 Nationality: 
 
2.3 Identification 
Number: 
2.4 Age: 
                         
Years                   
2.5 Place of Birth: 
 
 
3. 
Father 
3.1 Name-Surname: 
       
3.2 Nationality: 
 
3.2 Identification 
Number: 
3.4 Age: 
               
Years                   
2.5 Place of Birth: 
 
 
 
4.  
Person 
Notifying 
Birth 
4.1 Name-Surname: 4.2 Identification 
Number: 
4.3 Age: 
               
Years                   
4.4 Residence: 
 
4.5 Relationship:  4.5 Birth Certificate: 4.6 Birth Notification: 
 
………………………… 
Person Notifying Birth 
 
………………………… 
Signature of Officials 
 
………………………… 
Signature of Registrar 
 
Date ....../………/…….. 
Finger Print of a 
Left Thumb 
Finger Print of a 
Right Thumb 
 
 
Source: Translated by Ladawan Khaikham (2017) 
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Appendix 8: A Sample of a Birth Certificate for a Child 
without Legal Status 
สูติบตัรบุคคลท่ีไม่มีสถานะทางทะเบียน (ท.ร. 031)
 
Source: Office of Civil Registration (2009) 
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Translation of a Birth Certificate for a Child without Legal Status 
Form Thor.Ror.031 
 
CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH OF A CHILD WITHOUT LEGAL STATUS 
No:      Date: 
Registration Office:              
 
 
 
1. 
The 
New Born 
 
1.1 Name-surname: 
           
1.2 Identification Number: 
 
1.3 Date of Birth:   
 ……../……../………. 
At:               
 
              hrs. 
Corresponding to: 
[ ]  Waxing moon            
[ ]  Waning moon 
1.4 Sex: 
1.5 Place of Birth:  
  
1.6 Add Name to Civil Registration Number: 
 
 
 
2. 
Mother 
2.1 Name- surname: 
       
2.2 Nationality : 
 
2.3 Identification 
Number: 
2.4 Age: 
               
Years                   
2.5 Place of Birth: 
 
 
3. 
Father 
3.1 Name-Surname: 
       
3.2 Nationality : 
 
3.2 Identification 
Number: 
3.4 Age: 
               
Years                   
2.5 Place of Birth: 
 
 
 
4.  
Person 
Notifying 
Birth 
4.1 Name-Surname: 4.2 Identification 
Number: 
4.3 Age: 
               
Years                   
4.4 Residence: 
 
4.5 Relationship:  4.5 Birth Certificate: 4.6 Birth Notification: 
 
………………………… 
Person Notifying Birth 
 
………………………… 
Signature of Officials 
 
………………………… 
Signature of Registrar 
 
Date ....../………/…….. 
Finger Print of a 
Left Thumb 
Finger Print of a 
Right Thumb 
Source: Translated by Ladawan Khaikham (2017) 
